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Abstract 
 
This thesis sets out to look at the influence of Australia’s National Competition Policy 
reform in reshaping human services. In trying to understand this influence, the 
research explores the main threads of National Competition Policy –  including 
concepts of contestable markets, Competitive Neutrality and Competitive Tendering 
and Contracting. It also notes the dominance of neoclassical economics and public 
choice theories underpinning the framing of this reform. 
 
More specifically, the work tracks down the way in which National Competition 
Policy  is impacting on human service delivery through using particular contractual 
arrangements with non-government providers in a bid to foster value for money 
through competition and market choice arrangements. This part of the research rests 
on two case studies, an employment assistance service (Labour Market Programs) 
known as Job Network and a crisis accommodation service (Supported 
Accommodation Assistance Program - SAAP). Through them the thesis explores and 
locates the parameters and the terms under which federal and state funding is accessed 
and the new organisational arrangements which regulate the terms of client treatment 
and the scope of professional practice. 
 
In theoretical terms, the thesis draws on mainly a governmentality literature to 
illuminate the emerging modes of neo-liberal governance, particular attention is given 
to patterns of self regulation and the conditions governing distant actors.   iii 
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   1 
Introduction 
 
 
The provision of human services remains an important feature of most Western liberal 
societies. Significant changes, however, continue to take place in terms of reworking 
notions of the welfare state amid growing globalising social and economic trends. In 
Australia, significant changes have taken place in the organisation of most human 
services. According to the Australian Public Service Commission, successive 
governments have sought to transform public sector practices with a view to sustaining a 
strong economy underpinned by balanced budgets through economic cycles. This 
requirement has seen the public sector operational principles shifting from those seeking 
to deliver fair, equitable services with an emphasis on due process to new arrangements 
based on competitive market ideas stressing market choice, greater government 
partnership with the Non-Government Organisations (NGOs), consumer participation and 
accompanying notions of mutual obligation. At the same time, the public service is also 
currently called upon to ‘deliver services “fairly, effectively, impartially and courteously 
to the Australian public” whilst being sensitive to the diversity of the public’ (APSC 
2003a: Chpt. 6: 1, 19 and Chpt 7: 1). These changes are playing a part in the pursuit of 
greater value for money spent in the production and provision of human services around 
the country.  
 
It is against this background that questions arise about what services or programs should 
be produced. Under what terms should they be accessed? What organisational parameters 
should be regulating these new arrangements? It is with these sorts of concerns in mind   2 
that this study sought to explore the influence of National Competition Policy (NCP) in 
reworking the way human services are provided. 
 
This study argues that the introduction of Australia’s National Competition Policy (NCP) 
has ushered in a significant departure in the organisation of services and the treatment of 
unemployed people receiving employment assistance (Labour Market Programs - LMPs) 
and it is contributing to particular understandings of how unemployment is to be 
governed. The reform has also, to a lesser extent, reshaped the governance of 
homelessness, whereby greater effort has been focussed on fostering certain behaviours 
amongst homeless people with the intention of consolidating their access to the private 
housing rental markets. Simultaneously,  efficiency concerns have sought to limit the 
availability of the public housing stock previously more readily accessible to some low 
income earners. 
 
These shifts are partly facilitated through a range of mechanisms and techniques 
deployed under the NCP reform. Exploring the main threads of NCP, directly and 
indirectly, and in looking through the programmatic shifts arising in connection with this 
policy reform, offers some insights into the varied organisational arrangements and the 
terms of client treatment under these emerging systems. 
 
Under this policy, competitive practices have become a key requirement in the re-
organisation  and procurement arrangements of Australia’s government-funded human 
services delivered through non-government organisations (NGOs) and those contracted   3 
out to profit making organisations (APSC 2003a). The Competitive Tendering and 
Contracting (CTC) system used in the procurement of Australia’s Labour Market 
Programs (LMPs), and also the Preferred Service Provider (PSP) system characterising 
the procurement of the Western Australia’s state funded family support services are 
closely linked to the competition practices operating nationwide. These systems are a part 
of what is known as contestable markets strongly espoused in the 1993 NCP Report 
(Hilmer 1993) and allow the possibility of new service operators contesting and taking 
over service delivery run by a particular incumbent provider. Closely connected with this 
notion is also the concept of Competitive Neutrality –  a mechanism through which 
government operations are progressively prevented from maintaining a competitive 
operational advantage over other potential business or service operators in the private and 
not-for-profit sectors. Hence the requirement removing legislative and fiscal advantages 
held by public entities (Australian Government 1999; DFA 2002b). Through such notions 
of contestability, it is also becoming increasingly possible to require service providers to 
deliver greater value for money by ensuring that governments assume a greater say over 
the way services are designed and delivered (service specifications) (Australian 
Government 2003; Financial  Management  Accountability  1997). That is under what 
terms are services to be delivered, and through what frameworks are they to be provided? 
 
It is in this context that this research study explores the introduction of competition 
practices and the way these shape the organisation and delivery of services at Peel 
Training and Employment agency, a Job Network Service contracted by the federal 
Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (DEWR) to deliver Labour Market   4 
Programs, namely, Job Matching, Job Search Training and Intensive Assistance 
programs. I also look at the way in which Western Australia’s Preferred Service Provider 
model is reshaping organisational arrangements and the treatment of clients in receipt of 
crisis and supported accommodation services at Swan Emergency Accommodation 
funded by the state’s Department of Community Development (DCD). The case studies’ 
field data discussed in this thesis was collected from 2000 to 2002. 
 
Chapter One introduces the major conceptual framework used in making sense of NCP 
reform and the case studies - governmentality analysis - complementing it with insights 
generated by Pusey’s perspective on the ascendancy of neo-liberalism and subsequent 
decline of social democratic traditions in Australia. The chapter outlines the basic 
premises of the governmentality approach, starting with Foucault’s notion of political 
rationality. Tied with that, the study moves on to discuss governmentality’s concepts of 
technologies and mechanisms of rule. Tied to this is a discussion on the notion of 
alignments implicated in drawing closely an assemblage of distant actors such as NGOs 
engaged in pursuing governmental objectives. Finally, the work introduces a discussion 
on ‘technologies of the self’ (Foucault 1988b) or techniques of self formation involved in 
fostering self-discipline and surveillance connected to governmental objectives. 
 
In order to illuminate the role of National Competition Policy in reshaping the delivery of 
the human services described above, it is first necessary to provide a background on the 
broad formulation of this policy and those aspects of its formulation that have a bearing 
on the organisation of human services. Consequently, Chapter Two lays out the   5 
development and broad framework of this policy, locating it in the context of the 
ascendancy of global neo-liberal and managerialist frameworks and methods. The work 
disentangles the official definition and assumptions connected with NCP. The chapter 
then locates the NCP reform as part of a project  earmarked in the overhauling 
‘foundations’ of Keynesian economics that supported the expansion of the post-war 
welfare state in Australia. I describe and flesh out the narrow logic and rationalities of 
neo-classical economics and public choice knowledge systems that give impetus to the 
practices of competition policy. The work highlights the manner in which neo-classical 
economics and public choice theories have played a part in justifying shifts away from 
collective approaches, preferring instead a strengthening of individual-oriented 
frameworks. 
 
The thesis pays significant attention to the development of the NCP, spelling out the 
nature of knowledge, methods and techniques underpinning the constitution of this 
policy. Given the technical character of terms and concepts underpinning the workings of 
NCP reform, I have used examples in an effort to clarify the complex trail of economic 
and managerialist ideas underpinning a range of these formulations. Based on the same 
grounds, the section laying out the ‘foundations’ of NCP is preceded by the thesis 
conceptual framework, governmentality and Pusey. 
 
The thesis draws special attention to National Competition Policy’s pronouncement that 
general community welfare is primarily enhanced when welfare provision is subject to 
competitive practices as understood through what the Hilmer Report (1993) presents as a   6 
superior neo-classical economics knowledge underpinning competition. What is 
important to bear in mind is that it is this definitional assumption of competition that 
variously informs the formulation of the Competitive Tendering and Contracting for 
which Job Network employment assistance programs are subject, and to a lesser extent, 
the state’s moderated Preferred Service Provider models of service procurement explored 
in my second case study. The thesis points out that it is through this body of knowledge 
that new technologies of Competitive Neutrality are invented and set in play by 
reinforcing, among other things, the facilitation of contracting practices, and significantly 
regulating the public housing reforms at a broader level. 
 
The research project locates key players involved in driving the NCP agenda. Starting 
with the then Prime Minister Keating commissioning the Hilmer Report (1993) for the 
Coalition of Australian Governments (COAG), and the significant ongoing involvement 
of the Federal and State governments and Territories, I also bring into focus the 
prominent role of the National Competition Policy Council (NCC), an overseer and a key 
player in the ongoing authoring of the NCP. In the case of Western Australia, the study 
locates the Office of Premier and Cabinet, and the State Supply Commission (SSC). The 
implied influence of certain business players and policy communities is initially 
indicated. 
 
In Chapter Two, I also pay attention to Western Australia’s attempt to promote 
competitive practices as a way of enhancing community welfare and accountability as 
provided through the McCarrey Report (1993a, b). Here, I highlight key government   7 
technologies and rationalities aligned with the national mechanisms deployed through 
Hilmer (1993), and those being progressively elaborated and expanded by agencies such 
as the National Competition Council and other government institutions. In particular, I 
bring to the forefront two key technologies of rule, namely CTC and Competitive 
Neutrality (CN) – I explain their technical (definitional) meanings and their relevance to 
my case studies. 
 
A detailed description of managerial approaches linked to the NCP enables a glimpse into 
a range of connected techniques engaged in facilitating the National Competition Policy 
reform. In this way, the study locates Australia’s public sector shifts that have taken place 
in response to notions of competition and the drive to achieve greater value for money. 
 
Chapter Three briefly describes my search for a methodology, ultimately leading to a 
governmentality approach. I draw out the methodological working premises underpinning 
this analysis: the sorts of questions that governmentality seeks to answer; the 
problematisation of categorical policy truths, including the discursive and arbitrary 
character of policy justifications; the approach to notions of power, and the treatment of 
subjectivity. The chapter also locates Pusey’s complementary analysis mainly used to 
assist in locating the professional and welfarist approaches as counterdiscourses. The 
chapter then describes the research question and methods. 
 
In Chapter Four I look at program organisation and treatment of unemployed people (Job 
Seekers) in receipt of employment assistance programs, namely, Job Matching, Job   8 
Search Training and Intensive Assistance  at Peel Training and Employment agency 
operating under the Competitive Tendering and Contracting system. The chapter 
describes the means by which the practices of a contracting regime attempt to draw a Job 
Network provider into working within particular objectives of governance. The study 
brings to light a broad range of mechanisms that make the reformed Job Network LMPs 
knowable and possible – the rationalities and technologies regulating the relationship 
between the provider and their clients, the disciplinary mechanisms, and the ordinary 
ways in which self-regulation is promoted. The thesis also delves into the employment 
assistance programmatic shifts involving highly developed codification practices, 
enabling and containing the scope of client treatment. Then, I explore and discuss the 
elaborate technologies and practices of efficiency connected with the Job Seekers 
Classification Instrument (JSCI), performance measurements and the reward system 
promoting renewal of service contracts for highly rated performers. The study goes on to 
describe the regulation and monitoring involving the Job Network provider’s day-to-day 
client operations through electronic information systems linking client progress records 
from Job Network local operational sites, all the way to Centrelink and the Department of 
Employment and Working Relations (DEWR). The dissertation also describes Job 
Network staff experiences, concerns and uncertainties around their perceptions of 
operating under this contracting system. 
 
Chapter Five locates Swan Emergency Accommodation service in the context of shifts 
relating to Australia’s management of housing, and more specifically crisis 
accommodation supports over at least the last two decades. The dissertation identifies a   9 
detailed account of shifting political rationalities constituting the management of 
homelessness in the country. It simultaneously identifies sources of authority informing 
recent government objectives connected with NCP and authorised in the facilitation of 
these shifts. The chapter also describes a fairly complex picture of the clientele group 
using Swan Emergency Accommodation services. It then documents some rather 
disturbing findings indicating that most people seeking crisis accommodation are least 
likely to access the private housing rental market. Prior to and after receiving support, 
this group tends to exhibit a pattern of over-reliance on public and community housing 
options rather than private rental. These findings are of interest in the context of this 
discussion to the extent that they are incompatible with the Rental Assistance (that is, 
market-oriented voucher system) strategy emphasised by the McCarrey Report (1993b) 
and central to public choice theoretical prescriptions justified on the criteria of efficiency, 
as a technique of choice when selecting safety net frameworks. I argue that under NCP, 
the drive to attain greater value for money (efficiency objectives), by disposing of a 
significant portion of public housing stock under the former Homeswest, seems to have 
been achieved at some cost to other competing governmental social objectives of 
affording quality housing options for some Australians at the bottom end of the social 
economic scale. Not least amongst this group are Aboriginal people, representing 
significant rates of service users of crisis accommodation support systems. 
 
Detailed attention is drawn to the promotion of a range of techniques under the current 
system engaged in cultivating household management attributes aimed at encouraging the 
homeless population to work on themselves, building responsible and reliable tenancy   10 
behaviours agreeable in the housing rental market. Unlike the provision of the Labour 
Market Programs where new managerial techniques dominate over the traditional 
welfarist professional approaches, under the Preferred Service Provider system, 
professional practices pertaining to casework remain largely in operation, although the 
parameters of practice are subject to particular managerialist disciplines. In this sense, the 
thesis maintains that welfarist and managerialist forms largely co-exist in the governance 
of homelessness. Nonetheless, the study implicates managerial shifts in the demise of 
collective strategies such as lobbying and systemic advocacy involving Swan Emergence 
Accommodation staff, as a valuable part of agency operations in addressing the issues of 
homelessness. I also maintain that ongoing  professional development has gone into 
decline since the introduction of the state-based contractual practices. 
 
The study concludes with reflections on National Competition Policy, wherein attention 
is drawn to the significance of understanding the ‘foundations’ upon which this policy 
rests  –  the mechanisms and techniques connected with the NCP agenda. Here, the 
arbitrary character of this policy formulation is emphasised. The chapter reflects on a 
range of study findings and their potential implications. In discussing these findings, the 
study appraises the value of governmentality approach in its potential capacity generating 
particular study revelations. Of significance are the codification and technologies 
regulating efficient operational conduct, emerging forms of self governance and a range 
of other concerns leading to question particular taken-for-granted aspects of contestable 
markets. The political rationalities and technologies of the self implicated in the two case 
studies are revisited in my final reflections in Chapter Six, questioning the forms of   11 
governance involved in the cultivation of particular mentalities of rule amongst 
unemployed and homeless people in Australia. The final chapter also pays broad 
attention to the usefulness of governmentality techniques to this research study and more 
broadly, the understanding of social policy concerns. 
 
I now turn my attention to the conceptual framework used in this thesis to make sense of 
NCP.   12 
Chapter One 
Conceptual Framework - Governmentality and Pusey 
 
Background 
 
My choice of the analytical frameworks described in this chapter is in keeping with my 
personal commitments. As a former field practitioner now has an academic interest in the 
continued shaping and reshaping of the welfare state, I note the various explanations and 
justifications of programmatic change. Establishing an analytical framework has been a 
challenging and long-winded journey. Attendance at conferences and publication pursuits 
between 2002 and 2005 offered me an opportunity to share and discuss the implications 
of my research case studies and their relationship to wider political shifts. The feedback 
received and my initial reading of the data, pointed to the importance of the constitutive 
and fluid properties of language alongside the potential rationalities involved in the NCP 
reform. Against this background, I concentrate on the work of governmentality theorists. 
I also draw, to a lesser extent, on the work of Michael Pusey, who, while coming from a 
different tradition, is particularly useful in illuminating the displacement of social 
democratic rationalities underpinning Keynesian regulatory system.  
 
This chapter describes this conceptual framework. I start by describing the 
governmentality approach as initially established by Foucault (1991a, d; 1988a,b; 1984; 
1982) and then move on to the work of Miller and Rose (1990). In the final part of the 
chapter I turn to Pusey’s (2003; 1993; 1991) insights on neo-liberal policy reforms. 
   13 
 
Introducing Complementary Analytical Frameworks 
 
In using a governmentality approach as a means of understanding NCP, this research 
departs from orthodox explanations that view policy primarily through the role of the 
state. Governmentality concerns itself with the objectives of rule, suggesting that the 
officials and subjects modify their (and other’s) behaviours in connection with those 
objectives. This approach offers a useful analytical lens for this thesis as it allows one to 
focus on both the epistemology of rule and the means whereby it is implemented. In this 
way, it helps to make sense of how welfare clients and welfare delivery organisations are 
situated and treated under NCP, while drawing out and untangling the rationalities and 
technologies stemming from the NCP agenda in connection with the  human service 
practices under study. While National Competition Policy is authored at high national 
and state levels, it is important to give recognition to the dispersal of its sources of power 
– to explore the operation of power at the ‘coalface’ and sites of everyday experience. 
Through focussing on shifting rationalities of government and technologies of rule, the 
governmentality approach serves to elucidate the terms of client treatment and the new 
organisational arrangements through which clients are  subject under National 
Competition Policy conditions. 
 
My underlying argument is that the new market and managerialist modes rework the 
terms of client treatment and reshape professional practices. I argue that the older-
standing professional and bureaucratic forms of practice, and the activist and social   14 
democratic ideas characteristic of many NGOs, are either dislodged altogether, or made 
subservient to the new marketised welfare state configuration.  
 
In this context, Pusey’s work (1991; 1993; 2003) provides a complementary critical lens 
through which competition policies may be understood.  Pusey belongs to a broader 
critical tradition emphasising the displacement of post-war governing rationalities 
through the process of the global economic change (for example see Pollitt 1998; Battin 
1991; Mendes 2003; Lavalette and Pratt; Capling, et al; Ife 2002; Solomon 1999; 
Overbeek; Didsbury 1985; Rusimbi 2003), as well as welfare analysts such as Bryson 
(1992) who discusses the displacement of traditions associated with social reformists 
such as Beveridge, Titmus and Marshall and so forth as having been broadly supported 
and reliant on the project of Keynesian economics (1992: 46). 
 
In this chapter though I am interested in paying particular notice to Pusey particularly for 
the attention he gives in locating understandings of instrumental rationality underpinning 
neo-classical economics, contrasting it with the social democratic position which, he 
maintains, prevailed prior to the move to economic rationalism. Pusey is influenced by 
the elite theory and neo-Weberian notions of rationality. His analysis is of great value to 
my thesis in that he argues that under the new order what he calls ‘economic rationalism’ 
positions the market as the prime axiom through which political decisions are made. 
Crucially, he suggests that this has led to the subordination of social democratic values 
and practices as economic rationalism subjects both ‘society’ and ‘polity’ to the needs of 
the market.   15 
  
Conceptualising governmentality 
 
In the governmentality literature, government is not understood or explained as the 
‘elected’ government or in relation to official practices as in the traditional literature (for 
example see, Mendes 2003; Fenna 1998; Weimer and Vining 2005; Dunleavy and 
O’Leary 1987; Gough 1979; Hill 2005). Instead, government comes to be seen as 
involving loosely connected agencies and authorities drawn together by particular 
objectives. Governmentality theorists also focus on the way people regulate their own 
personal conduct in connection with governmental objectives. This self-regulation ties 
the notion of government closely to the exercise of personal conduct. Another crucial part 
of this equation is an understanding of the subjection of populations to a variety of 
knowledge developed and generated through the disciplines such as demography, 
statistics, public health and psychology. (Foucault 1991a, b, c,d,; Miller and Rose 1990; 
Rose 1996).  Crucially, from a governmentality perspective, it is also argued that 
‘liberalism’, as a way of ruling rather than a political philosophy, is the dominant form of 
governance in Western democratic societies. 
 
Management of national economy - Foucault 
 
Foucault explores the extensive growth of the ‘art of government’ in the period from the 
mid-sixteenth until the eighteenth century. He suggests that the study of the art of 
government during this period centred on questions of ‘how to govern oneself, how to be 
governed, how to govern others, by whom will the people accept being governed, how to   16 
become the best possible governor’ (Foucault 1991a: 87). This contrasted with earlier 
notions in which the object of governance was maintaining the power of the prince. 
 
Central to the emergence of this art of government was the ‘introduction of economy into 
political practice’ (Foucault, 1991a: 92). It follows that  
to govern a state will therefore mean to apply economy, to set up an economy at 
the level of an entire state, which means exercising towards its inhabitants and 
the wealth and the behaviour of each and all, a form of surveillance and control 
as attentive  as that of a head of a family over his household and his goods 
(Foucault 1991a: 92). 
 
Foucault also stresses that the ‘political and social processes’ (1988a: 11) underpinning 
Western European societies arise out of ‘precise historical change’ (1988a: 11).  In 
particular the development of the science of government enabled the management of 
populations, re-configuring the management of the economy as the possession of the 
prince to an independent sphere with its own laws. 
 
Thus, for Foucault, the ‘arbitrar[y]’ (1988a: 11) existence of state institutions and their 
role, have often gone unnoticed as if these are given, and of a fixed character. In the 
context of governmentality, under the newer configuration – reason of the state meant 
that the state’s justification for existence is inseparable from its quest to achieve security 
and wellbeing. In Foucault’s words reason of state become: 
Understood not in the negative and pejorative sense we give to it today (as that 
which infringes on the principles of law, equity and humanity in the sole interest 
of the state), but in a full and positive sense: the state is governed according to 
rational principles which are intrinsic to it and which cannot be derived solely 
from natural or divine laws or the principles of wisdom and prudence; the state, 
like nature, has its own proper form of rationality, albeit of a different sort. 
Conversely, the art of government instead of seeking to found itself in   17 
transcendental rules, a cosmological model or a philosophical-moral ideal, must 
find the principles of its rationality in that which constitutes the specific reality of 
the state (Foucault 1991a: 97). 
 
According to Foucault, it is the state’s own justification for existence that comes to 
represent a distinct form of ‘modern political rationality’ (1988c: 152). Population lies at 
the heart of this rationality: ‘the population now represents more the end of government 
than the power of the sovereign’ (1988c: 152). Further, ‘the population is the subject of 
needs, of aspirations, but it is also the object in the hands of the government, aware, vis-
à-vis the government, of what it wants, but ignorant of what is being done to it’ (Foucault 
1991a: 100). 
 
Foucault’s work on power underpins his approach to governmentality. He departs from 
the traditional approach that concerns itself with the ‘global kind of domination that one 
person exercises over others, or one group over another.’ (Foucault  1980c: 96). In 
moving away from regulated and juridico power frameworks, Foucault gives significance 
to the diverse relations of power that permeate, characterise and constitute ‘the social 
body’ (Foucault 1980c: 93), there he argues that such relations of power can only take 
shape  through ‘production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of discourse’ 
(Foucault 1980c: 93). In this way, ‘methods of subjugation’ (Foucault 1980c: 93) come to 
take a more central focus in his analysis, allowing an exploration of power in ‘its fields of 
application…where it installs itself and produces real effects’ (Foucault 1980c: 96-97). 
Foucault’s analysis also suggests that the exercise of power occurs through ‘net-like’ 
arrangements, whereby ‘individuals are always the element of its [power] articulation’ 
(Foucault 1980c: 98). This means that, ‘individuals are the vehicle of power, not its point   18 
of application’ (Foucault 1980c: 98). My two case studies will illuminate the manner in 
which subjects are becoming ‘materially constituted’, generating insights of what 
Foucault calls experiences of ‘subjection in its material instance’ (1980c: 97). 
 
In describing the development of governmentality, Foucault (1991a: 101-3) pays 
attention to the part played by the disciplinary mechanisms made possible by the growth 
of social, economic and psychological disciplines. He suggests that modern European 
societies are ‘ruled by techniques of government, [that] turns on the theme of population 
and hence on the birth of political economy.’ (1991a: 101). He also proposes that the 
policing of the population (in the manner of polizeiwissenschaft) can be understood as a 
kind of ‘economic pastorate’. In this way, one sees ‘profound connectedness between the 
principles of political action and those of personal conduct’ (Foucault 1981, quoted in 
Gordon 1991:12). 
 
Foucault’s concept of disciplinary mechanisms has several features relevant to this thesis. 
First, he argues that disciplinary mechanisms tends to emigrate, asserting that although 
‘disciplinary establishments multiply, their mechanisms have a certain tendency to 
become de-institutionalised, to step outside closed fortresses and to circulate in a “free” 
state; massive and compact disciplines decompose into supple processes of control, 
which can be transferred and adapted’ (Foucault 1980c: 113). In addition, he refers to 
‘normalisation’ of disciplines, arguing that strategies of ‘hierarchical surveillance, 
normalising sanctions, and examination’ involve ‘production (not repression) – 
producing, raising value, intensifying rather than constraining, forbidding, stopping’   19 
(cited in Ewald 1991: 171). Significant here is Foucault’s emphasis that ‘discipline 
“manufactures” individuals; it is the specific technique of a power which take individuals 
at one and the same time as objects and the instruments by means of which is exercised’ 
(cited in Ewald 1991: 171). 
 
So far I have concentrated on Foucault’s insights into the growth in governing techniques 
in Western societies since the eighteenth century and the basic element of his notion of 
‘governmentality’. It is against this background that I turn to the work of Miller and 
Rose. 
 
Miller and Rose’s approach to governmentality 
 
In their work on advanced liberalism, Miller and Rose describe official endeavours ‘to 
transform the calculative procedures of economic actors’, and link this with attempts to 
promote forms of individual self-government that are in line with broader governmental 
objectives (1990: 1). Expanding on the usefulness of the governmentality approach, they 
comment on its distinct relevance in probing ‘the exercise of political rule’ (1990: 3) – a 
matter that lies at the heart of this thesis. Their analysis attends to ‘elements out of which 
particular rationalities are formed, and to the mechanisms and techniques through which 
they are rendered operable’ (1990: 11). They emphasise that ‘the rationalities and 
technologies do not stand in a one-to-one relationship; the relays and linkages between 
them are decisive conditions for the elaboration of each’ (Miller and Rose 1990: 11-12). 
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Miller and Rose put the very notion of policy under a microscope.  The way they see it, 
“policy should itself be treated as something to be explained’ (1990: 3), rather than taking 
its historical existence for granted. They thus depart from  some of the common 
conventions and assumptions associated with mainstream policy traditions, where the 
policy dynamics involving ‘social problems’ are primarily understood through the frame 
of contesting political and philosophical discourses. It follows from this that Miller and 
Rose believe that the transformations, whereby issues such as unemployment, poverty 
and crime come to be known as problems, should themselves be interrogated (1990: 3).  
 
Miller and Rose want to draw attention to ‘the programmatic  character of 
governmentality’ (1990: 4), and, in this respect, are interested in the actual ‘workings’ of 
policy. Here they also draw attention to the unfinished nature of government and the 
constant need of policy to reinvent and improve itself. This is illustrated by the 
characteristic cycle of policy reforms – the re-working, re-evaluating, and revamping of 
failures and drawbacks in programs originally presented as improvements designed to 
achieve a better deal in terms of ‘economic growth, productivity, low inflation, [and] full 
employment’ (1990: 4). 
 
Rose (1996) discusses advanced liberalism as a political rationality and points out that the 
philanthropic activities characteristic of the first part of the 19
th century were associated 
with classical liberal rationality. This way of governing people’s fortunes was 
‘supplemented and displaced by the truths produced and disseminated by the positive 
sciences of economics, statistics, sociology, medicine, biology, psychiatry, and   21 
psychology’ (Osborne 1994, quoted in Rose 1996: 39). It was not until the late nineteenth 
century that another significant shift took place, this time with the expansion of the 
“social” (Rose 1996: 39). It aimed to simultaneously ‘humanise’ the harshness of the 
urban industrialised economy and to impact on labour conditions and economic 
arrangements, with the broader aim of promoting the economic and social wellbeing and 
security of the population. Rose argues that the period was characterised not so much by 
the proliferation of positive state interventions, as is commonly understood in the 
traditional policy literature, but by the ‘invention of various “rules for rule” that sought to 
transform the state into’ an entity that could ‘shape, guide, channel, direct, control… 
events and persons distant from it. Persons and activities were to be governed through 
society’ (1996: 40) and regulated through social norms In this respect, Rose points to the 
role of the social and economic disciplines in enabling the new forms of political rule to 
‘install and empower a variety of “professionals”, investing them with authority to act as 
experts in the devices of social rule’ (1996: 38). This particular shift, according to him, 
reconceptualised the subject from one who was regulated by the ‘individualising moral 
normativity’ characteristic of the early 19
th century into a person of ‘needs, attitudes and 
relationships, a subject who was to be embraced within, and governed through, a nexus of 
collective solidarities and dependencies’ (Rose 1996: 40-41).  It is through this latter 
nexus that the development of the welfare state has come to be understood, including 
responses to the question of unemployment and homelessness, subjects of my case 
studies. 
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Crucially, Rose identifies a shift from the ‘social’ epoch to the period of advanced 
liberalism. The new political rationality challenges the legitimacy of the welfare state, 
accusing it of inefficiency, violating economic liberties and undermining morality. 
Advanced liberalism, Rose says, seeks to ‘de-governmentalize the state and de-statize 
practices of government, to detach the substantive authority of expertise from apparatuses 
of political rule, relocating experts within a market governed by rationalities, 
accountability and consumer demand’ (1996: 41). He suggests that with the advent of 
advanced liberalism, the governing of the economy, broadly speaking, starts to gradually 
be taken out of “society” (1996: 41). This is achieved through neo-classical market 
mechanisms, whereby citizens are ‘constructed as subject of choices and aspirations to 
self-actualization and self-fulfilment’ (1996: 41). 
 
In the next section of this chapter, I examine Rose’s discussion of advanced liberalism in 
more detail. 
 
Rose’s characterisation of advanced liberalism 
 
Rose identifies the antecedents of advanced liberalism in post-war moves, including 
Hayek’s revamped free-market critique of the ‘interventionist state’ (1996: 50). This form 
of critique is guided by a logic that sees wealth and the securing of the nation to be 
enabled by thriving private enterprises, while the welfare state is generally considered 
“unproductive” (1996: 51). In this way, the ‘state’ is charged with over-extending itself. 
Rose also notes that the Keynesian interventionist state, previously seen to promote a 
cohesive and moral society, came to be faulted for failures in economic management.   23 
More specifically, advanced liberalism argues that despite their intentions the older 
‘rationalities, programmes and technologies of welfare’ (1996: 51) increase poverty and 
unemployment. Additionally, the welfare bureaucracies are accused of promoting their 
own interests. This criticism has also been heightened by a certain fragmentation of 
expertise in the field of welfare, coming about as a result of growing specialisations 
together with the growing pressure from the community and specific service ‘consumer’ 
groups (1996: 52). 
 
Rose observes that the ideas surrounding advanced liberalism have been ‘crystallized’ 
into a consistent ‘mentality of government’ (1996: 53). So what constitutes this “new” 
mentality of government? The first point to note is that, as a mentality of rule, it shares 
many of the features of what has gone before, including the constant attempt to adjust to 
changing circumstances and rectify what comes to be seen as government failures. 
Marking a significant shift from rationalities of the post-war welfare state, however, it 
seeks to de-couple welfare from economic security and prospects, and to distance 
government from service provision (Rose 1996: 54). This thesis engages with these 
points through exploring NCP contracting-out practices, alongside the arrangements 
separating entities responsible for funding provision and program design from those 
engaged in service provision. In identifying the ‘purchaser–provider’ split as 
characteristic of welfare under advanced liberalism, Rose draws attention to the 
significance of this shift, whereby policy and program formulation is separated from 
service provision, with effort devoted to the very act of creating distance between these 
different functions. The corresponding dislodgement of welfare experts and the human   24 
sciences from their key place has seen the growing influence of the accounting 
disciplines. In Rose’s words, this constitutes a new way of ‘responsibilizing experts in 
relation to claims upon them other than those of their own criteria of truth and 
competence’. In this quest, advanced liberalism: 
invent[s]  new…techniques of government that create a distance between the 
decisions of formal political institutions and other social actors, conceive[s] of 
these actors in new ways as subjects of responsibility, autonomy and choice, and 
seek[s] to act upon them through shaping and utilizing (1996: 55). 
 
In this context, Rose draws on Power’s (1992, 1994) argument about the place of the new 
“audit” mechanisms, suggesting that they displace the trust that government formerly 
‘once accorded to professional credentials’ (Rose 1996: 55). Emphasising the importance 
of this transformation, Rose contends: 
In this process, the entities to be audited are transformed: they have to be “made 
auditable”, producing a new grid of visibilities for the conduct of organizations 
and those who inhabit them. Audit may make heavy demands, but it travels well 
across space and time, is capable of being propagated in a multitude of locales, 
channelling and organising activities and linking centres of calculation to sites of 
implementation according to new vectors. Despite the fact that its 
“epistemological profile” is, if anything, even lower than the knowledges that it 
displaces, and that there is nothing novel in the techniques of audit themselves, 
the mode of its operations – in terms of procedures rather than substantives, in 
terms of apparently stable and yet endlessly flexible criteria such as efficiency, 
appropriateness, effectiveness –  renders it versatile and highly transferable 
technology for government at distance (Rose 1996: 55-56) 
 
As discussed earlier, according to Rose another strong feature of advanced liberalism is 
the pursuit of the ‘“de-governmentalisation of the state” and “de-statization of 
government”’ (Rose 1996: 56). In the wake of this, the knowledge associated with the 
social sciences and the Keynesian economies are dissolved, along with a ‘detaching of 
the centre from the various regulatory technologies’ (Rose 1996: 56). In their turn, the   25 
technologies engaged in reworking ‘the social’ are preoccupied with ‘contracts, targets, 
indicators, performance measures, monitoring and evaluation, which are used to govern 
conduct while according them a certain autonomy of decisional power and responsibility 
for their actions’ (Rose 1996: 57).  
 
Lastly, Rose holds that advanced liberalism brings about ‘a new specification of the 
subject of government’ (1996: 57). This sees the emergence of the ‘active’ citizen who 
promotes his or her potential and maximises the opportunities made possible through 
market frameworks.  Here Rose highlights the emphasis on the ‘powers of the client as a 
customer’ (1996: 57), underlying advanced liberalism’s account of ‘freedom, liberty and 
autonomy’ (Rose 1996: 57). 
 
So far, I have covered the main elements of advanced liberalism as described by Rose. 
For the purposes of my thesis, three concepts require more detailed elaboration, namely: 
rationalities and technologies of rule, the disciplinary technologies, and the discursive 
formation. The first two are dealt in the sections that follow, while the notion of 
discursive formations is elaborated under language.  
 
Rationalities and technologies of rule 
 
According to governmentality theorists, the activity of ruling is made possible through 
the deployment of a variety of mechanisms making the objects of rule knowable and 
possible. Miller and Rose (1990: 8) use the expression technology to mean the ‘actual 
mechanisms through which authorities of various sorts have sought to shape, normalize   26 
and instrumentalize the conduct, thought, decisions, and aspirations of others in order to 
achieve the objective they consider desirable.’ 
 
Miller and Rose (1990: 13) emphasise the importance of ‘techniques of recording and 
calculation’. In more detail, they argue that this involves paying attention to:  
techniques of notation, computation and calculation; procedures of examination 
and assessment; the invention of devices such as surveys and presentational forms 
such as tables; the standardization of systems for training and inculcation of 
habits; the inauguration of professional specialisms and vocabularies; building 
design and architectural forms (1990: 8). 
 
These arguments are particularly germane to this thesis given that in moving away from 
collective decision-making frameworks National Competition Policy has relied so 
heavily on computation and calculation modes favouring individualistic assessments. 
 
While not a governmentality theorist, Muetzelfeldt’s (1992: 190) work is helpful in this 
context as he comes alongside Rose in depicting the importance of programmatic factors 
in shaping the style of the planning role that has emerged under neo-liberalism. In 
exploring the impact of marketisation and deregulation policy practices occurring during 
the Hawke-Keating era, he notes the emergence of a phenomenon he calls ‘meta-
planning’. In essence, this ‘comprises the design of new, or the mobilisation of existing, 
incentive structures to produce “appropriate” conduct by the target group’ (1992: 195-6). 
Echoing a point made by governmentality theorists, Muetzelfeldt observes that while 
meta-planning claims to give choice to subjects, it actually calculates the parameters of 
this choice. He also observes that:   27 
Meta-planning involves the centralisation of strategic control and the 
simultaneous devolution of tactical responsibility.  Policy makers centralise… 
themselves the strategic task of establishing systems of financial and/or non-
financial incentives and devolve to their clients responsibility for making tactical 
decisions within those systems. It is precisely because it is only tactical 
responsibility that is devolved that the ‘free choice’ it provides is more apparent 
than real. Meta-planning opens up the means by which the state’s ends may be 
achieved, without relinquishing its attempts to produce those ends (1992: 196). 
 
In the Introduction, I mentioned that prior to the market-driven policy changes, NGOs 
were able to deliver services under a submission-based funding model. This gave some 
measure of policy input in program designs, and provided some room for individual 
NGOs to assess local needs even though practices were still dependent on acceptable 
claims and economic rationing imperatives. The way in which NCP reduces such choices 
can be observed in service delivery across the board, and will be discussed later in 
relation to the two case studies researched for this thesis. 
 
Miller and Rose (1990: 2) maintain that the ‘analysis of modern government needs to pay 
attention to the role accorded to indirect mechanisms for aligning economic, social and 
personal conduct with social-political objectives.’ They go on to observe that, ‘Political 
power is exercised today through a multitude of agencies and techniques, some of which 
are only loosely associated with the executive and bureaucracies of the formal organs of 
state’ (1990: 1-2). 
 
In this respect Miller and Rose (1990: 1) also point out that governmentality ‘draws 
attention  to the assemblage of loose and mobile networks that can bring persons, 
organizations and objectives into alignment.’ This notion of alignment can throw light on   28 
the way in which the activities of NGOs are brought into correspondence with NCP and 
from  there  with the ruling objectives of government institutions. Thus, for example, 
NCP’s marketisation and privatisation strategies closely aligns the workings of NGOs 
with the federal government’s economic objectives and helps to streamline their 
economic, social and individual orientations to meet global economic imperatives. 
 
The path to alignment does not proceed directly from central government to the non-
government sector. Instead, and as will be outlined in Chapter Two, it is supported by 
incentives at state, local government and local service provider level. It is also reinforced 
by incentives to practice efficiency through pursuit of ‘better’ value for money, and 
through direct and indirect sanctions including the denial of potential contracts for the 
‘recalcitrants’. I explore this point in Chapter Two and Chapter Four. 
 
Disciplinary technologies and self-regulation 
 
Governmentality theory draws a close connection between technologies of rule and the 
exercise of self-policing in modern liberal societies. Miller and Rose point out that 
governing is much more than simply ‘ordering activities and processes’ (1990: 18), 
whereby, the exercise of governing takes place through subjects. In turn, the ‘self-
regulating capacities of subjects, [are] shaped and normalized through expertise’ (1990: 
1). It is in this context, that following Foucault, Hutton argues that government helps 
shape the ‘structure of the mind’ (Hutton 1988: 125-6) and that modern processes of 
governance ‘require ever more explicit definitions of what is appropriate to human 
behaviour’ (Hutton 1988: 126). It is through these disciplinary underpinnings that   29 
governmentality concerns its analysis with the examination of techniques (Dean 1995: 
560) engaged in regulating conduct. 
 
Dean’s (1995) contribution is useful in illuminating the notion of self-regulation. He 
argues that in order to understand notions of self-regulation as used in governmentality 
literature, it is important to bear in mind that in this context the notion of government is 
understood as one that brings the ‘regulation of conduct into focus’ (1995: 560). Hence, 
government comes to be seen as a ‘more or less calculated means of the direction of 
human conduct’ (Dean 1995: 560). It follows that in trying to make sense of the notion of 
self formation, recognition should be paid to its cultural and historical specificity 
connected through practices and techniques of the day. Foucault reminds that ‘the self or 
subject is not a substance but a form, one that is not necessarily identical with itself’ 
(Foucault 1988a quoted in Dean 1995: 362). Thus, there is a recognition of the 
constitutive character of the practices of government which: 
depend upon, operate through and create relays and linkages with what might be 
called “practices of self”. These practices are, if one likes, hybrid ones in that it is 
often not clear where the locus or agency for the direction of conduct lies, and 
which indeed suggests rather elastic boundaries in processes of self-formation 
(Dean 1995: 562). 
 
In turn, as Dean points out, the dimension of self-formation draws attention to analysis to 
‘the forms of self-relation, self-specification and self-shaping that are thrown into 
question and made possible and sometimes necessary by particular practices, techniques 
and exercises’ (Dean 1995: 564). 
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In the case of NCP, the technologies involved in shaping organisational, professional and 
client behaviour range from contracting practices such as Competitive Tendering and 
Contracting to the Preferred Service Provider systems, and a myriad of techniques 
regulating human service programs. Particular disciplinary expertise assists in the 
exercise of self-regulation of subjects. The case studies used in this thesis explores the 
nature of the workings of self-policing in connection with technologies of regulating the 
economy of unemployment and that of homelessness. Foucault argues, however,  the 
relationship between knowledge and self-regulation should not be seen in a fixed way 
(1982: 18). Hence, in this analysis the thesis avoids deterministic generalisations and 
provides glimpses of new possibilities. 
 
Language 
 
Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999: 10) remind the reader that language is central to the 
‘calculations of struggles over power’. An awareness of the constitutive character of 
language is thus crucial to make sense of the operations and facilitation of National 
Competition Policy. This involves paying attention to the discursive features of policy 
formulation and its capacity to constitute particular logics, explanations and techniques. I 
start this discussion by looking at how governmentality theorists treat the question of 
language and how their views illuminate the workings of National Competition Policy. 
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Discursive character of policy 
 
Miller and Rose (1990: 4) comment that ‘the conceptualisations, explanations and 
calculations that inhabit the governmental field require an attention to language.’ 
Foucault’s ‘Politics and the study of Discourse’ (1991b), suggests that any such analysis 
needs to look at the ‘episteme’ of a particular time through ‘changes which affect its 
objects, operations, concepts’ and ‘theoretical operations.’ (1991b: 55, 56).  Attention, he 
says, needs to be paid to those changes resulting from ‘generalizations, ‘limitations’, 
‘shifts’, and ‘exclusion or inclusion’. This type of analysis looks at ‘displacements of 
boundaries’ and gives weight to changes in hierarchy and ‘the nature of directing 
principle’ (Foucault 1991b: 56-7). 
 
In more concrete terms Miller and Rose (1990: 5) pay particular attention to the ways in 
which policies come to be written, numerical values get used, and the uses for which such 
numbers are made to serve, and, in the process constitute how matters are understood and 
governed (1990: 5). In these respects they are concerned with the inscription of reality 
through techniques and methods, rather than with developing a ‘contemplative’ approach 
to language analysis (Miller and Rose 1990: 7). In this context, they are particularly keen 
to explore how the computational devices embedded in language render any particular 
phenomenon knowable, calculable, and administrable. To use their words: 
Knowing an object in such a way that it can be governed is more than purely 
speculative activity: it requires the invention of procedures of notation, ways of 
collecting and presenting statistics, the transportation of these to centres where 
calculations and judgements can be made and so forth. It is of such procedures of 
inscription that the diverse domains of ‘governmentality’ are made up, that 
‘objects’ such as the economy, the enterprise, the social field and the family are   32 
rendered in a particular conceptual form and made amenable to intervention and 
regulation (Miller and Rose 1990: 5). 
 
In these respects language can be seen to perform an important role in aligning networks 
and effecting indirect rule. For Miller and Rose this is facilitated through:  
shared vocabularies, theories, explanations, that loose and flexible associations 
may be established between agents across time and space – Departments of state, 
pressure groups, academics, managers, teachers, employees, parents – whilst each 
remains, to a greater extent or lesser extent, constitutionally distinct and formally 
independent (1990: 10). 
 
Numerous examples of such alignment between the National Competition Policy 
Council, government agencies, NGOs, and economic and accounting disciplines can be 
found within the context of the subject matter of this thesis. Thus, for example, Adelaide 
University and the Flinders University of South Australia were entrusted with the 
responsibility of designing the nationwide Job Network performance assessment 
methods, indicators and comparative service provider performance ratings and this 
impacted more or less directly on service provision (DEWRSB 2000: 1). Equally, the 
alliance between the Institute of Public Affairs, Western Australia (Nahan and 
Rutherford 1993) and the McCarrey Report (1993b) impacted on that of Homeswest. It 
is important to recognise that the languages are also highly contested. There are pressure 
groups that do not endorse the dominant political rationality agenda and, as best they can, 
oppose the calculations, formulations and procedures deployed to facilitate the current 
rule. 
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Pusey’s Approach 
 
The quest for promotion of social policy concerns with its preoccupation for positive 
rights has tended to be pursued through social democratic traditions (George and Wilding 
1976; Titmus 2000; Kymlicka and Norman 1994; Bryson 1992; Dean 1995; Pusey 1991).  
In this thesis Pusey’s (1991, 2003) work helps to capture the welfarist rationalities as part 
of this social democratic tradition. He asserts that the resurgence and dominance of neo-
classical economics has transformed Australian policy. He argues that this transformation 
took place through the imposition of a narrow economic logic that displaced the social 
democratic tradition of the immediate post-war period. In the process, the ‘old’ form of 
bureaucracy, influenced by liberal social science disciplines, was marginalised, making 
room for newer managerial forms driven by the new elite trained in neo-classical 
economics. Pusey challenges the dominance of the market and its associated disciplines 
and disputes that it delivers better outcomes than the public sector. 
 
Subjecting Society to Economic Goals 
 
Pusey’s analysis is very different from that of governmentality theorists in that his 
treatment of power and ideology rests on more traditional philosophical assumptions. 
While there is a broad similarity in the shared importance they attach to the  new 
economic rationalities, Pusey visualises ‘economy’ and ‘society’ as two different pre-
existing spheres, with the former gradually taking over the latter, rather than spheres of 
governance constituted by discursive practice. Economic rationalism has relegated 
society to ‘a generic externality for the economy’ (2003: xiv), with the result that 
government now views it as a ‘stubbornly resisting sludge through which one must drive   34 
the economy’ (2003: 183). In his observation about people internalising economic reform 
in their everyday survival lives, Pusey (2003) roughly parallels the governmentality 
theorists’ notion of self-regulation. He also clearly implicates capital accumulation in this 
development, asserting that: 
Society itself, along with its broad middle, is externalised for big business as 
nothing more or less than an environment that is treated along with minerals and 
natural resources and the capital and labour markets, as one among many 
resources for production and profit-making in a competitive global economy 
(2003: 4).  
 
Pusey characterises neo-classical economics as a clearly bounded and limited form of 
rationality, and criticises its pivotal assertion that ‘markets and prices are the only reliable 
means of setting value on anything, and, further, that markets and money can always, at 
least in principle deliver better outcomes than states and bureaucracies’ (2003: 14). He 
describes how neo-classical economics has pushed out other versions of economic 
thought including institutionalists and Keynesians, (2003: 14). Keen (2001) similarly 
argues that neo-classical economics has obscured alternative forms of economics 
including, Austrian economics, which, while closely related to neo-classical economics, 
is sceptical about the claims of market equilibrium and does not accord much credence to 
mathematical formulas in guiding economics as a discipline (Keen 2001: 300-13). Finally 
Pusey suggests that under a market system, ‘the ideal person shrinks to a socially autistic 
“choice receiver” (1993:13) that responds only with yes/no decisions that are extremely 
coordinated by prices and free markets!’ 
 
In sum, then, Pusey is concerned with the social and political transformations brought 
about by economic rationalism that ‘constrain’ social planning. To the extent that   35 
planning exists, it is economic orientated meta-planning, directed towards enhancing the 
private sector meeting market ends, leading to the imposition of a narrow economic logic 
in areas previously influenced by the social, political and behavioural sciences (Pusey 
1993: 2003). This observation is also underscored by Muetzelfeldt’s (1992) contention 
that current policies involve a type of meta-planning aimed at particular economic 
imperatives. In opposition to this trend, Pusey insists that national interests are best 
served by a knowledge emanating from a variety of disciplines (1993: 13). 
 
In his work covering the experiences of middle class Australia Pusey (2003: 10) attempts 
to look beyond class, status, wealth and power as the sole drivers of modern capitalism to 
a focus on the factors that control and manage the new form of economic organisation. 
Using his words, ‘most people know that there never was a unified ruling class. It is the 
architecture, control and management of the new capitalism that matters’ (2003: 10). 
Reinforcing a point made in his earlier work, he maintains that the managerial elite 
includes economists trained in neo-classical economics, with this elite comprising the 
majority of senior executives in Canberra, especially in  the Treasury and Prime 
Minister’s Office, and Finance. He describes close working connections between them 
and the World Trade Organisation, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, 
and the Organization for Economic Corporation and Development, and points out that top 
government executives maintain very close linkages with Australia’s peak business 
bodies such as the Business Council of Australia. 
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Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has described governmentality as the main conceptual framework used in 
the analysis of this research study, and to a small extent, the chapter has drawn on the 
work of Michael Pusey to achieve its analytical purpose. Underlying governmentality is a 
basic notion that under liberalism the concern for the economy is introduced in the art of 
governance. In this schema, the state finds justification for existence through its quest to 
achieve security and wellbeing, with the population being the subject and object of these 
aspirations. The chapter has also paid attention to the particular way in which the notion 
of government is understood under governmentality –  through this conception, 
government is seen as that which involves loosely connected agencies and authorities 
drawn together by particular objectives. Significantly, I have explained that 
governmentalist theorists include government as also that which involves the self-
regulation of ones own conduct in connection with governmental objectives. Augmenting 
this understanding of government is the focus on the knowledge system generated by the 
dominant disciplines of the day essential in the regulation of the target population in 
keeping with objectives of rule. 
 
It is these sorts of underpinnings that are largely drawn upon in this thesis to probe the 
exercise of political rule as seen in the context of National Competition Policy. More 
specifically, I have discussed the relevance Miller and Rose’s (1990) point that under the 
governmentality premise the analysis of policy becomes a subject for interrogation. This 
questioning of policy pays attention to the programmatic character of policy – it probes 
how policy works in practice, the manner in which policy practice engages  itself in   37 
perpetual reinvention as an apparent quest to improve itself. In this regard, the chapter 
has highlighted Miller and Rose’s explanation of what they describe as advanced 
liberalism which sees a new mentality of government that maintains a strong will to 
govern, while at the same time engaging in decoupling welfarist rationalities and 
dislodging welfarist experts from its rule. Instead, it installs new priests from economic 
and accounting disciplines to regulate the governance of the economy of which the 
human services are part. It is partly in this context that the work of Michael Pusey is 
drawn upon to broadly locate the welfarist logics and rationalities that were traditionally 
supported by social democratic discourses of the past. 
 
The next chapter explores and describes the development of National Competition Policy.   38 
 
Chapter Two 
 
Development of Competition Policies and Related Managerialist Reforms 
 
Introduction 
 
Much has been written about the impact of neo-liberalism in re-configuring the welfare 
state over the last two and a half decades (Bryson 1992; Briskman and Muetzefeldt 2003; 
Lavalette and Pratt 1997; Jamrozik 2001; Mendes 2003a; 2003b; Pierson and Castles 
2000; Pierson 1998; Saunders 2000). Since the 1980s Australia has been pursuing various 
microeconomic reforms at both state and federal level (Capling, Considine and Crozier 
1998; INDECS 1992; Kaptein 1993; Hilmer 1993; Pusey 1991; 2003). These reforms are 
implicated in promoting and facilitating particular conceptual conditions and social 
formations through which the reshaping of the welfare state came to take place. Despite 
the availability of literature on broad reform trends, research into the experiences of neo-
liberal governance at points of service delivery remains sketchy. Investigation into 
Australia’s competition policies and related managerialist reforms reveals insights into 
the changes that have engulfed the social services over the last decade. The aim of this 
chapter is to provide a backdrop to the way in which NCP is structured and to offer a 
broad introductory understanding of how this structuring informs the ongoing reshaping 
of Australia’s welfare state. 
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This chapter begins with a description of the global economic change transforming 
diverse economies around the world. Interwoven with this description is a discussion on 
the ascendancy of neo-liberalism as the milieu in which National Competition Policy 
(NCP) is conceived. The work pays attention to the basic premises of the neo-classical 
critique of an interventionist state. Subsequently, the chapter draws close attention to the 
formulation of public choice theory as one particular way that individualistic calculations 
have played a part in strengthening the neo-liberal techniques of governance. In addition, 
the connection between the managerialist thinking as it relates to and is used in 
facilitating neo-liberalism is established. In outlining the neo-liberal trends, a clear link is 
made in terms of the implications this has for the welfare state.  Following this 
background a discussion of Australia’s Federal and State policies relating to the NCP 
framework and its mechanisms, and an outline of the general developments involving 
NCP, are also provided. This discussion also includes associated NCP administrative 
reforms centred on corporatisation and commercialisation policies. More specifically, 
details are presented of notions of competitive tendering and contracting (CTC) and the 
principles of competitive neutrality (CN), highlighting the broad principles and 
calculations laid out in the Hilmer (1993) and McCarrey Reports (1993a, b). In 
connection with this, a constellation of distinct shifts in rationalities and managerial 
technologies of government since 1983, involving operations of the public sector, is also 
described. Finally, the way in which NCP directly and indirectly shapes the configuration 
of human services in relation to the labour market programs and the Crisis and Supported 
Accommodation programs are discussed. 
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Throughout the chapter the manner in which the current reform project is involved in 
building new administrative managerial tools is explored. These tools usurp the old 
bureaucratic and professional orientation that facilitated the post-war Keynesian and 
social reformist system. 
 
Global Economic Change, Neo-liberalism and the Welfare State 
 
It is impossible to discuss Australia’s National Competition Policy without making 
reference to global economic transformation and the ascendance and dominance of neo-
liberalism. While countries undergoing this transformation may be characterised by 
different social, political and cultural landscapes, the occurring change is underpinned by 
certain common values associated with what a range of social policy writers commonly 
refer to as neo-liberalism (Pierson 1998; Pollitt 1993; Chachage and Mbilinyi 2003; 
Culpitt 1999; Mendes 2003; Pratt 1997; Lavalette and Pratt 1997). Australia is just one 
country, and perhaps a latecomer, undergoing economic change and embracing neo-
liberalism. This section broadly sketches the global economic transformation over recent 
decades and provides a detailed account of this neo-liberal trend. 
 
Over the last two decades, nations around the world have witnessed a significant 
transformation of their economic and political systems. The change has included the 
well-publicised reforms of the Reagan and Thatcher era, the economic transformation of 
the former republics of the Soviet Union (Solomon 1999; Overbeek 1993), and extensive 
structural adjustment programs (liberalisation policies) in developing countries, such as 
those implemented in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America (Hyden 1993; Kiwara   41 
2003; Rusimbi 2003; Morales-Gomez 1999; Puryear 1999). Focussing on this change, 
Didsbury (1985), in his discussion of the new global economic environment, addresses a 
wide range of questions from general micro and macroeconomic reforms, debt 
management, development frameworks and formulations for productivity growth, while 
also providing a critique of conventional economic logic. Aina (1999) discusses a 
significant shift involving a negation of social policy in the development process in West 
and Central Africa. Wangwe, Semboja and Tibandebage (1998) explore the transitional 
policy challenges that faced the Tanzanian presidency between 1980 and 2000 in 
redefining the role of the public sector in the production and commercial realms in the 
new global economic configuration. Similarly, Mort-Braun (2003) details the 
contestation over resources involving Lesotho’s Highlands Water Project relating to a 
construction of five dams supported by the World Bank and aimed at transferring water 
to the Gauteng region of South Africa. Equally significant is the analysis provided by 
Stigliz (2002), a former Chief Economist and Senior Vice President for the World Bank 
(1997-2000) and a winner of the Nobel Prize for Economics 2001. He describes the role 
of the World Bank in reforming economies in developing countries, Russia and the 
former republics of the Soviet Union. He questions what he considers to be outmoded 
and biased straightjacket ‘shock therapy’ (2002: xi) prescriptions to which a range of 
countries have been subjected with devastating results and limited evidence of economic 
success. Nonetheless, Stiglitz (2002: 64-7, 242) believes in the continued need to 
integrate world economies and emphasises the importance of proper management of the 
globalization process. For example, he prefers the gradualist approach used in reforming 
the Chinese economy. Like Stigliz, Jolly (2003: 26), in OECD Economies and the World   42 
Today, cites ‘China’s progress during the economic reform era that began in 1978 as one 
of the great economic success stories of the post-war era’. He credits perceived 
improvements as a function of ‘liberalizing its [China’s] international trade and 
investment policies since the mid 1980s and [argues that the country] is now as open as 
some present WTO [World Trade Organisation] members’ (Jolly 2003: 26).  
 
For Overbeek (1993), this international restructuring of global capitalism in the 1980s is 
part and parcel of the phenomenon of ‘neo-liberalism’ (Overbeek 1993: xi), leading him 
to use the two concepts neo-liberalism and ‘international economic restructuring’ 
interchangeably. From this perspective, this neo-liberal phenomenon is seen to be 
facilitated through ‘the coagulation of transnational money capital and globally operating 
productive capital’, involving ‘intricate mediations between [this] “logic”…and the 
historical reality of national political and social relations’ (Overbeek 1993: xi; Hollman 
1993; Mommen 1993; Gill 1993). Capling, Considine and Crozier (1998) note the rise of 
a global economy marked by ‘uncontrollable market forces’ involving new transnational 
and international economic actors, ‘largely unregulated by political institutions’ (Capling 
et al 1998: 5). The combination of global liberalisation policies and the growth of 
technology have opened up even greater options for multinational companies to move 
their capital freely around the world in search of better profit margins. On this Capling et 
al (1993: 7) cite a revealing comment from the Financial Times. 
Now billions of dollars of financial capital move freely across the world every 
single day in pursuit of short-term profit. One indicator of the dominance of 
financial flows across the world is that by the 1990s just five days worth of 
foreign exchange trading had become equal to a year’s export of  goods and 
services around the world (27 March 1995) 
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There is substantial agreement that neo-liberalism aims to dismantle the social 
democratic and Keynesian agenda developed in the middle of the twentieth century 
(Stretton 1994; Lavalette and Pratt 1997; Pierson 1998; Ife 2002; Battin 1991).  Overbeek 
and van der Pijl (1993: 14) suggest that the shift that occurred in the 1990s, associated 
with, but reaching beyond, the oil crisis of the 1970s, should be understood as a 
‘fundamental crisis of “normality” affecting all aspects of the post-war order: social 
relations of production, the role of the state, and the international order’. In this sense 
newly sought arrangements required an overhaul of previous structures and discourses, 
making way for a new political and philosophical configuration, ushering in new program 
innovations constructed and reliant on the new discursive formations of this era 
(Overbeek and van der Pijl 1993: 14). 
 
Neo-liberal ideas have increasingly taken on the appearance of common sense, at least in 
the circles of decision makers and program designers. Ideas once seen as revolutionary 
under the Reagan and the Thatcher eras have now become conventional norms. This 
point is well-put by Overbeek and van der Pijl; they maintain that neo-liberal ideas are:  
Now part of normal everyday discourse, self evident, near impossible to 
contradict, or even doubt. History conceived of as a struggle of ideologies has 
come to an end…In short the end of history appears to have resolved any 
remaining internal contradictions within international capitalism (other than 
straightforward competition), and to represent the triumph of the ideological 
tendency articulating these orientations, neo-liberalism. Its victory means that its 
radical tenets have themselves become the new ‘normalcy’ (Overbeek and van der 
Pijl 1993: 1-2). 
 
These reforms have gone beyond deconstructing the Keynesian welfare state (Capling et 
al 1998:4). They have sought to reverse the interventionist economic and development   44 
frameworks that characterised many developing economies and the former socialist states 
in the Eastern bloc. A number of writers have addressed this topic. For example, 
Solomon (1999) discusses the abandonment of centralised state planning in the former 
Eastern bloc, the former Soviet Union, and the market liberalisation in China (1999). 
Hyden (1993) and Jilberto (1993) detail the Third World economic transformation and 
the global economic re-orientation of economies in the former Eastern Bloc. The most 
notable aspect of these reforms is the departure from centrally planned development and 
nation-building strategies to a new emphasis on reliance on market methods. This global 
economic transformation has involved western industrial countries, previously centrally 
planned economies and developing countries (Solomon 1999: 1; Jolly 2003). In this 
connection, Solomon (1999: 1) observes that a marked change has occurred, resulting in 
the blurring of those categorical distinctions formerly used to differentiate countries 
around the world. 
 
In relation to Australia, Capling et al (1998) argue that the impact of the global market on 
Australia cannot be understood simply within the confines of the economic sphere. 
Rather, the change is radically transforming the country’s political institutions. Central to 
Capling et al’s (1998) argument is the observation that the transformation of recent 
decades has involved: 
a restructure of many of our most fundamental political 
institutions including the public service, the industrial 
relations and arbitration system, the welfare system, the 
institutions of national economic management, citizenship, 
and of course responsible government itself (Capling et al 
1998: 4). 
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While the appropriate use of the term neo-liberalism remains debatable, arguably social 
policy literature, a key concern of this thesis, has broadly come to associate neo-
liberalism with the transformation surrounding the welfare sector over the last two and a 
half decades (Lavalette 1997; Culpitt 1999; Pierson 1998; 1994; Ife 2002). 
 
At this point it is appropriate to explore further this notion of neo-liberalism. Two points 
need to be made about this exploration. The first is that crucially, assumptions covered 
here are not contested by analysts such as Nahan and Rutherford (1993) Niskanen (1994) 
and Tullock (1976) writing under the rubric of neo-liberalism. The second is that the 
social policy tradition that influenced the rise of the post-war welfare states drew heavily 
from the orthodoxy of social democracy (Bryson 1992; George and Wilding 1976; 
Williams 1989; Carney and Hanks; Jones 1990; Lavalette 1997). And as Pierson argues 
(1998: 25), ‘Keynes …was an opponent of the belief that capitalism was a self-regulating 
economic system. Above all, it was the neo-classical belief in a self-regulating market 
mechanism securing full employment that Keynes sought to subvert, indeed to invert’. 
Thus, the Keynesian strategy had come to influence the shaping of a welfare state based 
on the ‘macro-management of the economy to ensure economic growth under conditions 
of full employment’ and led to an array of redistributive social policies intended to spread 
the benefits of economic growth and manage the impacts of economic activities in a 
variety of ways (Pierson 1998: 27). 
 
It is this second point that strongly indicates the need to explore the ‘new’ neo-liberal 
assumptions since they provide important elements that inform the program of National   46 
Competition Policy (Overbeek and van der Pijl 1993; Stretton 1994; Culpitt 1999). 
Further exploration of the assumptions of neo-liberalism provides firmer ground on 
which to follow the trail of policy shifts and debates connected with this study. 
Specifically, included in this is an exploration of the manner and form in which the 
assumptions of the post-war Keynesian welfare state are being overhauled, making way 
for forms of welfare conducive to advanced liberal states. 
 
Basically, neo-liberalism works from a set of key assumptions about ‘economic man’, 
holding that all individuals make self-maximising choices based on rational thought and 
these are best expressed within a largely deregulated and competitive environment. 
Building on classical liberalism, this position relies on a body of knowledge generated 
under neo-classical economics, itself heavily dependent on abstract mathematical and 
accountancy-based formulas, to provide knowledge necessary in enabling objective 
policy-decision making. It maintains claims to value neutrality pursued through positivist 
methodological precision (Battin 1991: 296; Culpitt 1999; Pierson 1998). For example, 
Milton Friedman’s empiricist contribution to this body of knowledge maintains that any 
government’s effort to stimulate full employment is simply bound to create economic 
inflation (INDECS 1992: 12-13; Battin 1991: 296). Thus Friedman and others taking this 
position question the wisdom of interventionist strategies in pursuit of such a goal. 
 
Culpitt (1999: 42) describes neo-liberalism as a ‘restless and dissatisfied ethos of 
recurrent critique of state reason and politics’, while Pratt (1997: 31) characterises it as a 
‘synthesis of economic and political theories, and behavioural assumptions’ involving   47 
humans and institutions holding a ‘coherent and consistent explanation of the way the 
world works and ought to work’ (Pratt 1997: 34). Premised on the assumed selfish nature 
of individuals, this leads to an atomistic conceptualisation of an individual within society, 
thus ‘depending not so much on the political community as on personal (economic) 
initiative’ (Battin 1991: 296-7). The neo-liberal emphasis on rationality and 
methodological individualism leads to the prescription that: 
Departures from the ideal [non-intervention] can be quickly remedied if the old 
verities are reasserted and the ‘proper’ relationships re-established  between 
government and economy, between state and civil society, and between 
individuals themselves (Pratt 1997: 34)  
 
Some social policy writers have noted that while the neo-liberal critiques of state 
intervention have been built from Hayek and Friedman’s economic theorisation, it is 
essential to note that neo-liberalism has been strengthened by public choice theory 
(Pierson 1998; Mendes 2003a; 2003b; Dunleavy and O’Leary 1987. For a detailed 
outline of ‘public choice’, see Downs 1957; Niskanen 1994; 1973; Tullock 1976). In 
Pratt’s (1997: 44) view, ‘the real cutting edge of neo-liberalism is to be found not in its 
economic theory’ which in his view is not new. Instead, the power of neo-liberalism 
emanates from its argument about ‘government overload’, that is ‘public choice 
argument’, the argument that ‘the system cannot cope with excessive demands generated 
by the politics of Keynesian social democracy. As governments provide more, electorates 
demand more. In consequence, governments overreach themselves’ (Pratt 1997: 44). 
 
Public choice is mainly concerned with a scrutiny of ‘collective or non-market forms of 
decision making drawing [its knowledge base] from economics and political science’ 
(Pierson 1998: 43), intended to give ‘enhanced empirical and logical rigour to the moral   48 
and philosophical case against the welfare state’ (Pierson 1998: 43). From this position it 
is assumed by public choice theory that the exercise of collective choice beyond the 
minimum requirement suggested by theorists such as Smith and Hayek is bound to 
produce inferior outcomes when seen from efficiency criteria. In this connection, liberal 
democratic arrangements are seen to ‘encourage both governments and voters to be 
fiscally irresponsible …within the rules of the liberal democratic game it is then possible 
for voters to act rationally but through their collective action to produce sub-optimal or 
even positively harmful consequences’ (Pierson 1998: 43). Such harm is seen to result in 
higher inflation and in constraining the scope of private sector activities. It is in this 
connection that interest groups such as social policy advocacy groups and an unrestrained 
bureaucracy come to be accused of damaging the healthy functioning of the economy and 
general community economic wellbeing (Mendes: 2003a, 2003b; Niskanen 1994; Tullock 
1976; Downs 1957; Dunleavy and O’Leary 1987). 
 
The spread of public choice theory in relation to reworking the welfare state 
arrangements is noted across a range of literature (Fenna 1998; Pusey 1993; Culpitt 1999; 
Ife 2002). For example, Dunleavy and O’Leary (1987: 316) observe that although ‘there 
are relatively few areas where such non-recurrent interventions [the welfare state] are 
sufficient’, to reduce the burden of government overload, ‘some new-right prescriptions 
may be useful if implemented in a modest and selective fashion’ (1987: 316-7). Culpitt 
(1999: 61), while concerned about the influence of public choice theory, goes on to 
acknowledge that the ‘grand vision of public choice to create and maintain a collectivity 
of autonomous agents has commanded enormous respect’. Clarke (1998: 179) argues that 
often this preoccupation to transform the welfare state has tended to ‘displace real   49 
political and policy choices into a series of managerial imperatives’; that is, into notions 
of ‘“efficiency” and “effectiveness”, “performance” and “quality”’. Mendes (2003a; 
2003b) is also concerned about the influence of public choice theory; he warns of its 
impact in challenging the welfare state agenda in Australia. He argues particularly that 
this theory has generated particular forms of knowledge that are now used to attack and 
constrain the legitimacy of activities undertaken by peak welfare groups, that is, interest 
groups or pressure groups connected with the welfare sector. 
 
Furthermore, Dunleavy and O’Leary (1987: 75) take the view that, generally speaking, 
public choice arguments are not the preserve of right-wing political positions. In fact, the 
public choice arguments have found favour amongst some pluralist  scholars. 
Nonetheless, they note that the biggest following for the public choice stance is 
associated with ‘conservatism (in America) or market liberalism (in Europe)’ (Dunleavy 
and O’Leary 1987: 75). In this sense they observe that well-known public choice theorists 
such as Tullock, Buchanan and Niskanen largely subscribe to Friedman’s laissez faire 
version of economic theorisation, leading to a ‘strong correlation between using a public 
choice methodology and espousing new-right values’ (Dunleavy and O’Leary 1987: 75). 
 
Thus, public choice, although concerned with social and non-market questions such as 
‘the study of the state, constitutions, collective action, voting procedures, party 
behaviour, bureaucratic behaviour and manipulative behaviour’ (Dunleavy and O’Leary 
1987: 76), still relies on neo-classical economics to study these areas of interest. It 
follows that in using a rather narrow neo-classical economic framework to make sense of 
these areas, public choice theory finds close resonance with neo-liberalism since the latter   50 
is also concerned with narrowing the role of the state and, in the process, 
reconceptualising the relationship between the individual and society, hence the quest to 
seek reduction in state intervention. In other words, the preference for neo-classical 
economics, the mistrust of pluralist and or participatory democracy and the drive to 
reduce the scope of the welfare state are positions that resonate favourably across both 
public choice and neo-liberal perspectives. 
 
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that writers such as Pollitt (1993: 43) treat public choice 
theorists, monetarists, neo-classical economists and even Austrian economics as 
traditions that combine to form a neo-liberal orientation. Pollitt (1993: 43) argues that 
seen together as neo-liberals, these theoretical strands blame pluralism and corporatist 
politics as being responsible for contributing to the state overload. They also share a view 
that bureaucracies are primarily preoccupied with the need to promote their own 
individual self-interests (Pollitt 1993: 42-4). 
 
Pusey (2003: 14) maintains that neo-classical economics, used as strategic method of 
individualism, has pushed out other versions of economic thought including ‘Keynesians, 
institutionalists, [and] most economic historians’. Keen (2001) supports this position, 
arguing that the dominance of neo-classical economics has obscured alternative forms of 
economics including, importantly, the Austrian economics. While closely related to neo-
classical economics, the proponents of the Austrian school dismiss the claims of market 
equilibrium and do not accord much credence to mathematical formulas in guiding 
economics as a discipline. This version of economics dismisses the taken-for-granted   51 
notions of market equilibrium, instead treating it as a mere ‘intellectual abstraction’. The 
Austrian school argues that disequilibrium is a common feature of capitalism. This leads 
to economic formulations guided by questions of uncertainty in analysing the operations 
of a capitalist economy. From this perspective, such disequilibrium is taken as a strength 
constituting the capitalist system in that the ‘disaggregated nature of capitalist society 
makes it more adaptable to uncertainty than other centralised systems’ (Keen 2001: 301). 
Moreover, it is through this state of disequilibrium that the entrepreneurial spirit prospers 
through innovations and risk taking. Other competing forms of economics pushed to the 
margins include Post-Keynesianism, which reinforces the question of uncertainty (Keen 
2001: 300-13) and Sraffian economics known for its ‘detailed and careful analysis of the 
mechanics of production in the history of economics. Not…any simple abstractions’ 
characteristic of ‘the neoclassicals factors of production, or even Marx’s industry sectors’ 
(Keen 2001: 307). 
 
Similarly, Jessop (2002: 121) cites further examples  suggesting  that the Ricardian 
account of economics puts more weight on notions of comparative advantage and related 
prices, tending to read the notion of competition as that which delivers the lowest cost of 
production based on comparative access to factors such as labour, capital, raw material 
and so forth. This understanding of competitiveness is framed around fixed notions of 
efficiency and economic conditions. In addition, he observes that the Listian position 
provides another competing economic discourse which dismisses notions of cheap labour 
and raw materials with selective state protection, support and economic regulation of new 
developing industries that are likely to generate significant economic growth.  Jessop   52 
further points out that when seen from a Schumpeterian perspective, competitiveness 
‘depends on developing the individual and collective capacities to engage in permanent 
innovation  –  whether through sourcing, technologies, products, organization or 
marketing’ (2002: 121). 
 
He concludes that: 
The idea of competitiveness is conceptually ambiguous and politically 
controversial. There are many ways to define and measure it; and current policy 
debate indicate the political issues at stake…competitiveness is a discursively 
constructed notion with obvious strategic implications both economically and 
politically (Jessop 2002: 121). 
 
A number of social scientists and economists discuss the narrowness of the methods of 
neo-liberalism in great detail. For example, Threadgold (1990) explores the narrowness 
of neo-classical economics leading to a promotion of instrumental rationality at the 
expense of other forms of knowledge, including professional discourses. Keen (2001: 
259-264) discusses neo-classical economics’ bad use of mathematics to justify its version 
of individualism. He highlights the systematic omission of particular variables such as the 
time factor in its analysis. In addition, he argues that neo-classical economics also suffers 
from internal contradictions through its in-built assumption that it can mathematically 
‘aggregate individual utility to derive a community preference map that has the same 
characteristics as the individual map’ (Keen 2001: 260). Similarly, Hewitson (1999) 
provides a detailed account of a post-structural feminist critique of neo-classical 
economics’ reliance on the discursive construction of a world premised on exclusive 
binary terms, thus reducing a woman to that which can only be understood in relation to a   53 
man (Hewitson 1999: 19). This implies an elevation of the dominant masculine 
understandings (perceptions) of how the world ought to operate. 
 
Another interesting argument is advanced by Henderson (1985), who argues against the 
narrow calculations of neo-liberalism that lead her to estimate that, for example, about a 
half of a nation’s total economy is captured by official accounts; the other half remains 
unaccounted for. This non-monetised economy includes unpaid labour, costs associated 
with degradation and destruction of the environment, parenting and home duties, care for 
the elderly, subsistence agriculture and so forth. Henderson (1985: 325) argues that 
‘industrial societies now labour under excessively money denominated methodological 
biases’. She questions any notion that ‘statistical data quantified in money-coefficients’ 
can serve as ‘major policy tools and analyses’, and points out that notions of efficiency 
and ‘technical’ tools exclude consideration of the broad impacts on social, ecological and 
global future dimensions. In essence, neo-liberal models ignore the complexity of world 
trade, technological advancements, the inadequate information available to consumers 
and all the hidden distortions that make the claims of free markets difficult to sustain 
(Henderson 1985: 323-26). 
 
A question may still be asked about how this narrowness in accounting further links with 
the pursuit of social policy questions such as those relating to housing or labour market 
programs, which are subjects of this study. Here the concern is over the manner in which 
neo-liberalism understands and elevates ‘efficiency per se rather than the efficient 
delivery of services which the polity decides it wants’ (Battin 1991: 301). Battin argues   54 
that in this sense economic rationalism sets parameters for how the notion of efficiency 
comes to be defined, asserting that a better efficiency criteria requires that attention is 
paid to ‘many areas of life - economic, social, political, ethical, and aesthetic’ (Battin 
1991: 301). The production of techniques of efficiency facilitated through NCP is given 
greater attention in the case study discussions. 
 
The pursuit of social policy is also significantly impacted through the broad means of a 
transformed economy. According to Pierson (1998: 59), the shift to flexible forms of 
production (that is, post-Fordist) ‘has undermined the pursuit of Keynesian policies at a 
national level’, instead promoting self-financing and residual forms of welfare reliant on 
volunteerism and occupational benefits (Pierson 1998: 59; Pratt 1997: 29). 
 
In line with this analysis, older political values have come to be seen as being cast off as 
new forms of political culture emerge (Capling et al 1998; Rose 1996). More specifically, 
for some social policy analysts, ‘the political language of citizenship with its notion of 
reciprocal rights and obligations is being subverted and displaced by the language of 
consumerism and the vocabulary of greed’ (Capling et al 1998: 4). Under these 
circumstances, post-war social democratic discourses of social rights and citizenship are 
seen to lose their potency (Lavalette and Pratt 1997: 43; Culpitt 1999: 14; Rose 1996). 
For Pierson (1998: 59), under the workings of neo-liberalism, social policy initiatives 
come to take a form of Schumpeterian workfare state, intent on promoting innovation and 
technological gains, with reduced regard for redistributive welfare. The second case study 
in this thesis demonstrates that while under neo-liberal governance notions of social   55 
rights become tenuous, the dominant neo-liberal discourses are themselves by no means 
immutable and totally settled. Rather, they co-exist with the now subordinate social 
policy discourses of a post-war era. Moreover, the argument about the Schumpeterian 
shift deserves some attention. 
 
Schumpeter held the view that economic change is always propelled by transformation in 
the methods of production. Central to this is the idea of innovation as the cornerstone of 
economic change. Innovation entails distinct shifts in the methods of production, 
including new ways of organising production activities and processes, new products, new 
technologies and new markets (Heerje 2006; 1988: 71-72; Rosenberg 1986: 197-8). 
Schumpeter’s position underpinned by Austrian economics departs from the notions of 
equilibrium that characterise neo-classical economics (see previous discussion in relation 
to Keen’s differentiation of various economic discourses). Instead, Schumpeter took a 
broader view of economic change; situating it within a historical process of 
transformation, most specifically, for him, economic change can only be explained by 
non-economic factors. In this sense, it is ‘part of a larger social and historical frame of 
reference…a complex vision of the economic process’ (Rosenberg 1986:197). The point 
emphasised is by Jessop who notes that this perspective, ‘rejects the key assumption of 
neo-classical economics that there is a clearly delineated, socially disembedded sphere of 
economic relations with a tendency towards general equilibrium’ (1993: 5). Schumpeter 
also dismissed neo-classical notions of rationality and consumer sovereignty (the claim of 
consumer choice  influenced by some preference)  (Rosenberg 1986: 5), thus  modern 
Schumpeterians  insist that ‘economic rationality and dynamics cannot be adequately   56 
analysed in terms of pure exchange relations in perfect markets’ (Jessop 2002: 5). 
Rosenberg 1986: 203) notes that ‘at a deeper level, much of what Schumpeter had to say 
about neo-classical economics applies  to modern economics as well.’  His remark 
indicates  an acknowledgement of  the ascendancy and consolidation of orthodox 
economic thinking within ‘mainstream’ economics, a point stressed throughout the 
literature reviewed in this chapter. 
 
In this context it  is  thus  noteworthy, that  some analysts have characterised a 
contemporary shift from a Keynesian welfare national states  to a  Schumpeterian 
‘workfare’  national  state  (Jessop’s 2002; Torfing 1999; Lodemel 2005; 2002; Grover 
1999).  Arguing from this perspective,  Jessop suggests  that  the post-war Keynesian 
welfare system was broadly aligned and served as a regulatory mechanism under the 
Fordist economic system. He notes that it was a ‘historically specific political regime that 
corresponds with a historical specific stage of capital accumulation in a particular 
economic and political space within the world economy’ (Jessop 2002: 2). He elaborates 
the distinctive features underpinning this system included the primacy accorded to the 
interests of a nation state, prevalence of closed national economic systems, promotion of 
the reproductive welfare function used in furthering political and social rights, albeit one 
embedded through patriarchal forms (Jessop 2002: 72).  He maintains that under the 
competition state, promoting productive conditions takes a different form, emphasizing 
extra-economic innovative practices encompassing diverse forms of production, social 
organisation,  and increased application of new technologies, collaborative initiatives, 
networking and flexibility in the workforce. He maintains that this supply-driven state,   57 
underpinning the post-Fordist era, ‘involves commitment to…innovation and flexibility 
in the structural form of regulation’ (2002: 58). In addition, he observes that under this 
regulatory regime, we see greater uptake of global norms, standards, benchmarks 
connected with global markets, and engaged in mediating particular forms of integration 
of the capitalist global economy. Moreover, the competition embedding this process takes 
a virtual form, characterised by virtual audits. It is this  meaning of competition  that 
becomes  introduced in the social realm  that constitutes innovation as this becomes 
extended to the public sector (Jessop 2002: 115-6). 
 
 
 
New Managerial Techniques 
 
Before looking at how the program of NCP has been put together, it is important to 
briefly discuss the subject of New Public Management. This practice makes use of new 
technologies in transforming the management of human services, placing a premium on 
quantifiable  measures relating to service objectives and outcomes (Hill 2005: 267-8; 
Clarke 1998: 179; Jones 2003: 1). 
 
According to Hill (2005: 269), the new public management works to undermine the level 
of professional autonomy that has come to be enjoyed by various professions such as 
medicine, teaching and social work,  in  its  bid to regulate the outcomes of the 
organisation. It works in a top-down fashion, attempting to institute changes necessary to 
achieve efficient and effective management objectives.  
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Duff and Larsen (2003: 1) observe that traditionally, professions have staked their claim 
on the basis that they are using their particular professional knowledge for the benefit of 
their clients. Accompanying this question of autonomy was the belief that professionals 
have a taken-for-granted right to exercise certain levels of discretion in judgements they 
make in relation to their clients and some of the programs they deliver. As Jones (2003: 
1) notes, ‘the defence of professionalism assumes two postures; one concerns the 
inevitability of discretion; and the other its desirability.’ He maintains that this argument 
has potency when the fact that practitioners work and mediate across a complex set of 
interrelated and competing objectives with diverse population groups  is taken into 
account. This requires them ‘to draw upon sophisticated processes of communication and 
negotiation…regardless of whether or not such action attracts any formal recognition’ 
(Baldwin cited in Jones, 2003: 1). 
 
Duff and Larsen (2003: 1) argue that the professional status was defended on a basis of 
trust in its disciplinary  knowledge,  which, were  seen as something that ‘cannot be 
codified fully’. The shift involving top-down managerial attempts to classify and control 
the use of professional knowledge, while simultaneously encouraging client evaluations, 
has served to weaken this element of trust. Duff and Larsen observe that critics interpret 
the attempts of professions to retain their autonomy as a matter of self interests, and 
maintain that it is important to take account of the changing market structures of the 
human services within the public sector and across a range of government funded profit 
and not-for profit human service new market structures. 
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The growth of managerial techniques has been greatly aided by the availability of new 
technologies promising to deliver lower costs and greater productivity in managing 
human services (Loader 1998: 222; Brown 2003).  In these new arrangements, 
computerised client databases have emerged as a key tool whereby practitioners have 
managed to access and transfer a range of information for practice and program 
management and inter-agency purposes (Brown 2003: 1-6). Having discussed these key 
managerialist strategies, I now turn my attention to the way in which the NCP framework 
has been formulated. 
 
 
Mechanisms of National Competition Policy 
 
 
Putting the pieces in place – NCP calculations 
 
The Industry Commission (1995: 1-2) noted that while Federal and state governments 
were each pursuing a microeconomic reform agenda in the 1980s, these were largely 
undertaken independently before 1991. In a bid to bring the federal and state agenda 
together to harness competition policy more effectively, in 1991 the federal Government 
commissioned an independent inquiry into National Competition Policy. The Prime 
Ministerial brief issued by Hawke required ‘an urgent examination of all that could be 
done to widen the ambit of the Trade Practices Act to bring the excluded areas of 
economic enterprise within the scope of the national framework of competition policy 
and law’ (Department of the Parliamentary Library 2001: 2-3). As a result the inquiry 
was mandated to specifically look at the relevance of competition in respect to the 
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•  Government and Trading Enterprises (GTEs) 
•  Marketing Authorities 
•  Unincorporated bodies 
•  Government Procurement by Commonwealth, State, Territory and local 
governments (Department of the Parliamentary Library 2001: 1). 
 
This inquiry culminated in the 1993 Hilmer Report (Industry Commission 1995: 1-2). Put 
simply, Hilmer’s recommendations were formulated around the aim of removing what 
was perceived to be a privileged position previously enjoyed by government trading 
enterprises. The proposed changes were designed to ensure these businesses were left to 
face the same market pressures as those confronting the private sector. The new 
provisions facilitated private companies’ access to public owned infrastructure as a 
means of enabling more market players in service provision. Thus, for example, a new 
corporate player could be allowed to tap into an electricity power grid or use railway or 
telephone infrastructure developed by public owned companies. 
 
The recommendations of the Hilmer Report (1993) comprise six key policy reforms: 
• Extending the reach of the Trade Practices Act 1974  (TPA) to 
unincorporated businesses and State and Territory government businesses so 
that the competitive conduct rules (contained in Part IV of the Act) apply to 
all business activity in Australia; 
• Provision to allow third party access to nationally significant infrastructure; 
• Introduction of competitive neutrality so that government businesses do not 
enjoy unfair advantages when competing with private businesses; 
• Restructuring of public sector monopoly businesses to increase competition; 
review of all laws which restrict competition; and 
• Extending prices surveillance arrangements to State and Territory 
government businesses to deal with those circumstances where all other 
competition policy reforms prove inadequate (Department of the 
Parliamentary Library 2001: 4). 
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At the 1995 Council of Australian Government (COAG) meeting, the Commonwealth 
and State Governments adopted this broad framework for the implementation of 
competition policy (Industry Commission 1995: 1-2). It is currently encapsulated in the 
following three key Commonwealth/State government agreements: the Conduct Code 
Agreement; the Competition Principles Agreement; and the Agreement to Implement the 
National Competition Policy and Related Reforms (the latter generally known as the 
Implementation Agreement). Among other things, the last agreement set conditions for a 
reward system in the form of financial transfers from the Commonwealth in favour of 
those States and Territories that promoted National Competition Policy reform 
(Department of the Parliamentary Library 2001: 7; NCC 2002a: Section 1.1-1.2). 
 
There are various components to the NCP supported through legislative and non-
legislative means. A major part of competition involves the dismantling of the 
monopolistic market power of government business enterprises so that they are subject to 
similar market conditions as a private company. Another major feature commits 
government business activities to competitive neutrality, that is, to subject government 
entities to the same market forces as the private sector. In this way, education, welfare, 
health and labour market programs become subject to quasi-market conditions and 
frameworks. Depending on what is deemed the most competitive way, a service may be 
sold off, contracted out or out-resourced (Industry Commission 1995: 5).  
 
The role of National Competition Council (NCC) has relevance here. The Council was 
specifically formed by COAG in 1995 to provide oversight relating to the NCP reform.   62 
Its role includes the assessment of how the various levels of government are progressing 
with NCP reform. The council is also responsible for recommending how any financial 
benefits accrued through competition should be distributed. It undertakes reviews and 
gives advice pertaining ‘to restrictive or anti-competitive legislation, the structural reform 
of public monopolies, prices oversight, and competitive neutrality’ (Department of the 
Parliamentary Library 2001: 11), and is mandated to carry out community education 
relating to NCP. The Council prides itself on being independent, a position reinforced in 
its being constituted as a statutory body. The five NCC councillors are drawn from 
business backgrounds (Industry Commission 1995: 11). From the perspective of this 
thesis, it would seem that the culture and intellectual know-how associated with the 
private sector may have been deemed of greater value than social technologies associated 
with social sciences (Pusey 1993; Rose 1996) in the re-working of the interventionist 
government mechanism that dominated the post-war era. 
 
National Competition Policy is built around rewards and sanctions. As already indicated, 
this allows the Commonwealth to distribute funds to those States seen to keep pace with 
competition reform. Failure to implement relevant reform means that such dividends do 
not come about. In line with this, the NCC has a duty to recommend to the Treasurer a 
reduction or suspension of NCP payments to any state or territory deemed not to have 
made a contribution (NCC 2002a: section 1.4-1.6). In keeping with this system, Murray 
confirms a range of gains and losses made by States and Territories in relation to this 
compliance regime (2003: 20-25).   
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Australia’s Department of the Parliamentary Library (2001) documentation argues that 
competition policy is not entirely new. As far back as 1906 the Australian Industries 
Preservation Act  was enacted to counter monopolistic practices across states and 
territories, while a more recent version of competition policy can be found in the 1965 
Trade Practices Act (1971, 1974 as amended). Other 1970s and 1980s reforms associated 
with competition policy include tariff cuts, abolishing currency exchange rates and the 
‘elimination of exchange controls’ (Department of the Parliamentary Library 2001: 1). 
These were accompanied by major microeconomic reform initiatives involving the 
‘corporatisation of business enterprise and deregulation in the transport and 
telecommunication sectors’ (Department of the Parliamentary Library 2001: 1). On the 
basis of these trends, the Department of the Parliamentary Library text (ibid) claims that 
the advancement of NCP is a natural progression of a ‘broad public policy direction’. 
 
Notwithstanding the elements of competition historically embedded in Australian public 
policy, it is clear that the neo-liberal reforms embarked upon since the 1980s do contain 
devised new elements markedly different from those of the Keynesian ‘reign’. These 
reforms set out to entrench neo-classical economic methods as the main prism through 
which public policy was to be understood and delivered. In the Hawke-Keating era this 
was also accompanied by particular social protection measures and social wage 
provisions. These have been discussed by various authors. For example, Jamrozik (1994) 
discusses the introduction of occupational benefits in the 1980s and INDECS (1992) 
discusses  the indexation measures  and ‘safety net’ for low income earners, and 
superannuation. Similarly, Cox (1995) discusses superannuation and childcare benefits.   64 
In this thesis I take the view that the pursuit of NCP under the current Federal Coalition 
Government occurs simultaneously with the erosion of the social wage, industrial 
deregulation and increased user pays measures in higher education. This view is 
supported by McMahon, et al (2000: 33-36) in their work reflecting on the reconstruction 
of the social wage under the Howard Government. Pusey (2003) narrates the experience 
of middle class Australia under an economic rationalist regime; and Kinnear (2003: 116) 
discusses punitive mutual obligation breaching practices targeting income support 
recipients; while Fincher and Saunders (2001) highlight the widening gap in the standards 
of living associated with shifting government policies. This trend consolidates the 
importance of the market frameworks and values more than at any other time following 
World War II. 
 
From at least the 1990s on, these developments have set the context within which state 
governments must operate. Before turning specifically to Western Australia, it is useful to 
reflect somewhat further on the Hilmer Report (1993) and the scope of its discursive 
policy framework. 
 
The Hilmer framework 
 
In essence, National Competition Policy as formulated in the Hilmer Report and related 
documents is in tune with the technical formulations of neo-classical economics (Hilmer 
1993). Competition and competitive frameworks assume primacy, and other societal 
considerations must be understood and interpreted through this lens. Hence, within the 
frame of NCP it is not possible to talk of matters such as efficiency, quality, community   65 
and individual welfare or participation, unless these understandings are filtered through 
the lens of competition. It can be seen that Hilmer’s orientation is neo-liberal in that it 
assumes individual interest should largely, if not wholly, determine how individuals and 
societies reach optimal decisions (Hewitson 1999; Pollitt 1993; Threadgold and Cranny-
Francis 1990). Here, the common good is reached through each individual pursuing his or 
her own interests. 
 
Under the Hilmer (1993) policy framework, delivery of community welfare services 
becomes analogous with the delivery of business services, and thus needs to operate 
under the rubric of ‘contestable markets’ (Hilmer 1993: 2-3).  In effect, this means that if 
a family support program does not perform to the satisfaction of the government agency 
contracting out the service it stands to lose its contracted business to other potential 
operators. The fear of another contractor taking over the program in question is assumed 
to keep service providers and their workers on their toes.   
 
Alongside  this, the Hilmer Report proposes that having more competitors in a given 
business is not always necessarily the best means of promoting efficiency. Instead, there 
may be times when the number of possible players is reduced to promote ‘economies of 
scale and scope encompassing production, marketing and technology’ (Hilmer 1993: 2-
3). This acknowledges that in a country with a relatively small population like Australia, 
competition policy has to consider questions of the investment cost required to build and 
operate a particular infrastructure (for example, electricity or gas). This also entails 
exploring a way to maximise innovation and other technological advancements. In this   66 
context, it can be argued that not only  the neo-classical  economics, but also  the 
Schumpeterian concept of competition appear to influence the framing of the Hilmer 
Report. However, as my Labour Market Program Case Study will show, it seems the 
Schumpeterian features connected with NCP are  being read in a particular way, in 
keeping with notions of methodological individualism. 
 
In so far as people come into the matrix of NCP, they do so on the understanding that 
enhanced  competition between firms will promote ‘different mixes of benefits to 
consumers’ (Hilmer 1993: 2-3). These benefits are seen in terms of consumer preferences 
relating to factors such as service quality and timeliness. The committee further claimed 
that price is, in fact, a very small part of what competition is about (Hilmer 1993). 
Broadly speaking, reconceptualising the relationship between individuals, society and the 
state into one centred around the notion of consumers signifies a shift away from a 
capitalist welfare state, ‘in which the state intervenes within the processes of economic 
reproduction and distribution to reallocate life chances between individuals and/or 
classes’ (Pierson 1998: 7). 
 
In its discussion of community welfare, the Hilmer Report assumes the primacy of 
economic criteria. It thus discusses the effect of competition on ‘economic efficiency and 
other social goals’ (Hilmer 1993: 4) and assumes that economic growth is the major route 
to the realisation of greater wellbeing.  While competition is also considered to be 
strongly consistent with empowering consumers, the report does admit that in some cases   67 
it may not deliver the desired social objectives. In such instances other allocative means 
should be sought (Hilmer 1993: 5). In this respect, the report acknowledges that, 
in some cases, competition could be restricted in favour of a public monopoly of 
government pricing directions as a way of pursuing particular non-economic objectives. 
Instances where community service obligations may be indicated include public utilities 
such as water, electricity and ports (Hilmer 1993: 5). Unfortunately, Hilmer’s views on 
these issues have been neglected within the contemporary culture of competition. This 
has become so pervasive that the belief that questions of equity, community service 
obligations and the like ought to be addressed by imitating market mechanisms has 
increasingly gained momentum. A document titled Progress Report: Implementing 
National Competition Policy in Western Australia (1998) confirms and details the way in 
which notions of ‘Competitive Neutrality’ (Competition Policy Unit 1998: 21) are being 
used to reform a range of services in keeping with NCP requirements. Seen from this 
perspective, to cite one instance, it is disturbing that local governments are now obligated 
to subject their community services to competition criteria such as user-pays, cost 
recovery and increased preference for contracting out, irrespective of the rationale for 
which those provisions were set up (see clause 3 and 7 of the Competition Principles 
Agreement. NCC u.d. http://www.ncc.gov.au/sector.asp?ID=16). For example, Home and 
Community Care Service, HACC, for the elderly and a range of recreational services 
have become subject to user-pays and marketisation methods. 
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Constructing authoritative calculations – The McCarrey Report 
 
The McCarrey Report (1993a; 1993b), (Report of the Independent Commission to 
Review Public Sector Finance) is to Western Australia what the Hilmer Report is to 
Australia.  The McCarrey review took place in 1993. A central tenet of this report is its 
assertion that ‘the sheltered position of [government] agencies has resulted in inefficient 
structures and practices…such protective practices have worked against the broader 
community interest in that operating costs (and taxes and charges) have been maintained 
at unnecessarily high levels’ (McCarrey Report 1993a: 3).  
 
 The McCarrey Report moves a step further in that it also addresses managerial issues in 
the context of public sector finances. The following discussion highlights key aspects of 
the McCarrey Report’s mechanisms for creating a competitive environment aimed at 
reducing state expenditure. Set in the context of public sector reform, the language of the 
report is as similar to that of the Hilmer Report in its emphasis on competition as its 
emphasis on key competition mechanisms involving corporatisation, commercialisation 
and privatisation demonstrates. The notions of Competitive Neutrality and Competitive 
Tendering and Contracting (CTC) play a key role in the report. 
 
The McCarrey Report (1993a; 1993b) subjects the Western Australian government and 
the public sector more generally to critical scrutiny. It asserts that ‘the engine that drives 
efficiency is free and open competition’ and that, as a result of competition reform 
Western Australia’s economy will be more resilient and productive in the new global 
environment (McCarrey 1993b: 3-4). The civil service and public utilities are criticised   69 
for not being ‘subject to the same market discipline to determine price and quality’ as is 
assumed to be the case with the private sector (McCarrey 1993a: 17). The report argues 
that there is an excessive cost of service provision that has hitherto remained hidden. It 
claims that public choices are distorted since the ‘judgements as to the amount and 
quality of services provided are made by Ministers and public servants reflect imperfect 
political assessments of community needs rather than direct decisions of consumers’ 
(ibid). In addition, the report asserts that the monopolistic position enjoyed by 
government trading enterprises such as the former agency the State Energy Commission 
of Western Australia – SECWA, and the Water Authority, leads to a situation where 
customers are denied choice (McCarrey 1993a: 17). 
 
The McCarrey Report (1993a: 176) adopts a technical tone or vocabulary deliberately 
distancing itself from the matters of policy and the political operations of government. 
McCarrey claims ‘it is not for the Commission to address matters of government policy. 
Decisions on future policy settings are for elected governments’ (McCarrey Report 
1993a: 176). This claim to be apolitical is, though, misleading since the ideological codes 
of the Report are evident in the methods it prescribes for reforming the public sector. In 
recommending managerial methods to reduce the government’s coordination and 
mediation function, the Report clearly adopts an identifiable policy position. 
 
The  Report pays the prevailing government structure special attention, criticising the 
system for having an excessive number of statutory authorities enjoying a greater power 
than corresponding government departments. Of the 189 agencies examined, 131 were   70 
statutory authorities. Unlike departments, statutory bodies are not subject to both 
ministerial and parliamentary accountability processes. Observing the degree of 
independence enjoyed by statutory bodies, the report argues that: 
the statutory authority is a more rigid administrative form. Its 
responsibilities can be varied only by Act of Parliament…in these 
circumstances, non elected members of authorities are in a position 
to frustrate policies of elected governments or pursue their own 
policy agenda, notwithstanding that the government is held 
accountable for the outworking of policy decisions (McCarrey 
1993a: 179-80). 
 
More broadly, the McCarrey Report argues that there was a consistent lack of quality 
management systems across government agencies and an inability to distinguish between 
specific ‘resource needs and usage’ (McCarrey 1993a: 183). Public agencies are faulted 
for not encompassing acceptable performance measurements and failing to produce 
adequately documented accountability resource use measures (McCarrey 1993a: 183-84). 
In all these respects the Report’s emphasis on outputs, performance concerns and 
timelines is evident, as illustrated in the following two quotes:  
No budgetary working papers seen [in the course of the review] 
demonstrated a ‘real resource capacity’ or ‘best performance’ 
approach to evaluating resource requirements. Even when the 
measure of work is straightforward, the work is generally not 
measured. In those cases where work is less tangible, little attempt 
was made to define project objectives, set calendar time frames or 
estimate the amount of human resource required for shorter 
interval milestones. This lack of even the most fundamental project 
control and resource planning activity was most evident throughout 
many policy development areas reviewed   (McCarrey 1993a: 
184). 
 
Instead of starting with the questions: “what work is the agency 
required to do and what outcomes are required?” and “what are the 
short-interval objectives within this process and how much 
resource is required?”, agencies start with an approved level of 
expenditure and ‘backfill’ to decide what work will be done.   71 
Although probably a somewhat unfair criticism, agencies appear to 
develop strategies that consume available funds rather than 
justifying the funds required for agreed, defined, measured and 
controlled objectives as is required of private sector managers 
(McCarrey 1993a: 184). 
 
As well as asserting that competition will bring about enhanced levels of efficiency and 
effectiveness, McCarrey also maintains that government costs will fall through this 
process without adversely impacting on quality of services. Allied with this, he suggests 
that governments across the board will become aware ‘of the greater efficiency and 
economy of private sector practices resulting from specialisation’ (McCarrey 1993a: 1-2). 
In line with this, the Report urges a re-orientation of responsibility and accountability. It 
faults the public sector for ‘excessive layers of management and lines of control’ (ibid). 
The answer is seen to lay in reallocation of resources to the private sector and other areas 
of emerging needs. This, in turn, means challenging the ‘reluctance on the part of 
government agencies and sectional interests to abandon the old to make way for the new’ 
(McCarrey 1993a: 3). 
 
As in the Hilmer Report, corporatisation and commercialisation are key features of the 
managerial reform process proposed under McCarrey. For the most part, this was aimed 
at Government Trading Enterprises (GTEs), but also had a direct bearing  on the 
reorganisation of former statutory organisations such as Homeswest, where it aimed to 
instil market principles in the structure of the organisation and its treatment of customers.  
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Homeswest and the new accounting calculations 
 
The former Homeswest (reconstituted into a Ministry of Housing and Works) was one of 
the fifty government agencies reviewed by the McCarrey team. The responsibility for its 
review was put in the hands of ‘business people with long experience in the land 
subdivision and housing industry’ (McCarrey: 1993b: 63). 
 
The Report notes that as of 1993 there were two major rental housing types administered 
by Homeswest; those that were assessed at full market cost and those in which a 
subsidised rent attracted only 22.5 per cent of the occupant’s income. In June 1992 those 
receiving a rent concession represented 81 per cent of rental households (McCarrey 
1993b: 68). Officially, this translated into an annual subsidy of $2,200 per property per 
year. The McCarrey Report, however, argues that the actual subsidy was likely to be 
much bigger given that Homeswest rent was below market value (McCarrey 1993b: 68). 
Following from this, one of the main recommendations of the Report was the need to re-
orientate Homewest’s welfare function. It is unclear how this was to be done, aside from 
the stipulation that the change should occur after an appraisal of eligibility criteria of 
potential occupants. The Housing Authority was also asked to strengthen its management 
function in respect to its property management section and move towards contracting out 
its property management role to the private sector (McCarrey 1993b: 71, 73). Against 
these recommendations, the report does, in fact, recognise certain important aspects of 
Homeswest’s functions. It recognises that people accessing Homeswest housing were 
likely to be ‘disadvantaged groups and groups with special needs, people having 
difficulty in the private rental market, and borrowers experiencing financial difficulty’   73 
(McCarrey 1993b: 63). In addition,  the Report acknowledges that there are other 
productive roles played by Homeswest such as the facilitation of home ownership for 
first home buyers and the maintenance of substantial productive land holdings (McCarrey 
1993b: 63). 
 
The McCarrey Report reserved its comments about Aboriginal people and home 
ownership for a chapter dealing with Aboriginal affairs across government. Observations 
were made about the disproportionately high level of Aboriginal people occupying rental 
accommodation. This was stated to be 83 per cent, with a sizable 57 per cent ‘at the lower 
end of the scale’ (McCarrey 1993b: 271). A mere 17 per cent owned or were buying a 
home (McCarrey 1993b: 271). The recommendations made for Aboriginal affairs, of 
which housing is a small part are said to be in line with those of the 1992 COAG 
(McCarrey 1993b: 283). The team made it clear at the time of reporting, however, that 
although COAG was aware of the need to ‘achieve a greater coordination for improved 
service delivery to Aboriginal people…it did not provide the detail through which greater 
coordination could be achieved’ (McCarrey, 1993b: 273). In its turn, the McCarrey 
Report, having acknowledged the level of disadvantage experienced by Aboriginal 
people, did not make clear how this could be redressed by market principles. 
 
It is important to note the actors who contributed to the McCarrey agenda. The main 
players were associated with accounting and private enterprise, including representatives 
from Arthur & Anderson, Deloitte Ross Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, KPMG Peat 
Marwick, Macquarie Bank, Price Waterhouse, Alcoa’s Executive Director, the Chamber   74 
of Commerce and Industry (Western Australia), the Institute of Public Affairs and 
property and real estate enterprises. In addition, a few government representatives were 
drawn from the office of Public Sector Management, State Treasury and Premier and 
Cabinet (McCarrey, 1993b: iv-ix). 
 
The recommendations made by the McCarrey review in respect of Homeswest are 
reflected in even greater detail in a publication produced by the Institute of Public Affairs 
in March 1993. This publication, titled Reform and Recovery – An Agenda for the New 
Australian Government, starts by saying that the Institute’s objective is to ‘encourage 
understanding and appreciation of the free society and free enterprise’ (Nahan and 
Rutherford 1993: preface). To this end it applies ‘classical economic and political 
analysis to Australian society and institutions, particularly when it appears that freedom 
or economic wellbeing are threatened’ (Nahan and Rutherford 1993: preface). The text 
then calls for a separation of Homewest’s welfare function from its commercial activities, 
saying that the pendulum has swung in favour of the welfare function. The Institute also 
deplored the hidden cross-subsidisation occurring in favour of the welfare function. From 
its point of view:  
All tenants are receiving a ‘hidden’ subsidy of $25 per week….If 
we go further and ask what return might be earned on an asset 
worth (at a rough guess) $2,275 million, then a larger figure is 
suggested. At present that asset appears to be earning little or 
nothing. In effect, then, all of the asset’s earnings potential is being 
sacrificed to serve a welfare function. On that way of reckoning the 
matter, many Homeswest renters will be receiving a subsidy worth 
perhaps $100 per week (Nahan and Rutherford 1993: 220). 
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More broadly, the Institute is preoccupied with the general impact of social protection 
policies and Keynesian economics. In relation to Homeswest, Nahan and Rutherford 
(1993: 217) argue that the housing authority started in 1945 with the intention to ‘provide 
cheap but adequate housing for young families’ but that due to policy change in the late 
1960s, the ‘welfare clientele’ eventually rose to 83 per cent of Homeswest tenants. For 
the Institute of Public Affairs this is unacceptable due to diminishing financial returns. In 
its view, this raises questions about accountability since it blames sectional influence for 
the entrenchment of welfarism. It sees the answer in the new frameworks that separate 
‘the welfare and the commercial functions, so that both can be made to perform more 
efficiently’ (Nahan and Rutherford 1993: 219). 
 
In summary, the prescriptions of competition policy are all too familiar: reduce 
government involvement in the public sphere, lessen the role of welfare bureaucracies, 
enable customers to make individual choices through the market system and refashion 
welfare services to follow market principles. The emphasis is on the individual choices of 
consumers and is designed to achieve a radical shift away from collective practices. 
Related to this point, think tanks such as the Institute of Public Affairs assist in reshaping 
the calculative dealings of government agencies and other actors, and have a direct 
impact on the management of housing policy. The constitutive nature of the language in 
play and the mechanisms of inscription employed by these agents of reform are worthy of 
further exploration - a task that is tackled throughout this thesis. 
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Having outlined Hilmer’s competition framework and the accounting calculations 
contained in the McCarrey Report, the thesis discusses two key aspects of NCP namely: 
competitive neutrality, and competitive tendering and contracting (CTC). Understanding 
these principles is critical since they are decisive points of reference shaping the entire 
reform process and the specific reforms embedded within it. They also represent the 
managerial modalities through which competition takes shape. 
 
Competitive Neutrality 
 
National Competition Policy requires that all parties apply competitive neutrality 
principles to ‘all significant government owned businesses (including local government 
businesses) where appropriate’ (NCC 2002a:  Section 1.1). In essence, competitive 
neutrality is a mechanism whereby private and public sector players are effectively 
placed on the same footing and compete with each other ‘equally’. In the words of the 
National Competition Council, competitive neutrality entails: 
placing significant government business activity on the same footing – 
for taxes, interest costs and regulation –  as their actual or potential 
private competitors, to the extent that the benefits to be realised from 
implementation outweigh the costs. It encourages government to 
corporatise their significant government business enterprises and ensure 
the prices charged by other significant government business reflect full 
cost attribution (NCC 2002a: 2.14). 
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The National Competition Council states that competitive neutrality is a useful decision-
making tool. The Council argues that this principle: 
helps governments to make better informed decisions about 
the future of their entities. Full attribution of costs often 
leads governments to assess afresh whether they wish to 
provide a good or service directly through a government 
business, to allow competitive bidding for the provision of 
the good or service, or to vacate the area of production 
(NCC 2002a: 2.14-2.15). 
 
The argument here is essentially that, stripped of their artificial advantages, government 
will need to make decisions about resource allocation ‘on the basis of merit’ rather than 
tradition or preference (NCC 2002a: Section 2.14-2.15). In addition, the National 
Competition Council asserts that competitive neutrality leads to enhanced performance, 
reduces taxation and costs for service users and, in general, enhances community 
economic welfare (NCC 2002a: Section 2.14-2.15). For this reason, the Commonwealth 
Competitive Neutrality Guidelines for Managers (1999) extends application of 
competitive neutrality to services categorised under the purchase/provider split. The 
guidelines emphasise that where a government arm makes an ‘in-house’ (Commonwealth 
of Australia 1998: 2) tender bid, their operations would need to be  provided on 
commercial basis even if the customers are not charged for services (Commonwealth of 
Australia 1998: 1). Here, the Commonwealth Competitive Neutrality Policy Statement 
stresses that this mechanism ‘is intended to remove resource allocation distortions.... 
[these distortions occur] because prices charged by significant government businesses 
need not fully reflect resource costs. Consequently, this can distort decisions on 
production and consumption’ (The Treasury, Australian Government 1999: 4) including 
policy decisions involving what goods and services should be produced by the public   78 
sector, and thus enabling the private sector competitors to make appropriate investment 
decisions on an equal footing. 
 
There are other applications of competitive neutrality relevant to the concerns of this 
thesis. These include the indirect extension of competitive neutrality to organisations not 
formally intended under NCP. For example, in November 2000, COAG endorsed the 
principle whereby when ‘a government business (for instance, a university) is not subject 
to the executive control of a government, a “best endeavours” approach could be 
adopted’ (NCC 2002a: Section 2.17, 2.20). This would also require governments to, at a 
minimum, provide a transparent statement of competitive neutrality obligations to the 
organisation concerned. While there is no requirement for government to employ a 
competitive process in providing Community Service Obligations (CSOs), the fine print 
requires parties to use market formulas in determining the target criteria and the level of 
provisions. Thus the quest to use market techniques in meeting even community service 
obligations, which are there to address market failures in the first place, resonates with 
Rose’s observation that: 
the powers once accorded to positive knowledges of human conduct are to be 
transferred to the calculative regimes of accounting and financial management. 
And the enclosures of expertise are to be penetrated through a range of new 
techniques for exercising critical scrutiny over authority. These certainly rely 
upon a claim to truth, but it is one that has a different character from that of the 
social and human sciences (Rose 1996: 54). 
 
It is through similar justifications that local governments are encouraged to extend 
competitive neutrality to their recreational and welfare facilities, with the National 
Competition Council calling for greater transparency in relation to any hidden subsidies   79 
associated with such local government activities. Such subsidies, the Council believes, 
should be subject to regular reviews (NCC 2002a: Section 2.17, 2.20). 
 
Western Australia prides itself on the progress it has made in relation to advancing the 
notion of competitive neutrality. In its 1998 Progress Report to the National Competition 
Council, the West Australian Government made note of its move to legislate in favour of 
a commercialised status for the State’s Port Authorities, thus bringing this utility in line 
with organisations such as Western Power, Alinta Gas and the Water Corporation. At the 
time similar legislation was being prepared for Land Corp, and the following agencies 
had competitive neutrality reviews underway to ensure their operations were placed on an 
equal footing with the private sector: Gold Corporation, Insurance Commission of WA, 
Homeswest, Lotteries Commission, Totalisator Agency Board, Rottnest Island Authority, 
and Bunbury and Busselton Water Boards. Westrail and the former MetroBus escaped 
competitive neutrality reviews as measures had already been undertaken to privatise the 
Westrail freight business and to contract out MetroBus and ferry services (Competition 
Policy Unit, WA Treasury, 1998: 2, 7). 
 
Furthermore, although local governments are not signatories to the NCP COAG 
arrangements, by 1998, 97 of Western Australia’s local government businesses had been 
reviewed under the notion of competitive neutrality. These businesses stretched from 
waste collection and disposal services to regional airports and social services, including 
local government-funded ‘recreation centres, aged care centres, child care centres and 
golf courses’ (Competition Policy Unit, WA Treasury, 1998: 20). In addition, 43 out of   80 
54 Western Australian major local authorities had made significant moves to meet the 
requirements of competitive neutrality (Competition Policy Unit, WA Treasury, 1998: 
20). 
 
Even though local government programs such as community aged care services were not 
mentioned as a priority by the National Competition Council, they had nonetheless 
become subject to NCP in an indirect way, namely through the requirement that they 
adopt a commercial culture, impose user pay methods and cost recovery initiatives, and 
reduce their subsidies (Competition Policy Unit 1998: 21). The influence of these 
strategies has had a far-reaching effect on community services and some of these will 
receive more attention in the two case studies undertaken in Chapters Five and Six. 
 
Competitive Tendering and Contracting (CTC) 
 
Competitive Tendering and Contracting (CTC) is central to National Competition Policy 
at all levels. It centrally determines which stakeholders are to be involved in service 
delivery and how such services are to be provided. Moreover, it is the mechanism 
whereby government employment and training services, the subject of the first case 
study, are now delivered. In a modified form, it underpins the service contracting system 
relevant to the second case study. 
 
Competitive tendering and contracting is defined in a 1993 Western Australian Premier’s 
Circular to Ministers as the process whereby the discipline of competition is used to 
underpin delivery of public funded services (Court 1993: Premier’s Circular to Ministers,   81 
No 46/93). Through this process, services’ specifications are outlined and put out to 
tender:  
Comparisons are drawn between bids for the work from current in-house 
providers, the private sector, and in some cases from other public sector agencies, 
and a contract signed with the successful tenderer. Over time and under these 
arrangements, public services will be provided at competitive prices by the most 
efficient and effective suppliers (Court 1993: Premier’s Circular to Ministers, No 
46/93). 
 
Under National Competition Policy government departments are required to introduce 
CTC in the procurement of services as prescribed through a range of authorities, 
including the  2004  Commonwealth Procurement Guidelines  (Australian Government 
2004a), the 2004 Australian Government Competitive Neutrality Guidelines for 
Managers,  (Australian Government 2004b), the Financial Management and 
Accountability Act  1997, and so forth. The term ‘procurement’ has become common 
under the current forms of securing services to a particular provider. Procurement in these 
and other such documents is defined as a process whereby government secures the 
services of an external party or an internal public service delivery arm to deliver services 
in line with certain prescriptions. For instance, government ‘procures’ services from 
Centrelink to provide assessment, administration and local monitoring of programs for 
the unemployed. Over recent years the Howard government has moved to streamline its 
procurement framework across its agencies in line with the spirit of CTC. Currently, 
Commonwealth procurement is broadly guided through the Commonwealth Procurement 
Guidelines and Best Practice Guidance (revised 2000). The guidelines are of a general 
nature, referring in broad terms to the importance of ‘professionalism, transparency, 
probity and accountability while maximising efficiency, effectiveness and flexibility’ 
(Department of Finance and Administration 2000a: 2). Underlying all this, primacy is   82 
given to the need to obtain ‘value for money’ (DFA 2000a: 2,4,9), a principle mandated 
under section 44 of the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997. 
 
The guidelines are clear about how ‘value for money’ is to be understood and pursued. 
Value is optimised when procurement is deemed efficient and effective. This does not 
necessarily equate to the cheapest price. Rather, it is predicated on ‘whole-of-life’ 
considerations characterising the nature of the market. Thus, value for money may be 
enhanced by the procurement method, the market maturity, market performance, price 
considerations and other monetary expenses likely to be incurred in the procurement 
process (DFA 2000a: 3,4; 2000b: 2). 
 
To promote government success in obtaining ‘value for money’, procurement 
arrangements are to be ‘incorporated into corporate governance, supported by 
contestability and competitive neutrality requirements’ (DFA 2000a: 4). In relation to the 
case studies discussed in this thesis, this means that the procurement of Job Network 
Service provision under CTC and that of crisis accommodation support under the 
Preferred Service Provider model are made to come into line  with the principles of 
contestable markets through the threat of losing business to other players. At the same 
time, competitive neutrality means their service delivery is now not only open to 
government and traditional non-government service providers, but also to private profit 
making companies. For example, in the delivery of labour market programs under Job 
Network, profit-making entities are allowed to compete against non-government   83 
operations and government service delivery arms. The impact on recipients of these 
services will be taken up in Chapters Four to Six. 
 
The procurement system implemented through CTC and other hybridised contracting 
versions stands to influence decisions concerning the reallocation of large amounts of 
state resources. At present, Western Australia’s 2000/2001 Report on Who Buys What 
puts the State’s annual expenditure on goods and services at $5.11 billion. Purchases 
through Contract Management Services, that is, those purchased through the CTC 
method, totalled $481 million. In contrast, the Department of Community Development 
purchased services worth $54,506,195. The figure for 1997/98 stood at $47,545,299. By 
2001, the value of this category of services was just below $500,000,000 (State Supply 
Commission 2001: 5,9; 1999). As of 2004, the value of ‘Social, personal and selected 
community services contracted by this department amounted to $69,553,747 representing 
29 per cent of departmental overall expenditure on goods and services delivered’ (State 
Supply Commission, 2004: 10). From this it can be argued that if this procurement trend 
continues, more services may be increasingly subjected to definitions of procurement 
requirements in pursuit of ‘value for money’, as understood under the efficiency criteria. 
 
In line with their obligations under COAG’s agreements, successive Western Australian 
governments have required public agencies under their authority to embrace CTC as a 
means of pursuing value for money in the operations funded by the government. In this 
context, Premiers in this State habitually issue policy circulars requiring government 
agencies to put into practice the CTC (Gallop 2004; Court 1999; 1994; 1993a; 1993b). It   84 
follows that the sources of authority outlined below set the framework through which 
state government agencies come to understand the practices of ‘procurement’. At the time 
of collecting data for the second case study, the following circulars were in place and 
provided increased authority in connection with contracting out reforms:  Circular to 
Ministers No. 46/94 – Contracting out of Services, Circular to Ministers No. 46/96 - 
Competitive Tendering and Contracting: Union Involvement, and Circular to Ministers 
No. 7/99 – Implementation of major change (Government of Western Australia, 2000c: 
section: Key Policy Statements; Court 1999; 1994; 1993). A more concrete analysis 
regarding the relevance of various sources of authority is tackled in detail in the case 
studies in Chapters Four and Five. 
 
Shifts in Public Sector Practices 
 
Before the formal development of NCP, the philosophies of competition and the 
managerial organisational and coordination forms had already gained considerable 
ground in Australia. The Hawke-Keating’s national macroeconomic reforms of the 1980s 
led to deregulation of the financial sector, tariff reduction and the privatisation of once 
highly prized national companies such as Qantas and The Commonwealth Bank. 
Similarly, the former Victorian Premier Jeff Kennett’s market reforms were well 
established (Capling et al 1998; Halligan 1996; INDECS 1992;  Commonwealth of 
Australia 1999a; Hilmer 1993; for elaboration of managerial practices, see Newman and 
Clarke 1997; Valentine1999; APSC 2003a, b). 
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Managerialism is cited as one key means through which the neo-liberal agenda has been 
articulated and imparted (Newman and Clarke 1997; Lavalette and Pratt 1997: 235, 241). 
Organisational and coordination forms and patterns used by proponents of new 
managerialism show a simultaneous trend towards a centralisation and decentralisation of 
state power (Lavalette and Pratt 1997; Pollitt 1993), a similar point made by Muetzelfeldt 
(1992) in Chapter One about meta-planning occurring at a central level and the ensuing 
calculated choices embedded into programs delivered on the ground . Thus far, the thesis 
has identified neo-classical economics and public choice formulations as key drivers 
engaged in facilitating enhanced competition. On the other hand, Pollitt (1993: 15) notes 
that managerialism is influenced by separate origins from that of public choice theory and 
of neo-classical economics. He links managerial practices to Taylorism, arguing that as a 
neo-Taylor orientation, managerialism seeks to entrench the division between program 
planning and carrying out planned programs. While the traditional Taylor model aimed to 
separate the work planners from that of manual workers, the new managerialism seeks to 
apply this approach to the ‘non-manual workforce’ (Politt 1993: 16). Similarly, van 
Krieken, Smith, Habibis, McDonald, Haralambos and Holborn (2000: 289: 291) link 
managerialism and Taylorism in the way in which they aim for a ‘decomposition of the 
labour process into discrete calculable units’ (van Krieken et al 2000: 290). With this 
need to compartmentalise tasks and further separate planning from the doing of designed 
programs, managerialism is inclined to give more authority to managerial parties while 
simultaneously curtailing the levels of autonomy for professional staff (Pollitt 1993: 130). 
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This study treats managerialist practices as broadly consistent with this ‘new pattern of 
political and administrative reform [managerialism]’ (Culpitt 1999: 5). This link is further 
supported by Pollitt (1993: 130) who observes that ‘adherents of generic managerialism, 
whether of neo-liberal persuasion or not…[defend] the “right to manage.”’ A further link 
is noted by Mooney (1997: 241) who notes that by accommodating decision-making 
assumptions espoused in public choice thinking managerialism came to be seen as the 
‘vehicle through which greater efficiency, effectiveness and economy could be achieved’. 
This point is affirmed in the Notes on Public Sector Reform and Performance 
Management – Australia, which observes that ‘with the introduction of managerialism 
ideas, a new stage of public service reform emerged in the 1980s’ 
(www.bcauditor.com/papers/PSReforms).  
 
Furthermore, Pollitt (1993: 46-9) points out that managerialism is differentiated from 
preceding understandings of administration by its emphasis on results, a drive for 
improved performance and better outcomes. In this quest, it preoccupies itself with the 
management of human and program related resources and, in the process, challenges 
previous bureaucratic methods centred on program activities, procedures and regulations 
(Pollitt 1993: 46-9). 
 
In Australia, at the Commonwealth level, a major managerial shift involving the 
operations of the public sector took effect from 1983. This was preceded by the White 
Paper known as Reforming the Australian Public Service, released in1983, resulting in 
the Public Services Reform Act 1984 (APSC 2004: 87), making provisions for ‘a more   87 
open and efficient public service’, and enabling a framework for ‘devolution, 
deregulation and the integration of the Australian Public Service  into the national 
industrial relations and employment’ reforms 
(http://www.apsc.gov.au/about/exppsreform5.htm).  In keeping with the governmental 
rationalities of the time, alongside emphasising efficiency, the Public Service Reform Act 
1984  also incorporated notions of Equal Employment Opportunity and industrial 
democracy and entrenched provisions for merit principle (APSC 2004: 87).  Broadly 
speaking, though, the 1980s ushered in a move away from old notions of ‘compliance’ to 
‘performance control’ (APSC 2003a: http://www.apsc.gov.au/about/exppsreform9.htm). 
The Australian Public Service Commission (2003b chapt 8: 1) clearly describes this 
change as being aimed at reversing the public sector role from one formerly conceived in 
terms of ‘provid[ing] citizens with services that were fair, equitable, correctly and 
lawfully delivered’ (Service Commission 2003b chpt 8: 1) to one where ‘results-based 
management reforms…saw increasing adoption of private sector methods in the public 
sector and a new emphasis on citizens as customers’ (APSC 2003, chpt 8: 1). 
 
It is in this context that the Western Australian McCarrey Report (1993a, b) called for a 
strengthening of performance control mechanisms linking service (program) inputs, 
sanctioned activities, unit costing and internal charges for each activity, including 
overhead costs used in supporting these services (McCarrey 1993a: 150-163). From his 
analysis, ‘activities of [government] agencies expand to meet the agencies’ own 
perceptions of their functions unless restrained by clear guidelines’ (McCarrey 1993a: 
182), hence re-orientating operations to focus on getting results.    88 
 
In the 1994 Commonwealth Public Service Reform, Volume 2: Conference Proceedings 
the quest is noted to have entailed a new emphasis on strategic planning, evaluation, 
prioritisation, benchmarking, and accountability (Commonwealth of Australia 1994). 
Also evident in these proceedings is the variation in the participants’ perceptions 
concerning the usefulness of the managerial logics of the pursuit of value for money 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1994). The widespread adoption of the premises of 
performance culture and accountability are also revealed by the research undertaken by 
Halligan (1996). This project involved interviewing 23 out of the nation’s 24 
Departmental Secretaries. The report, Australian Public Service: The View from the Top 
(Halligan 1996), suggests that the managerial trends of the 1990s were a progression of 
reforms developed a decade before, and that since that time they had become embedded 
in public service structures and approaches.  In this report the interviewed Australian 
Departmental Secretaries particularly identified devolution of management powers and 
responsibilities, pursuit of a greater return from government funding, and the introduction 
of corporatisation, commercialisation and outsourcing methods as being key shifts 
associated with performance and efficiency concerns (Halligan 1996: 6). 
 
Miller and Rose’s (1990) argument that policy appraisal is a key feature of 
governmentality rings true in respect of these managerialist reforms. Although by 1994 
notions of flexible management were already being consolidated (APSC 2003b, chpt 3: 
3), in 1996, yet again, a discussion paper titled Towards Best Practice Australia Public 
Service canvassed ways of promoting a more responsive and professional quality service.   89 
This appraisal produced its own diagnosis, finding the Australian Public Service to be 
‘outdated, rigid and [characterised by] cumbersome regulations, systemic inflexibility 
and a culture which does not sufficiently promote or recognise innovation’ (Australian 
Public Service Commission 2003, chpt 4). Linking this appraisal more clearly in the 
context of reason of the state, the Howard Government reaffirmed that a reform of the 
Australian Public Service ‘is a key element of our government’s micro-economic reform 
agenda’ (Australian Public Service Commission 2004: 130). In this way, this agenda also 
sees these managerial shifts as a way of ensuring that Australian taxpayers can be 
guaranteed efficient and effective use of their resources. 
 
The consolidation of these reforms found legislative expression in a number of mandated 
frameworks such as the Financial Management and Accountability Act  1997, 
Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997, and the Auditor General Act 1997. 
More specifically, the provisions of the Financial Management Act present a meeting of 
minds in the orders of discourse embedding NCP, managerialism and theoretical 
assumptions alluded to in the discussion of neo-liberalism. In this Act, the re-orientation 
of the Australian Public Service Commission captures the quest for competition and 
managerial drive aimed at attaining results. As officially summarised, the  Financial 
Management Act serves to: 
•  put the Commonwealth public sector on a more business-like footing 
•  foster a more competitive environment 
•  shift the focus from complying with rules to managing for results 
•  plan, budget and report on an accruals, outcomes and output basis 
(APSC 2003b chpt 6: 1). 
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In addition, the Act ‘provide[s] the framework for the proper use and management of 
public money, public property and other Commonwealth resources’ (APSC 2003b: chpt 
6: 5). 
 
Along similar lines, in 1998, with the aim of disciplining the conduct of public sector 
agencies in their program costing and pricing practices, the Western Australian 
Government produced a major document entitled Costing and Pricing Government 
Outputs (1998). In this document the Government made it clear that it was shifting its 
approach from activity or program costing to ‘costing outputs and to provid[ing] more 
information on the treatment of costing and pricing…in the context of output based 
management and competitive tendering and contracting (CTC)’ (Government of Western 
Australia 1998: i). The document contained guidelines on how this was to be achieved, 
the most relevant to this thesis being specific requirements for ‘quantification of 
transition cost’, ‘competitive neutral pricing’ and the projected ‘savings from contracts 
under CTC’ (Government of Western Australia 1998: i). 
 
Having looked at the emergence of National Competition Policy and the various 
managerialist reforms accompanying the development of this program, the chapter now 
broadly sketches the impacts of competition practices in re-organising the delivery of 
welfare services involving Australia’s labour market programs for unemployed people 
and the delivery of crisis and supported accommodation services in Western Australia. 
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The Impact of Competition Policy on Non-Government Organisations 
 
The extension of the contracting system to NGOs is best understood in the context of the 
spread of competition policy and managerial methods in Australia’s public sector. In this 
context the alignments between central and local government are shaped by mutual 
interests concerning funding and delivery of a range of social service programs. It is 
through the procurement, specifications and monitoring of the services contracted out to 
NGOs that competition and managerial discourses circulate and invest themselves at 
points of service delivery. In the words of Western Australia’s Auditor General (2000), 
programs delivered by the community sector have become subject to increased 
requirements for ‘efficiency, effectiveness and accountability’ (Auditor General 2000: 
15), leading to the development of a contract system based either on ‘market-type 
mechanisms’, or ‘“non-competitive” service agreements’ (Auditor General 2000: 15). 
The move away from the previous grant system to a contract-based system aims to ensure 
that NGOs maintain focus on contracted outputs. 
 
In the discussion that follows, a broad overview of the Competitive Tendering and 
Contracting system adopted by the Federal Government in the procurement of labour 
market support programs from Job Network agencies is provided. The discussion then 
turns to the Preferred Service Provider (PSP) model employed by the Department of 
Community Development, the funding organisation for the second case study. 
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i)  Competitive Tendering and Contracting of Labour Market Programs 
 
According to the former Department for Employment, Working Relations and Small 
Business (DEWRSB) the contracts processed in 1999 for the Job Matching, Job Search 
Training and the Intensive Assistance Program constituted ‘the largest human services 
tender [since the commencement of the competitive tendering and contracting system] 
with expected contracted expenditure of $3 billion over three years’ (Commonwealth of 
Australia 1998-2000: 1). This tender involved 200 non-government, government and 
commercial providers. 
 
The change to labour market programs marked by these developments represents a far-
reaching reform involving a reworking of organisational arrangements, the mode of 
service delivery and a reconceptualisation of the way in which the problem of 
‘unemployment’ is understood. These changes are underpinned by assumptions about the 
need to separate activities of policy planners and actors involved in designing federal 
Labour Market Programs from those parties providing services on the ground (Centrelink 
1998). 
 
The developments associated with this shift provide an important background to the 
contracting of Job Network services. Following various transitional steps in 1999 the then 
Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs (DEETYA) was 
eventually replaced by the Department of Workplace Relations and Small Business 
(DEWRSB). By 2002 the latter was reformed into the Department of Employment and 
Workplace Relations. At the time of collecting the case study field data, DEWRSB was   93 
still in place. In order to maintain research authenticity, in a number of instances, this 
former department remains a key point of reference ensuring data is treated in the context 
of the period in which it was collected. Generally speaking, it is necessary to broadly 
understand the current structural arrangements, drawing together key actors connected 
with regulating the conduct of the unemployed population who are using Labour Market 
Programs. These elements help to put this service procurement arrangement (that is, 
contracting out) into perspective: 
•  The new framework provided for DEETYA and later DEWRSB, invested these 
departments with key responsibilities for policy and program formation relating 
to delivery of labour market programs (Centrelink 1998: 3-4). This Policy 
function is largely concentrated in the head office in Canberra (DEETYA 1996; 
DEWR 2004f; DEWRSB 2001b);  
•  Centrelink is a government labour market and training service provider as well 
as the primary income support delivery arm of what used to be the Department 
of Social Security. It serves as the initial primary point of contact for most 
unemployed people seeking assistance (Centrelink 1998); 
•  National Employment – a corporatised Commonwealth Employment Service that 
was made to compete with NGOs and the profit making private sector in delivery 
of Labour Market Programs. This government service delivery agency is no 
longer in existence (DEETYA 1996; Centrelink 1998; Eardley 2002); and 
•  Job Networks – Community-based government-funded labour market program, 
replacing the former Skillshare agencies. Centrelink enforces and monitors   94 
contractual obligations with these non-government and private agencies in the 
delivery of programs funded under the Job Network scheme. 
Since Centrelink is a significant actor implicated in regulating the Job Networks’ 
operational conduct and that of Job Networks’ unemployed clients, locating the position 
of this actor serves as a good background to the case study chapter. 
 
At the time of undertaking this study, the management of Centrelink became completely 
separated from that of DEWRSB. As stated in official documentation, ‘many of the key 
design features of Centrelink in themselves represent a major structural reform to the 
Australian Public Service’ (Centrelink 1998: 3). In keeping with the new patterns of 
administration in 1997 Centrelink had become subject to the Financial Management and 
Accountability Act, while at the same time it was also put under a Board of Management, 
a number of whom are drawn from the private sector (Centrelink 1998: 3). The Board is 
invested with executive powers, a strategic devolution of the power to manage that 
supports Pollitt’s (1993) view about the managerialist drive aimed to give managers the 
right to manage in keeping with the rationalities of advanced liberalism. It follows that 
Centrelink mainly acts as an agent of DEWRSB, carrying out business on behalf of the 
latter according to the contractual agreements made with DEWRSB. In the Centrelink 
Annual Report 1997/98 the ‘cultural shift to…purchaser/provider financial arrangements’ 
(Centrelink 1998: 3) is regarded as a significant and complete departure from previous 
arrangements.  
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Through this new system, Centrelink ‘derives its funding through strategic partnership 
agreements with client agencies [Commonwealth department vested with policy 
formation and program development] who purchase Centrelink services’ (Centrelink 
1998: 3). This agency concentrates on client assessments and decides who should be 
slotted into the Job Matching Program, Job Search Training, and Intensive Assistance 
designed by DEWRSB and then DEWR. Further, it is DEWR rather than Centrelink that 
determines eligibility guidelines and sets the level of support for clients. In essence, then, 
as a party contracted and funded by DEWR, Centrelink is under an obligation to meet its 
responsibilities set out at DEWRSB’s policy and program level. In this respect, it 
monitors the functions of Job Network providers and is the ultimate administrator of 
labour market related activity tests linked to income support benefits. In the figure 
provided next page, a sketch of roles and responsibilities assists to locate the working 
arrangement involving the key governmental actors in the provision of labour market 
programs. 
 
For their part, the Job Networks are now subject to the competitive tendering and 
contracting regime, and thus to the framework of contestable markets discussed earlier. 
That is, the networks need to compete one with another, operating under the threat that 
their business faces possible challenge from other networks. Under the current regime, 
the Job Networks are largely unable to engage in discretionary decisions involving the 
form or manner in which their clients could benefit from available services. As a result, 
there is reinforced codification, service specification and strict prescribed outcome-based 
interventions – predetermined in the then DEWRSB’s Canberra office and sanctioned   96 
through Centrelink’s administrative system. A detailed account of this is discussed in the 
first case study. 
 
A schematic representation on the roles of involved parties is illustrated under figure 1 
 
Schematic representation of roles of key stakeholders 
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DEWSRB 
Responsible for program design, 
specifications, price determination  
and purchasing services from Centrelink, and 
Job networks  CENTRELINK 
Responsible for assessing level of need and 
classifies clients into specific service categories i.e. 
Flex 1, 2, or 3.  
 
Carries its ‘provider’ function in line with 
contractual agreements with DEWRSB. In some 
respect Centrelink also competes with Job 
Networks in delivering jobseekers services 
JOB NETWORKS 
A term used in reference to a network of organisations 
contracted to deliver labour market programs on behalf 
of DEWRSB. They compete for funding under Flex 1, 2 
and 3. Job networks are under contractual obligations to 
report to Centrelink any activity test breaches made by a 
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These changes are accompanied by neo-liberal discourse about welfare dependency, 
which emphasises self-reliance and active welfare (Saunders 2000). In the recent welfare 
reform package, McClure (2000: 1-2) contends that the welfare system should provide 
‘opportunity for people to increase self reliance and capacity building, rather than merely 
providing a passive safety net’, that the unemployed should ‘support themselves and 
contribute to society through increased social and economic framework of Mutual 
Obligation’ (McClure 2000: 1-2). In line with this kind of thinking, eligible ‘jobseekers’ 
may have their income benefits discontinued and their access to labour market and 
training programs stopped where a breach of the new activity test is deemed to have 
occurred. Moreover, the new framework puts Job Networks under a legal obligation to 
inform Centrelink of any suspected activity breach by their customers (Centrelink 1998: 
9).  
 
It is under the constellation of these new organisational arrangements that the first case 
study, the Peel Training and Employment Agency, is located as a contracted party funded 
to deliver a Job Matching Program, Job Search Training and Intensive Assistance. 
 
 
Contracting of Family Support Services under the Department of Community 
Development 
 
During the 1997/1998 financial year, the Western Australian Department of Community 
Development (DCD) (at the time, the Department for Family and Children Services) re-
organised its funding and service framework and adopted a ‘funder-purchaser-provider 
model’ in line with the national competition policy framework. Under the new scheme,   98 
the purchaser has a greater role in policy formation, program design and codifying 
specification than the funding organisation would have had under the previous system. It 
is in this environment that the Department developed a new procurement strategy for 
services delivered by non-government organisations. It engaged in market testing and 
buying these services through a ‘preferred-service provider’ model approved by the State 
Supply Commission. In its 1997/98 annual report, the Department stated that it aimed to 
use this strategy for a six-year period, and in October 1999 it reiterated its preference for 
a Preferred Service Provider Model (PSP) except when purchasing new and replacement 
family support services (DFCS 1999: Foreword). 
 
As clearly indicated in the Auditor General’s Report (2000), the preferred-service-
provider system remained a contracting market model, even though it is a modified form 
of the fully-blown competitive tendering and contracting system such as that used in 
procuring Labour Market Programs. In 1995, the Western Australian government 
developed a broad funding framework for service funding with a specific view to 
procuring services from non-government organisations. The model was said to be ‘a 
direct result of the findings of the McCarrey Report’ (DFCS 1999: 4). In a nutshell, the 
Department of Community Development adopted a two-pronged approach: primarily, a 
Preferred Service Provider system for buying existing services and an open competitive 
system involving both new and replacement services. In keeping with McCarrey’s 
(1993a, b) call for efficient and accountable resource use, the Department required non-
government organisations to go through a specific process (Request for Proposal Process) 
when tendering for  services. Any failure to attain the prescribed outcomes specified   99 
during this process threatens the contracts of the tendering organisations concerned, 
especially its preferred provider status and other contractual arrangements entered into 
through the open competitive system (DFCS 1999). 
 
As previously indicated, the quest for efficient systems had been paralleled by managerial 
reforms, often seeking a separation of key functions such as funding, policy and program 
development, and service delivery. As a result of this overall restructuring, by 1998 the 
functions of the Department of Community Development came to comprise: funding 
management, specification and purchase of services, and service delivery as separate 
functional areas (DFCS 1998: 10, 13). This was said to provide clearer information about 
cost effectiveness, to facilitate better state-wide comparisons of cost and outcomes, and to 
enhance accountability in terms of customer services (DFCS 1998: 10, 13).  
 
These strategies have a direct bearing on the second case study, Swan Accommodation 
Support Services, and these are discussed in Chapter Five. In that chapter attention is also 
given to the further development of the Department of Community Development 
contracting practices in relation to crisis and supported accommodation. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Methodology 
 
This chapter starts by elaborating the study’s methodological approach, which by and 
large is already grounded in the work discussed in my first chapter that outlines the use of 
governmentality as a productive tool for this thesis. I highlight the key methodological 
features, including the sorts of questions and the kind of study that can be undertaken 
when governmentality is used in examining and exploring a research question. A detailed 
account covers the case study research protocol and procedures. These are accompanied 
by detailed descriptions of research methods, such as sampling, data collection, analysis 
and ethical considerations. 
 
The promotion of social policy concerns, for example, the conceptualisation of 
homelessness and unemployment, have tended to be located within a social democratic 
tradition (for example, see: Bryson 1992; Titmuss 2000; Kymlicka and Norman 1994; 
Jamrozik 2001; George and Wilding 1976; McMahon et al 2000; Williams 1987), and 
emphasizing notions of positive rights. Augmenting that has been the pursuit of certain 
social policies through practices of identity politics, evidenced by ‘a feminist critique of 
the welfare state’ and that of the ‘race relations policies’ (Williams 1987). As Dean 
points out: 
I think it is fair to say it has been common to analyse social policies principally in 
terms of the ideologies or policy frameworks they are held to realize and the role 
they accord the state and the market in the allocation of resources (Dean 1995: 
569).   101 
 
While recognising the value in such an approach, a governmentality approach is used in 
this study particularly as ‘one of the distinctive features of the recent work on 
government….emphasis[ing]…the practices and techniques  by which government 
occurs’ (Dean 1995: 569). This approach maintains a sceptical stance towards notions of 
truth, progress and values (Kendall and Wickham, 1999: 9-11). That is to say, the social 
democratic quest for positive rights and the ensuing optimism in solving social problems 
such as unemployment and homelessness stand to be problematised through a 
Foucauldian approach. Of great methodological significance is Foucault’s main 
preoccupation with the following questions: 
(1)What are the relations we have to truth through scientific knowledge, to those ‘truth 
games’ which are so important in civilization and in which we are both subject and 
object? (2) What are the relationships we have with others through those strange 
strategies and power relationships? And (3) What are the relationships between truth, 
power, and self?’ (Foucault 1988a: 15). 
 
In this sense, a governmentality approach implies a methodology that embraces an 
understanding of government as an activity of governing that ‘can concern one’s relation 
to oneself, interpersonal relations that involve some form of control or guidance and 
relations within social institutions and communities’ (Tremain 2005: 8). This implies a 
different focus on the objects, subjects and methods of study from those commonly 
employed in making sense of social policy. Specifically, governmentality problematises 
taken-for-granted categorical truth claims, preferring to engage with the ‘history of the   102 
present’ (Kendall and Wickham 1999: 5). Significantly, and of direct relevance to my 
thesis, governmentality focuses on problematising the way that policy science ‘produces 
truth rather than exempting it from scrutiny’ (Kendall and Wickham 1999: 5). So here, 
the Foucauldian approach transcend concerns of whether ‘knowledge or language 
provides an adequate representation of reality’, instead it highlights how ‘knowledge 
actively orders [discursive] reality…within which the knower is located’ (Gordon 1980: 
210). Supporting this position, Higgins (2000) argues that in this way, knowledge can be 
understood as the ‘will to truth’ (Foucault cited in Higgins 2000: 17) fostered through 
attempts to order and rank such arbitrary knowledge. It is against this background that the 
development and practices of National Competition Policy are problematised as 
‘something to be explained’ (Miller and Rose 1990: 3) rather than taking its historical 
existence for granted. The questioning of truth produced by NCP practices, therefore, 
especially through the discursive ordering of reality has a direct bearing on the methods 
of analysis, as explained later. 
 
Chapter One discussed governmentality’s distinct approach to the question of 
subjectivity, which emphasises the understanding of a human subject through the study of 
the body, particularly ‘the effects of power on it’ (Foucault 1980: 58-9). As Foucault puts 
it: 
I’m not one of those who try to elicit the effects of power at the level of ideology. 
Indeed I wonder whether, before one poses the question of ideology, it wouldn’t 
be more materialistic to study first the question of the body and the effects of 
power on it. Because what troubles me with these analyses which prioritise 
ideology is that there is always a presupposed human subject on the lines 
provided by the classical philosophy, endowed with consciousness which power 
is thought to seize upon (Foucault 1980c: 58). 
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It follows that in adopting the premise of individuals as the vehicle of power (Foucault 
1980c: 58-9), governmentality theory concerns itself ‘not to reformulate the global 
systematic theory which holds everything in place, but to analyse the specificity of the 
mechanics of power, to locate the connections and extensions to build little by little a 
strategic knowledge (savoir)’ (Gordon 1980: 145). Linked to this understanding is the 
view that power operates through the body by means of a normalisation strategy. The 
techniques of government are seen as engaged in the regulatory normalisation processes 
(Tremain 2005: 4-5). In this way, the normalising strategy serves to ‘identify subjects and 
to make them identify themselves in order to make them governable’ (Tremain 2005: 6). 
Thus a methodology based on governmentality theory is particularly effective in a study 
that focuses on the locations where subjects are ‘materially constituted’ (Foucault 1980c: 
97) via NCP contracting practices at the point of service delivery. The exploration of 
contracting practices through use of case studies at the points of service delivery is best 
suited in achieving this aim. 
 
As noted in Chapter Two, I have used Pusey’s (1991, 1993, 2003) approach to provide a 
complementary analytical lens through which the current competition policies may be 
understood. In methodological terms, it is worth remembering that Foucault sees 
liberalism itself working as a form of critical reality. In this sense, the ‘counterdemands’ 
and ‘counterdiscourses’ (Tremain 2005: 12) are linked with liberalism’s reflective 
character. Pusey’s line of argument employed in my thesis implicates neo-liberalism in 
subjecting social and political rationalities to needs of the market. In drawing from 
Pusey’s social democratic position, it is important that this is not seen as foreign from   104 
liberalism, as Tremain (2005) observes, liberalism is neither static nor homogenous. As 
she put it: 
While not a libertarian, Foucault was, nevertheless, intrigued by 
liberalism…[especially] its capacity to continually refashion itself in a practice of 
autocritique. In fact, Foucault viewed liberalism as a form of critical reflection on 
government practice itself. Liberalism he asserted, can be found simultaneously, but in 
different forms, as both the regulative scheme of governmental practice and the theme 
of a (sometimes) “radical” opposition…liberalism constitutes a tool for the criticism of 
reality, that is, for the criticism of (1) a previous governmentality that one tries to 
shed; (2) a current governmentality that attempts to reform and rationalize; and (3) a 
governmentality that one opposes and tries to limit (Tremain 2005: 12). 
 
It is with these methodological understandings in mind that the methods of analysis will 
pay due regard to the non-homogenous character of rational practices differentiating 
‘instrumental’ from ‘professional’ or ‘welfarist’ rationalities’.  This differentiation is 
inseparable from attempts to understand the ways in which competitive practices 
promoting value for money engage in ranking and systematising knowledge regulating 
program delivery. 
 
Research topic 
 
This thesis explores the influence of National Competition Policy (NCP) in reshaping 
human service delivery, with reference to federal-funded labour market programs and the 
state-administered family support crisis accommodation program. 
 
Objectives 
 
In exploring the influence of NCP in reshaping human services, two case studies 
involving service delivery agencies are used to assist in making sense of the influence of   105 
this policy, one of which is funded to deliver labour market programs and another 
providing crisis accommodation support services. To this end, these case studies are used 
to look at how National Competition Policy (NCP) mediates service delivery at a micro 
level. Specifically, it will explore the following questions: 
  How does NCP affect treatment of clients? 
  Who gets what service? 
  In what terms are services being accessed and delivered? 
  What is it like working under the NCP framework? 
 
I now turn my attention to the case study approach, describing more specifically what 
such a study entails. An account of the research protocol addressing procedures and 
methods used in this study is also provided. 
 
A Case Study 
 
As indicated above, two case studies are used to illuminate the practices of National 
Competition Policy. It is useful, therefore to provide a broad understanding of what is 
meant by a case study. Stake argues, ‘the case study is not a methodological choice, but a 
choice of object to be studied’ (Stake 2000: 372), and ‘we could study it in many ways’ 
(Stake 2000: 236). More specifically, a case study sets out to capture contextual 
conditions which are an important feature of any such study (Yin 2003:13; Stake 2000; 
1994). It is interested in the ‘manifest interaction of significant factors characteristic of 
this phenomenon [and therefore]….the researcher is able to capture various nuances,   106 
patterns, and more latent elements that other research approaches might overlook’ (Berg 
2004: 251). 
 
A case study approach allows a researcher to conduct a study in an open and flexible way 
in the context of a ‘natural setting’ (Sarantakos 1998: 193). Such context may include 
factors such as historical background, physical setting, economic, political and legal 
contexts, and informants positioning (Stake 1994: 238). In addition, Yin (2003: 13) 
points out that this contextual approach ‘retain[s] holistic and meaningful characteristics 
of real life cycles, organisational and managerial processes’ (Yin 2003: 2). Similarly, 
Berg points out that case studies ‘focus on holistic description and explanation’ (2004: 
207). Here, the notion of holism allows openness to complexities, tuning into the 
‘situational and influenced by happenings of many kinds’ (Yin 2003: 2). These points are 
significant for my case studies, which seek to capture the individual, organisational and 
situational interplays connected with the NCP reform. 
 
This thesis specifically uses what Stake describes as an instrumental case study, in which:  
A particular case is examined mainly to provide insight into an issue…the case is 
of secondary interest, it plays a supportive role, and it facilitates our 
understanding of something else. The case still is looked at in depth, its contexts 
scrutinised, its ordinary activities detailed, but all because this helps the 
researcher to pursue the external interest...Here the choice of the case is made to 
advance understanding of that other interest (Stake 2000: 437). 
 
My two case studies, Peel Training and Employment, and the Swan Emergency 
Accommodation are chosen to illustrate further understandings of and contextual insights 
into how National Competition Policy is reshaping human services as experienced at   107 
points of service delivery. That is, in exploring contracting practices as these are 
experienced day to day at sites of program delivery, this study approach translates into a 
strategy suited to ‘grasp subjection in its material instance as the constitution of subjects’ 
(Foucault 1980c: 97). 
 
Sampling and nomination procedures 
When choosing a case study intended to play a supportive role, the emphasis is placed on 
ensuring that such a case is carefully chosen in respect to its relevance to the particular 
phenomena under study (Stake 1994: 243; Yin 2003: 32).  Stake notes that ‘nothing is 
more important than making a proper selection of cases’, adding that a selection of such 
cases ‘is a sampling problem’ (Stake 1994: 243). Here, notions of contracting and 
tendering practices involving human services are broadly situated in the context of NCP 
mechanisms out of which the case studies for this project have been selected. In this way, 
the research identifies two cases from this ‘bounded system’ (Merriam 1998: 47) of NCP. 
In choosing these case studies, I was also influenced by an interest examine at one case 
concerned with the provision of federally-funded services and another receiving program 
funds administered through state government, although those funds are still jointly 
provided by the State and the federal authorities. Prior to selecting the cases, I was aware 
that some variation applied in how authorities sought to implement contracting practices. 
Through field experience, I had become aware that while some programs had been 
subjected to the full mechanisms of Competitive Tendering and Contracting, others had 
been subjected to what was seen as moderated versions of contracting such as the 
Preferred Service Provider system.   108 
 
Peel Training and Employment Job Network was chosen from a list of over 200 such 
contracted Job Network providers around the country. On its part, Swan Emergency 
Accommodation was nominated out of over 300 non-government providers whose family 
support programs fitted under the state contracting practices in keeping with official 
definitions evident in the Department of Community Development, the Auditor Generals 
texts, and definitions adopted by the State Supply Commission, the state compliance 
overseer of contracting practices. A detailed account of the close connection between the 
National Competition Policy, the Competitive Tendering and Contracting practices, and 
the contracting practices established under the Preferred Service Provider model has 
already been described in Chapter Two. 
 
Case study sampling decisions call also for participants and the events to be studied. 
According to Stake (1994: 244), following a determination of which case to study, more 
sampling decisions are required ‘about persons, places and events’ to be studied, 
including a selection of a period of study Merriam (1998: 47). Stake (1994: 244) suggests 
that ‘training and intuition tell us to seek a good sample.’ Prior field experience had 
alerted me to the key Job Network programs namely Flex 1, 2 and 3 (later renamed as Job 
Matching, Job Search Training and Intensive Assistance), as the main employment 
assistance programs subjected to Competitive Tendering and Contracting. The 
contracting practices specific to this study cover the contract period 2000 – 2002. 
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In theoretical terms, this study used a purposeful sampling technique, a strategy coming 
under non-probabilistic stratified sampling (Hannigmann in Merriam 1988:47-48; Denzin 
and Lincoln 2000; Sarantakos 1998). This method does not attempt to employ a 
representative sample of all elements of the population. Rather, it ‘seeks out groups, 
settings, and individuals for whom the processes being studied are most likely to occur’ 
(Denzin and Lincoln 2000: 370), a point also supported by Hannigmann (in Merriam 
1998: 48). Once programs of interest had been identified and specific literature studied, 
from January 2001 to October 2001, I formally approached four Job Networks and one 
family support program. The invitation requests for agency participation had been 
preceded by telephone inquiry explaining about my research. 
 
It is also important to note that the process of nominating the two agencies was done on a 
practical basis. Of the three other Job Network agencies that had been approached, two of 
these expressed interest in the subject under study, but showed reluctance to participate. 
A third Job Network agency was keen to participate, but informed me that they had given 
back one of their contracts to DEWRSB due to agency concerns that the contract was not 
commercially viable. Broadly speaking, a number of people in the employment assistance 
area at the time informally communicated with me that participation in a study on 
contracting practices may present some vulnerability for a contracted organisation. This 
background led me to invest more time in securing entry through existing networks. In 
the case of the state-administered family support crisis accommodation program, Swan 
Emergency Accommodation was the only organisation approached and readily accepted.  
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For sampling purposes, it should be noted that study participants using the Intensive 
Assistance program, were also beneficiaries of all program supports available under the 
Job Search Training and the Job Matching programs. Similarly, those admitted under the 
Job Search Training had full access to support available under the Job Matching. Clients 
eligible for the Job Matching  support provisions, however, were unable to access 
additional assistance rendered either under Job Search Training or the Intensive 
Assistance programs. 
 
The involvement of Peel Training and Employment, and Swan Emergency 
Accommodation was formalised through written invitation letters (see Appendices 1 and 
2). In addition, both agencies were further requested to clarify the nature of the 
authorisation regarding data use in relation to publication purposes (see Appendices 3, 4), 
and notification of agency approvals were sent to the researcher (see Appendices 5 and 
6). These agencies had also clearly indicated to the researcher that whilst allowing the use 
of their data, they would not release statistical data and any additional specific 
information where they felt any such information could jeopardise their competitive edge 
in an environment of contestable markets that encourages program take-over by ‘rival’ 
human service agencies. In addition, each participating agency nominated one senior 
executive to act as a point of contact for the researcher whilst arranging to access study 
participants during the data collection phase. The final decision for staff participation was 
left in the hands of individual staff.  
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Prior to commencing formal data collection activities, I visited each agency twice, during 
which time I was introduced to a range of agency staff so that firstly, I was familiar with 
the setting, and secondly, I had the opportunity to engage with staff and invite their 
individual participation. 
 
Data Collection Methods 
 
Structured and in-depth interviews 
 
Case study interviews were conducted in 2002. An interview guide comprising of 
structured and open-ended questions was used. The latter format allowed for flexibility in 
probing participant responses (see the interview schedule, Appendices 7 and 8). All 
interviews were taped and the researcher also took notes during interviews. Overall, 25 
participants were interviewed at the two case study sites, Peel Training and Employment 
(14) and Swan Emergency Accommodation (11). A maximum of one and a half hours 
was allocated for each interview. 
 
The 14 participants at Peel included seven clients and seven staff. Of these seven clients 
one was specifically drawn from Job Matching program, two from Job Search Training, 
and four from the Intensive Assistance  program. Two of the staff were in senior 
managerial positions and five were workers involved in the everyday contact with clients.  
 
It is necessary to point out that in these interviews three staff were interviewed together. 
The decision for this arrangement was influenced by the agency’s stated concern to ration   112 
worker’s time. Yin (2003) reminds us that with case studies, a researcher ‘collect[s] data 
from people and institutions in their everyday situations’, thus: 
You must learn to integrate real-world events with the needs of the data collection 
plan. In this sense you do not have the control over the data collection 
environment…you must cater to the interviewee’s schedule and availability, not 
your own....[After all], you are intruding into the world of the subject being 
studied (Yin 2003: 72). 
 
In interviewing three staff at the same time, the researcher ensured every participant 
commented on each key aspect of the interview questions. Although these three staff 
sometimes took very varied positions on issues under discussion, it is still important to 
acknowledge that interaction of  participants  can inject a different factor in thinking 
through some of the issues. According to Madriz (2000: 835-6), the interaction can 
enhance spontaneity, open up more probing of views expressed through the interaction 
process, and lends itself best to ‘capture important sociological process -  collective 
human interaction’ (Madriz 2000: 836). At the same time, however, Madriz observes that 
interactive group settings can also narrow the range of views and behaviours amongst 
participants. 
 
Of the eleven participants interviewed at Swan Emergency Accommodation, eight were 
members of staff and management. Participants also included three homeless residents 
residing at Swan Emergency Accommodation. Initially, the research set out to access 
more residents in receipt of crisis accommodation supports. The researcher did not push 
further this possibility as it had become clear that service users although illuminating on 
the day to day experiences of service usage, were not able to shed additional light on 
specific influences of contracting practices  under the Preferred Service Provider   113 
arrangements in shaping the parameters of service delivery. This led to the decision to 
concentrate on staff responses regarding their experiences of working under the 
contracting system. With the benefit of a hindsight, it is still important to highlight that 
participants using crisis accommodation support could have been asked questions not just 
on their experiences of services under the contracting practices, but also questions framed 
to capture the influence of the changes relating to the notion of Competitive Neutrality – 
the justifications that led to the reworking of the former Homeswest welfare function. In 
this context, questions could have been framed around the experience of homelessness in 
connection with individual attempts to navigate through the Department of Housing and 
Works, the private rental market and crisis accommodation. This, I believe, holds 
potential to further elucidate the practices of National Competition Policy reform in the 
regulation of the homeless people and human service delivery. 
 
Observation 
 
Observation plays another role in gathering information in this study. According to 
Merriam (1998: 88), observation enables the researcher to pick up information, which 
‘has become routine to the participant themselves’. 
 
Thus, although observation was not used as one of the primary data collection tools in 
this study, it was seen in the context of what Berg (2004: 207) calls an ‘opportunity to 
gain familiarity with the setting’. My observation included sitting-in through two full 
days observing Job Search Training sessions at Peel Employment and Training. This also 
meant some of the participants had seen me around the centre and may have therefore felt   114 
more comfortable to participate in my study. At Swan Emergency Accommodation 
Service I was also invited to sit in at one staff shift hand-over meeting. This was another 
useful way to hear the various teams summing up specific client-related events and 
concerns of the day for follow up by the in coming staff shift. Note taking was also taken 
during these observations. 
 
In addition, during 2001, I attended a national consultation meeting in Perth where 
Canberra-based DEWRSB tendering and contracting staff met with some state-based Job 
Network provider executives to brief them about the structure of the following round of 
the Job Network competitive tendering and contracting of labour market programs. 
Attendance at this consultation was useful in terms of further building my understanding 
on the way that the government had developed the terms of Job Network contractual 
arrangements and the detailed specifications of programs intended for delivery. 
 
Official Texts 
 
In keeping with governmentality insights, this study has also drawn heavily from the 
official NCP and contractual service-related procurement literature as a rich source of 
data offering a broad framework within which the means and ends of policy are made 
known. Chapter Two has already described in detail the governmentality framework and 
its preoccupations with questions of means and ends. This includes sources of authority 
(official accounts) that formally authorise and produce programs and set parameters 
within which these program operations are intended to function. In this sense,   115 
government texts are used in this study as another primary as well as secondary source of 
study data. 
 
Methods of Data Analysis 
 
Firstly, interviews were transcribed within 24 – 36 hours of being conducted. Secondly, 
in thinking about the process of data analysis involving this study, it is best not seen in a 
linear way, rather the ongoing attention to reviewing collected data was also instrumental 
in further refining interview probes. Yin (2003: 61) points out that when carrying out 
case studies, a researcher ‘must understand the theoretical or policy issues because 
analytic judgements have to be made throughout the data collection phase. Without a firm 
grasp of issues, [a researcher] could miss important clues’. To this extent, initial themes 
generated from my initial literature review on the development of NCP were useful in 
providing some broad directions. Ryan and Bernard (2000: 781) point to a range of 
literature that proposes that researchers commence with general themes indicated through 
their literature review. In addition, they point out that an investigator needs to rely on 
professional, experiential, and their own value and theoretical understandings to guide the 
analysis that simultaneously occurs during the data collection phase. 
 
I developed a working codebook which served as a tool and a mental map in processing 
my transcribed data. Stake (2000: 781) defines a codebook as ‘simply an organised list of 
codes…[involving] a detailed description of each code, inclusion and exclusion criteria, 
and examples of real text for each theme’ comprising of either words or numbers. 
Guiding my coding drafts were three levels of analysis partially already embedded in my   116 
data collection tools, namely: individual, programmatic and organisational processes and 
procedures that were being explored in the way in which the terms of client treatment, 
organisation operational process and the design of programs were being reshaped by the 
NCP reform. 
 
Initially I used Nud*ist, N6, to simplify the coding process involving my first case study 
data (Job Network). Some researchers recommend Nud*ist as a helpful tool in coding and 
categorising responses (Ryan and Bernard 2000; Yin 2003; Ely, et al 1997). Nonetheless 
the contextualisation of this coded data was undertaken manually because this program, 
while sensitive to recurring words and themes, I found that it is the researcher’s own 
insights that are necessary in assigning particular contextual elements to the processing of 
this data. In this sense, Nud*ist, N6, did not offer clarification of whether a phrase, word 
or comment was used in the negative or affirmative. Instead, the categorisation 
simplification was more meaningful in facilitating a grouping of responses occurring with 
similar patterns of words. I further decided to manually categorise the rest of my case 
study’s data. This proved time consuming since I repeatedly went through responses and 
marked the margins of my transcripts with thematic codes. The process simultaneously 
offered the opportunity to reflect more intently on the study responses. 
 
Overall, the ongoing refinement of these categories and analytic forms developed ‘as the 
research [went] along’ (Ryan and Bernard 2000: 781). The complex and non-linear 
nature of this process is also reinforced in Ely, et al (1997) who point out that: 
We sit down with our earliest log entries or interview transcript and begin to code 
them in whatever ways makes sense to us as a starting point. As we proceed, we   117 
begin to note similarities and differences, to notice a variety of relationships and 
patterns within and among codes. In time we will make some kinds of more 
general or abstract groupings of them – perhaps structured into an outline or web 
or clusters – and also perhaps into thematic or other generalised statements (Ely, 
et al 1997: 167). 
 
The pattern of words, themes and even particular isolated experiences was also carefully 
examined alongside assumptions underpinning governmentality and the complementary 
Pusey perspective in making sense of the influence of NCP in reshaping the delivery of 
human services in Australia. More specifically, through word and thematic analysis, the 
researcher facilitated an analysis of shifting patterns in the treatment of clients, patterns 
of organisation of services, shifting internal program management systems and the way in 
which professional practice was being governed and contested. In practice, this analytical 
process using governmentality and drawing from Pusey entailed what Ryan and Bernard 
(2000: 770) call a ‘systematic elicitation to identify lists of items that belong in a cultural 
domain and to assess the relationships among these items’. Here, a cultural domain refers 
to a language ‘agreed on by all native speakers of a language….[or] represent highly 
specialised knowledge’ (2000: 770).  
 
Ethical Considerations and Research Limitations 
Researchers are subject to ethical obligations to their study participants, their institutions 
and to the society in which they operate. This obligation includes recognition of ‘rights, 
privacy, and the welfare of people and communities that form the focus of their studies’ 
(Berg 2004: 43).  In this context, ethical considerations have come to be associated with 
notions of doing no harm, voluntary and informed consent, maintaining confidentiality in 
the process using collected research data and justifying a positive contribution to   118 
knowledge (Berg 2004; de Vaus 1995; Alston and Bowles 2003). These factors were 
given significant attention in this research undertaking as also demonstrated through 
attached appendices. Moreover, in detailing the ethical considerations, this thesis also 
maintains that ethical research practice is a complex phenomenon involving a lot of 
thinking through dilemmas about ‘how to represent responsibility’ (Fine, Weis, Wessen 
and Wong 2000: 108). 
 
The invitation to agencies to participate (see Appendices 1 and 2) described the nature of 
the research project, the reasons why the selected agencies were seen as suited to this 
study, a brief on the key questions that the research intended to address, and the 
researcher’s hope that the project held some potential in contributing to future knowledge 
on service delivery. 
 
The significance of providing this kind of briefing is emphasised by a number of writers 
(see Yin 2003; de Vaus 1995). Both agencies informed the researcher that the study 
requested would be considered through their agencies’ management committees in 
keeping with their internal accountability processes. Once approval was granted and upon 
receipt of written confirmation of the agencies’ willingness to participate (see 
Appendices 2 and 3), further clarification was sought in relation to the use of data for 
publication purposes (as per Appendices 5, 6 and 7). 
 
As noted earlier, however, both agencies made it verbally clear and implied in writing 
that they would limit the researcher’s access to some internal statistical information in   119 
order to maintain their competitive advantage in this contracting regime. The researcher 
accepted this limitation as necessary since she took account of ‘doing no harm’ as one 
important principle needing to be brought to bear. Importantly, the researcher believed 
that access to staff interviews, agency reports, some program documents and, in one case, 
comprehensive Quality Assurance documentations detailing operational procedures and 
processes, were likely to provide sufficient reasonable working data to assist in 
addressing the research question. 
 
In recruiting the client study participants at the selected agencies, firstly, program 
coordinators and facilitators announced to potential participants about the invitation to 
participate and briefly explained the intention of my study. At Peel Training and 
Employment, I was also invited to one of the Job Search Training sessions to announce 
my interest before a group of program participants, some of whom came to see me after 
their sessions and made appointments for interviews. At Job Network jobseekers are 
regularly coming in and out of the Job Network premises, enabling self-introduction and 
easier interaction. I was also encouraged to introduce myself to clients in the foyer and 
reception. 
 
At Swan Emergency Accommodation, access and appointments with clients were done 
through staff. Because of the way in which clients access the service I had fewer 
encounters than that afforded at Job Network. Upon commencement of client interviews 
at Swan, it was also clear that the sample population presented with complex high-
support needs. One client was not present at his premises although arrangements had   120 
been made through agency staff regarding our scheduled meetings. After he failed to turn 
up to two scheduled appointments, I felt I had an ethical obligation not to press ahead in 
including this potential participant in my study.  
 
I have noted that the response of the three interviewed service users gave no convincing 
indications about their knowledge on the influence of contracting practices in relation to 
the services they received. Part of this may be explained by the voluntary nature of client 
participation that embeds the Preferred Service Providers at the time of conducting my 
research. As I explain in detail in my second case study, crisis accommodation service 
users can choose to simply use accommodation facilities, and do not have to accept the 
use of a range of other accommodation support services offered by a crisis 
accommodation agency. That is not to suggest that NCP has not influenced questions of 
housing access and general service delivery in the area of crisis accommodation. Rather, 
with the benefit of hindsight, questions aimed for clients using crisis accommodation 
support at the time of collecting my interview data may need to have been framed very 
differently. It is the researcher’s view, partially reinforced through study findings 
involving staff, that certain interview questions could have been framed with a view to 
getting a feel of how clients experienced and navigated through the Department of 
Housing and Works, the crisis accommodation supports and the private rental market. 
This would have allowed for further teasing out the influence of Competitive Neutrality – 
a justification for reducing the public housing stock, a point discussed in some detail in 
Chapter Two. It should also not be assumed that because some of the questions asked 
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information, that those questions are not relevant. Since the terms of contracting these 
programs continue to evolve, at best a researcher may need to remain open to a range of 
possibilities. 
 
In keeping with expectations of informed consent, all participants were provided with a 
copy of a consent form prior to commencing an interview. The researcher used the first 
few minutes to explain the nature, purpose and possible future benefits of the research 
being conducted. Participants were also individually informed beforehand that 
participation was voluntary and could withdraw from this process at any time in the 
course of this study. Each participant was asked to read through the consent form first 
and then ask any questions. It was also explained to them that if they had any additional 
questions, these could also be asked at the end of the interview. Through this process, I 
came across some participants who were already well informed about what the study 
intended to do (through information initially provided to the agencies), while there were 
also participants who had fairly limited information, in which case I took the opportunity 
to expand further about the nature of my study. Consent forms also contained my 
telephone number and that of my supervisor (see Appendix 8 for copy of the consent 
form). 
 
That said, as de Vaus (1995: 334) points out, ‘while the issue of informed consent seems 
entirely reasonable and desirable it is not straightforward.’ He argues that just the mere 
act of giving participants more information does not automatically lead to better informed 
subjects. He observes that too much information can lead to confusion or even discourage   122 
participation. de Vaus also suggests that despite the ethical necessity of formalised 
consent, such formalisation can ‘lead to a loss of rapport, it can also make some people 
more suspicious about the research’ (1995: 334). Fine, et al (2000: 113) also argue that in 
some cases it is plausible that some participants ‘simply signed the [consent] form as just 
another procedural matter’. In this context, in trying to communicate the nature and 
purpose of my study on NCP, I adopted an approach that de Vaus (1995: 334) sees as a 
need to stick to ‘basic information and to offer to answer further questions’. In answering 
questions, I still remained open to those participants who, at the end of the interview, 
wanted to discuss the subject of tendering and contracting beyond the formal interview 
scope.  
 
Importantly, as a researcher, I can also see a greater significance in Fine et al’s (2000: 
113) point that the notion of informed consent for the most part acts as a further reminder 
to researchers of our accountability and position. In this thesis, that accountability has 
significantly meant contextualising participant responses and engaging with analysis 
describing client accounts as well as organisational and broader governmental 
rationalities. In at least two cases, I have also highlighted some strong concerns from the 
service delivery sector, where participants openly indicated their wish to have their 
particular concerns communicated openly. As a researcher, I have also subtly brought my 
own understanding of National Competition Policy to bear in the analysis of my case 
studies.  
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The thesis also makes effort to maintain participant anonymity through use of 
pseudonyms. To this extent, however, such anonymity can still be problematised in that 
the case studies involve two community agencies whose identities are known. As Berg 
(2004: 65) observes, study locations and participant characteristics can bring up 
challenging dilemmas, requiring care in discussing ‘subjects and the setting as well’. For 
me, this entailed checking with at least two participants about information they had 
communicated about how they felt since the information might have left some clues to 
their identities. Nonetheless, these were experienced professional people who took the 
view that communicated information was likely to do more good than harm. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Contracting Labour Market Programs -  Job Matching, Job Search, and 
Intensive Assistance 
 
Introduction 
 
The chapter explores the ways in which neo-liberal and managerial rationalities are 
drawn upon  in the  reformed Labour Market Programs. It  locates the National 
Competition Policy’s Competitive Tendering and Contracting framework used in 
procuring Job Network services as the main technology of rule through which the 
reworked terms of service provision are spelled out. It argues that through this method, 
the provider organisation is closely drawn into operational arrangements connected with 
the government objectives. The chapter explores how unemployment is constituted and 
made knowable through neo-liberal authorities and knowledge systems. In so doing, it 
draws attention to the everyday experience of the Peel Training and Employment agency, 
highlighting the way that this Job Network provider is subject to the specific rationalities 
and managerial specifications. As part of this, it also looks at the treatment of 
unemployed people under the reformed employment assistance system, and thus engages  
with the question of the ordinary ways in which power seems to operate. 
 
My examination of the data suggests that managerial techniques flourish in these 
reformed employment assistance operations and play a significant part in ordering and 
systematising operational knowledge in particular hierarchical orders.   125 
 
 
 
The chapter describes the way in which Job Network practices are implicated in the 
cultivation of employable minds among the users of Job Network programs. It thus 
problematises practices and techniques of self-formation, highlighting contradictory 
subject positions in the responses of some of the interviewed participants. It draws special 
attention to the activities of Peel Training and Employment as a particular distant actor 
involved in the governance of the unemployed population. Staff responses on practices of 
mutual obligation provide additional insights into the prevailing forms of subjectification 
and self-formation. 
 
Data Collection 
As reported in the methodology chapter, the interview data for this case study was 
collected from 14 study participants from the Peel Training and Employment centre at the 
Mandurah office, including management and frontline staff, and clients from the Job 
Matching, Job Search Training and Intensive Assistance programs. Of the 14 participants 
involved, two were managers, five were frontline staff and seven were unemployed 
service users. Of the latter, five were males and two females. One client was drawn from 
Job Matching program, two from Job Search Training, and four from the Intensive 
Assistance program. All of these job seekers were also accessing Job Matching Services. 
In the same way, all Intensive Assistance clients were also fully utilising Job Search 
Training programs.   126 
 
Background 
 
Peel Training and Employment is located along Tuart Avenue in Mandurah about 74 kms 
from Perth. Mandurah is the major city for the Peel region. The Peel region covers a 
5,500 square kilometres, an zone situated between 35 to 145 kilometres away from the 
Perth city centre (Peel Development Commission 2005: 10). According to the Peel 
Development Commission, in 2002 the population for this region stood at 87,791. This 
distribution includes the City of Mandurah comprising of 66.7 per cent; Serpentine-
Jarrahdale 14.2 per cent; Murray 13.5 per cent; Waroona 4.05 per cent and Boddington 
1.56 per cent (Peel Development Commission 2005: 1; 2003: 1). Significantly, the Peel 
region enjoys the highest regional population growth in the state estimated at 135.7 per 
cent during the period 2001 and 2003. 
 
The major economic activities for this region are mining, especially bauxite and mineral 
sands, agriculture, timber production, fishing, manufacturing, construction activities and 
tourism (Peel Development Commission 2005: 1; 2003: 1). 
 
 Despite this, the Peel region is a depressed area with estimated unemployment rates 
estimated at 7.8% compared to the regional average of 6 per cent (Peel development 
Commission 2005: 1; 2003: 1). 
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Shifts in the Employment Assistance Programs Across Welfare States 
A brief review of contemporary shifts in employment support programs for unemployed 
people across welfare states is illuminating and offers a useful global context to changes 
taking place in Australia. According to Jessop, under the previous Keynesian welfare 
state systems, the welfare regime was integral in providing structural support to largely 
closed economies, reliant on stimulating consumer demand through state regulation and 
promotion of collective forms of consumption patterns  (Jessop 2002: 2), such as 
healthcare provisions, education, and so forth.  In the  late 1980s and throughout the 
1990s, there was a growing shift to what  some policy writers have termed a 
Schumpeterian Workfare State aimed at enhancing product process, new forms of 
organisation and innovative practices  intended to shape competitive human service 
market structures. 
 
As far as the shifts in Labour Market Programs are concerned, some writers have come to 
characterise this under the term ‘workfare’, (Jessop’s 2002; Lodemel 2005; Lodemel and 
Stafford 2002; Torfing 1999; Grover 1999). While this concept as yet bears no agreed 
definition (Lodemel and Stafford 2002: 6), there are a number of features that have come 
to be associated with workfare programs for the unemployed. Lodemel and Stafford have 
explored the notion of workfare across six European countries (Denmark,  the 
Netherlands, the UK, Germany, Norway and France). They maintain that these programs 
are underpinned by compulsion; are focused at getting work; and they are accompanied 
by the lowest possible level of social security benefits. In this sense, ‘the introduction of 
work and compulsion tied to the receipt of aid represents a fundamental change in the   128 
balance between rights and obligations in the provision of assistance’ (2002: 6) across 
Europe, unlike the US where these practices have been entrenched since the 1970s (2002: 
7). 
 
Grover (1999: 73-4) prefers to locate the shift towards workfare as a neo-liberal turn 
entailing a rejection of  commitment to full employment; and instead claiming  labour 
market flexibility as the primary mechanism for employment generation. In this kind of 
situation, social security (income support system) is problematised and comes to be seen 
as a rigid system, requiring radical reform. Grover goes on to make a clear distinction 
between traditional claims associated with notions of welfare dependency such as those 
posed by Mead (Grover 1999: 76),  which he argues,  simply reduces the notion of 
workfare to one of enforced active job search in return for welfare benefits. For Grover, 
workfare is in practice aimed at creating jobs by quite consciously engineering a strategy 
intended to depress wage levels by ensuring increased labour supply. And in the process, 
those threatened with the loss of their welfare incomes, have little or no option but to 
secure some of those jobs. For this reason, he argues that the workfare shift should be 
called ‘market  workfare’  as in his words jobseekers are ‘coerced’ into filling those 
vacancies (Grover 1999: 77). 
 
Torfing (1999: 1, 5) provides another distinct perspective by examining the way in which 
the notion of workfare has been applied in Denmark. He argues that the construction of 
workfare in that country has been disarticulated away from a neo-liberal framework 
which characterise such programs in the UK and the US. Instead, effort has been made to   129 
rearticulate this notion in keeping with Denmark’s social democratic and universalist 
inclinations. Whilst clearly a shift has taken place emphasising activation practices, the 
change has refrained from measures intended to drive down levels of benefits and or 
minimum wage. Moreover, Danish workfare programs have avoided simply focusing on 
job search activities, instead training and education are given a stronger emphasis – with 
education comprising 50 per cent of activation outcomes  with high-quality employer 
based programs within the private sector also proving effective in meeting participant 
training and job-matching opportunities. The programs have tended to promote notions of 
empowerment amongst participants, instead of merely  relying on sanctions. 
Underpinning these operations is the requirement to involve participants in the planning 
process, whereby client participation  rights  in influencing the  planning process is 
mandated through the Law on Active Social Policy, which also provides they be offered a 
range of activation options. Torfing goes on to characterise this shift as an offensive neo-
statist strategy, and Schumpeterian, while differentiating it from an Anglo-Saxon model 
which in his view is clearly neo-liberal (Torfing 1999: 6, 17-8). Having looked at some of 
these shifts in welfare states, it is now useful to briefly look at the Australian experience. 
 
Australia’s employment assistance programs can be traced back to 1945, when 
employment assistance took a more institutionalised turn with the formation of the 
Commonwealth Employment  Services (CES) under the Re-establishment and 
Employment Act 1945. In its early days, CES aimed to promote an efficient job matching 
process in Australia (Dockery 1998: 12). Clearly, this period marked assistance practices 
that seems in keeping with what Jessop (2002) has characterised as the Keynesian   130 
welfare regulatory practices. Dockery observes that the early 1990s saw a marked shift in 
this tradition with a move away from traditional cyclical employment preoccupations. 
The revamped LMPs established in 1994 under Working Nation programs bore witness to 
the new rationalities and technologies intended to meet the concerns of this period 
(Dockery 1998: 12). Stromback, Dockery and Ying suggest that: 
Its [Working Nation] most important feature was the Job Compact which was to 
provide a job placement to everybody who had been unemployed for 18 months 
or more. As such, it implied significant expansion of labour market programs and 
a shift in assistance towards the longer term unemployed (Stromback, et al 1998: 
2). 
 
Another major shift was exemplified by the abolition of the Commonwealth Employment 
Services in 1996, a move that saw community organisations taking over increased levels 
of contracted job matching and case management activities previously undertaken in the 
public sector. This shift in responsibility occurred at the same time as the overall federal 
employment assistance programs became subject to cutbacks (Dockery 1999: 12-3), with 
LMPs budget slashed by $575 million in 1996-97 followed by further cutbacks 
amounting to $956 million in 1997-98 (Junanker and Kapuscinski 1997: 4). It is partly 
against this broad background that the operations of Peel Training and Employment need 
to be understood. 
 
Peel Training and Employment Inc. 
The agency was set up in February 1984 as a Community Youth Support Scheme 
(CYSS), offering counselling services, career development, employment support 
services, advocacy, and a drop-in-centre. It was re-named Mandurah Community Support   131 
Group towards the end of 1991. The change coincided with a new mandate to diversify 
its services in response to community needs beyond those of young people. It also linked 
with a new re-alignment in provision of the federal government funded Skillshare LMPs 
for the Peel District, and the state-funded Retail Training Skills and Precise Training 
(Peel Employment and Training 1999/2000; Interviews with Senior Staff). 
 
In 1998, Peel Training and Employment became a Job Network provider in line with the 
reorganisation of community-based government-funded LMPs alongside most other 
former Skillshare training and employment assistance providers (Annual Report, 
1999/2000). This change marked a shift from grant-based funding to a competitive 
tendering and contracting system. It also saw the implementation of the three key 
programs, which are the subject of this study, namely: 
-  Job Matching (initially known as Flex 1 with Flex standing for 
Flexible Labour Exchange Services ); 
-  Job Search Training (initially known as Flex 2); and 
-  Intensive Assistance (initially known as Flex 3)  
(Centrelink 1997; Dockery 1999). 
 
The 1999/2000 Annual Report of Peel Training and Employment notes that funding 
changes under the then new Job Network system caused uncertainty for the agency. In 
response to this, the agency joined a national consortium of JOB Futures, a nation-wide 
community-based not-for-profit provider network bringing together Job Network 
consortium members based on a commitment not simply ‘to the effective delivery of   132 
employment and training services, but to a wider agenda of strengthening local 
communities through job generation, economic development and community 
development’ (Job Futures http://www.jobfutures.com.au/aboutus/). In this quest, 
members of Job Futures are expected to retain their strong local identity and are 
distinguished by their links with their communities’ (Job Futures 
http://www.jobfutures.com.au/aboutus/). In addition, the consortium says it aims to 
enhance client life choices while minimising coercion. They also maintain that their 
practice is intended to respond holistically, rather than merely focus on training while 
disregarding client personal support needs, advice and counselling. 
 
In 1999/2000 Peel Training and Employment was awarded a Job Network contract for 
Job Matching and Job Search Training programs through Job Futures. The consortium 
also won a tender for Intensive Assistance in Mandurah, and a New Enterprise Incentive 
Scheme in Mandurah and Bunbury. At the time of collecting field data (March 2001 – 
February 2003), the agency had expanded its operational catchment area from Mandurah 
to as far as Golden Bay, Lake Clifton, Waroona, Boddington and Dwellingup; extending 
from there to touch the base of Jarrahdale and Serpentine. In addition, the agency was 
also funded to deliver LMPs in the South West region of Western Australia (Peel 
Training and Employment, 1999/2000 Annual Report). 
 
During the life of this study project, Peel Training and Employment was also running a 
number of programs (in addition to Job Matching, Job Search, and Intensive Assistance) 
catering for the needs of the unemployed people and the business community in its   133 
regional area. These included a range of industry-specific training courses involving 
skills development in hospitality, retail and welding; an apprenticeship support scheme, 
Work for the Dole, and respite support for people with disabilities. A senior staff member 
noted that the agency also used programs such as Work for the Dole as a valuable pool of 
‘volunteers’ useful in supporting the elderly and disabled people in the locality. The 
agency has maintained a key role as a training provider in the Peel region. In keeping 
with this, it has benefited from  traineeships funding from the State Government’s 
Department of Training. 
 
Peel Training and Employment also prides itself in playing a significant role in reducing 
isolation among unemployed people by linking them with employers who would 
otherwise be disadvantaged by geographical distance from regional centres where most 
job placements, training and employee hire services are located. 
 
Program Description 
It is worth restating that at both federal and local levels, DEWR and Centrelink play 
important roles in regulating the Job Network programs offered by Peel Training and 
Employment. DEWR sets the overall framework encompassing service specifications and 
corresponding contractual financial rewards. On its part, Centrelink determines the level 
of support for all eligible participants through its Jobseekers Classification Instrument 
(JSCI), in keeping with its own contractual responsibilities previously required by 
DEWRSB (Centrelink 1998), and now DEWR. 
   134 
Job Search Training 
This training program is said ‘to improve the jobseekers job search skills, help motivate 
them to look for work and expand their job search networks leading to an employment 
outcome’ (Peel Training and Employment 1999: Flex 2 Project Procedures PP-F2-0001). 
People access the service following a Centrelink referral. If they present at a Job Network 
in the first instance, they are sent back to Centrelink for eligibility determination, after 
which they can then come back to attend the Job Network concerned if they are deemed 
eligible.  
 
Job Search Training clients enjoy all of the benefits accorded through Job Matching 
services. Unlike participants who are purely Job Matching, however, people assigned to 
this program are eligible to attend job search training sessions, which are implemented 
over a period of three weeks. The training covers a variety of topics such as preparing a 
resume, vacancy applications, canvassing employers for possible work, job application 
techniques, interview skills and presentation skills. The program also offers opportunity 
for work experience (Peel Training and Employment 2000: Form CL-F2-0001, CL-F2-
0002). 
 
Intensive Assistance 
The Intensive Assistance Program aims to assist the most disadvantaged job seekers. It is 
an intensive support program designed for the long-term unemployed or those considered 
to be at risk of long-term unemployment. Clients are assigned to case managers 
responsible for coordinating individual support plans involving the establishment of   135 
approved goals and provision of information on training and educational programs. 
Agreed plans are put into an activity agreement which is signed by a participant, thus 
binding him or her to the identified plan of action designed to enhance his or her 
opportunity for securing a job placement (Commonwealth Government, Information for 
Job Seekers - Intensive Assistance (u.d). 
 
In line with the notions of active participation, requirements to inform participants about 
the terms and conditions under which services are delivered have become important. 
Consequently, Job Network clients are informed upon admission about how the Intensive 
Assistance program works and what is expected of them (Peel Training and Employment 
1999). They are made aware of the nature of available case management assistance, what 
is expected of  them, and what they can expect from the agency providing services. 
Within these parameters, clients are informed of their rights, responsibilities and 
obligations as defined under the reformed LMPs. As indicated in the agency’s Quality 
Assurance manual (1999: 3), case managers are required to “inform Intensive Assistance 
job seekers that not attending job interviews, failure to respond to communications or 
take reasonable steps within the terms of activity agreements will result in notification of 
a possible breach action to Centrelink”. 
 
Drawing these obligations to the attention of participants has become a significant feature 
in the provision of LMPs under the Job Network system. There is further emphasis on 
customer focus. In line with this logic, information is provided to clients in the early 
phase of their contact with a Job Network about appeal options internal or external to   136 
challenge both the Job Network provider and Centrelink (see requirements outlined in the 
Peel Training and Employment 1999). This kind of emphasis on consumer rights is a 
common feature of neo-liberal rationalities (Pollitt 1993). 
 
Job Matching Service 
The Job Matching program aims primarily to match clients with potential employment 
vacancies coming to the attention of Peel Training and Employment. This program takes 
a two-pronged approach, one part involving job seekers, and another, employers. It 
matches eligible job seekers to potential job placements. Participants are drawn from job 
matching data, Job Search Training and Intensive Assistance programs, and participants 
from other labour market programs. 
 
The contractual funding agreement requires that all competing Job Network providers 
place the Job Network-generated vacancies in DEWR’s online information system pool 
for access by each provider. This is also meant to ensure competitive candidates are 
secured to fill available vacancies. According to Peel Training and Employment, the 
government logic is that businesses acquire the best employees no matter how the 
vacancy was generated (Peel Training and Employment 2000: Form W1-F1-0006). 
The Quality Assurance file also states that when a client has been able to complete 15 
hours of work, the Job Network must submit an online payment claim to Centrelink. A 
second payment claim is submitted if the participant is still holding a job at 13 weeks. 
Following this process, the responsible job Network officer lodges an online request to 
Centrelink for income support reduction for the client in question.  The rate of clients   137 
exiting the income support system is now used as indicator that the Job Network is doing 
its part to achieve results for the client and meeting the federal government’s aim to 
efficiently manage expenditure. Where a Job Matching client has had their social security 
benefit reduced by at least 70 per cent, the provider organisation concerned is able to 
claim a bonus payment from the funding authority, DEWR (Peel Training and 
Employment 2000: Form W1-F1-0002).  
 
From 1998, funding arrangements shifted from being program-based to funding unit cost. 
In this way, the employment assistance provider organisations receive their contractual 
fees dependent on the progress of individual client intervention (DEWRSB 2001a) 
 
It is against this background that I turn to the findings of this case study. 
 
 
 
Technologies of Rule and Processes of Codification 
 
The Competitive Tendering and Contracting (CTC) framework used in procuring Job 
Network services can be seen as a key ‘technology of rule’ deployed under NCP. It 
operates through a number of connected concepts tied with the idea of free market. As 
Dockery (1998: 8) points out, ‘competition, or “contestability” of Job Network programs, 
can be fostered through competitive tendering and contracting out.’ The requirement that 
outcomes are specified in the contract ensures that systems concentrate on results rather 
than process and ‘can serve to increase accountability’ (Dockery 1998: 8). This move 
signifies the government interest to focus the Job Network role around job placement and 
job matching (Hunter, Gray, and Chapman 2000: ix). It is also in line with the overall   138 
procurement requirements established under the Commonwealth Financial Management 
and Accountability Act 1997, whereby government entities are able to maximise desired 
returns from public resources (APSC 2003a, b, 2004). 
 
More specifically, the competitive tendering and contracting arrangements ties Peel 
Training and Employment to a highly prescribed and codified framework of service 
delivery. In the following section describe the means by which these prescriptions take 
place: through producing of notions of responsibility, regulating client conduct, and 
systematising service operations and procedures in particular orders. 
 
Producing notions of responsibility 
DEWR has produced particular notions of client responsibility which define the terms 
under which employment assistance is to be delivered. The requirements placed on 
clients are stated in a Commonwealth flier given to unemployed people titled Job 
Network: Connecting the Right Person to the Right Job,  where unemployed people are 
told: 
You must: 
 
•  Keep your appointment with Centrelink or let them know if 
you can’t make it and arrange another time; 
•  Keep all your appointments with the job Network member 
or arrange other times if you can’t keep them; 
•  Develop and sign the Activity Agreement negotiated with 
your Job Network Member; 
•  Do the activities you have agreed to in your activity 
agreement; and accept any offer of suitable work 
(Commonwealth Government jobseeker flier u.d). 
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This set of responsibilities is reproduced in the Peel Training and Employment Quality 
Assurance manual (Quality Assurance, Form 1A5). It stipulates the following: 
When you take part in Intensive Assistance, there are a number of 
things you must do. 
•  You must work out an Intensive Assistance Activity 
Agreement with your Intensive Assistance Case Manager to 
help you get back to work 
•  You must do the things you agreed to in your Intensive 
Assistance Activity Agreement 
•  You and your Intensive Assistance Case Manager must work 
together to make sure that Intensive Assistance Activity 
Agreement will help you to get into work 
•  You must accept any offer of a suitably paid work 
•  You must turn up to jobs and referral interviews arranged for 
you by your Intensive Assistance Case Manager or Centrelink, 
(if you cannot, contact the organisation you are to have an 
interview with before the appointment and arrange another 
time)   
(Peel Training and Employment 2000: Form 1A5). 
 
These notions of responsibility are integrated in the working agreements mutually 
binding a job seeker and Peel Training and Employment. Thus, the job seeker and their 
Job Network are drawn into signing a “Job Seekers’ Declaration’, which is then lodged 
with DEWR affirming that both parties intend to work within the formulated framework 
[DEETYA, u.d. Documented adopted as Peel Employment and Training 1999: Form IA3 
(b)]. The prescribed terms of this Job Seeker Declaration include these provisions: 
 
Job seeker declaration 
I acknowledge that the terms of this Agreement have been negotiated between the Job 
Network member and myself. I agree to carry out the activities that are listed on the 
attached schedules. I also understand that: 
a)  I must demonstrate that I am willing to do everything I can to get a job and to 
undertake suitable paid work; 
b)  I must accept a suitable job offer that becomes available even if I am doing 
training;   140 
c)  If I do not accept a suitable job offer, my participation in Intensive Assistance 
may be cancelled; 
d)  I may be required to enter into a new or revised agreement; 
e)  I can ask the Job Network member for this agreement to be changed any time; 
f)  I must contact, attend or provide information to the Job Network member 
when I am asked about my progress under, or compliance with, this 
Agreement 
g)  I must tell the Job Network member when I cannot attend a job interview or 
do an activity. 
 
These requirements regulate the conduct of the parties involved, including the way in 
which staff must ‘manage’ clients. As will be demonstrated later in this chapter, these 
sets of responsibilities put in place particular expectations on both staff and clients. The 
agreements and terms in which clients are required to work closely with their case 
managers set limit to what can be considered together with what can be done. These 
understandings though, are not absolute or uncontested. Hence, in this study some clients 
questioned government strictures. One client who was attending a Job Search Training 
Program contested the plan of intervention, which he believed did not take account of his 
previous skills and experience: 
I don’t agree…because they don’t take into account a person’s situation. 
Look at my situation for example; I’ve got TAFE qualifications Certificate 
Two, Three, Four and a Diploma in IT. I couldn’t get any exemption from 
Centrelink from doing this course [that is Job Search Training]. The only 
other way is doing 20 hours of part time or voluntary work. So it doesn’t 
take into consideration what you have done in the past. There is no 
premise for prior learning. This is done to anyone unemployed for three 
months…I’m interested in this not just now, but in fact I’ve written before 
to my Member of Parliament and the Ombudsman because of the sort of 
obligation that doesn’t make sense (Client 1). 
 
Under current employment assistance arrangements, suitable work is expressed as ‘any 
job you are able to perform…it can be outside your preferred occupation, or at a lower 
level of pay than you may have previously earned.’ (Job futures: The National   141 
Employment Network, Form 1A5). Unsuitable work is now limited to be a situation 
whereby a person lacks the skills to undertake a particular job, the job is unsafe, at least 
90 minutes of travel to the place of work is involved, or where a job fails to meet existing 
award standards or enterprise agreement. There is also no compulsion to join the armed 
forces. 
 
Illustrating the previous point about resistance, one of the clients in this study questioned 
what he saw as narrow definitional parameters regarding the notion of ‘suitable work’: 
Okay, I think people should take other jobs within reason. It depends on 
circumstances. If it is going to affect the quality of your life, you shouldn’t 
take that job. There is a real emotional and psychological impact. People 
shouldn’t be forced to accept any menial jobs that come up. For them 
[Centrelink], there’s no shades of grey. 
(Client 1) 
 
  
Ordering operational processes and procedures 
 
Under the competitive tendering and contracting system, Peel Training and Employment 
has developed highly codified systems regulating a range of organisational and client 
organisational processes. 
 
Peel Training and Employment Quality Assurance Manual contain detailed step by step 
instructions on processes and procedures necessary to meet the expectations of the 
funding body. At an organisational level, all staff are required to pay attention to the 
Internal Quality Audit and its related standards and procedures. They are also prompted 
to remember that ‘Peel Training and Employment Inc. shall also be reviewed by an   142 
external body at scheduled intervals as required to remain quality assured’ (Peel Training 
and Employment 1999: Form CP008). This particular internal quality standard mandates 
the agency manager to appoint a well trained internal auditor, whose quality development 
and maintenance role is specifically prescribed under the Internal Audit Checklist (Peel 
Training and Employment 1999: CF0013). The requirement to manage agency operations 
through ‘process control’ (Peel Training and Employment 1999: CP007) has generated a 
plethora of codified documentation on how individual programs are to be carried out, 
managed, how clients should be treated and the requirement to spell out client 
compliance expectations in the course of using employment assistance programs at the 
agency. 
 
All of the Job Network programs covered in this case study were subject to detailed 
codification. The program operations are individually articulated, step by step outlining 
operational and support processes involving the treatment of individual clients – from the 
point of entry to termination of service use. For example, Form W1-F2-0001 details the 
processes involved in dealing with Job Search Training client referrals. This includes 
confirming a client’s Centrelink eligibility status; a standard letter to a client confirming 
service availability, and a subsequent telephone call arranging for an interview or 
commencement of an activity (or sending letter if no response is forthcoming). During 
their particular interviews with the Job Network, clients need to sign activity agreements 
and commence a three-week Job Search Training program. On completion of these 
processes, Form W1-F2-0001 draws staff attention to the means of filing payment claims 
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Training and Employment highlights its contractual obligation to contact Centrelink with 
reports of ‘possible breach’ for those unemployed people who fail to turn up to a Job 
Search Training session as mandated by DEWR precise instructions are also given 
describing ways of recording the details of each specific client contact and the necessary 
assistance steps using the IES system linking Job Networks and relevant government 
authorities (Peel Training and Employment 1999: Form W1-F2-0001 are further detailed 
in Form W1-F2-0001. 
 
The Quality Assurance Manual identifies the skills to be learnt under its Job Search Skills 
Plan. These include resume preparation, preparing job application, obtaining references, 
cold canvassing, developing job application and interview techniques, presentation skills, 
teaching job seekers to ‘market’ themselves. 
 
The procedures for dealing with notification of vacancies from employers are also subject 
to detailed instruction (Peel Training and Employment 2000: Form W1-F1-0004). The 
staff member is required to introduce him or herself to employers and then check if the 
employer has previously used Peel Training and Employment. If it is established that the 
employer making contact is new, staff are expected to check how the employer learnt 
about the service. The responsible officer then proceeds to explain about the agency role 
in connection with the employers’ needs. Vacancy details are obtained from the employer 
who is given contact details of relevant staff who will deal with matters relating to 
vacancy referral; a vacancy file record is processed; where an employer requires a higher 
level of service, a service fee is negotiated and agreed upon.  Details of the vacancy are   144 
then uploaded to the IES system as required by DEWR. Following this process, any Job 
Network may then be able to inform their respective clients about the vacancy since they 
are accessible throughout the IES Job Network system. 
 
 To monitor the process and outcomes of the organisation key performance indicators are 
established. In line with quality assurance instruction ‘KPIs Flex 2 Checklist, CL-F2-
0002’, the agency must regularly monitor the following: rates of job seekers placed in a 
job, successful employment placements exceeding 13 weeks, average reduction in the 
clients’ percentage of income support received from Centrelink, and the duration of client 
support counted from the point of referral to the completion or termination of support. 
 
The staff coordinating the Job Matching programs are required  to maintain up-to-date 
statistical and agency tracking systems using manual and electronic softwares; keep 
update reports for agency management purposes; forward fortnightly payment claim 
records to head office (their national consortium); conduct monthly electronic IES review 
reports to ensure accuracy of client data shared with DEWR; and report any statistical 
errors to head office (Peel Training and Employment 2000: Form W1-F1-0010).  
 
Requirements such as these are in line with documents such as the Commonwealth 
Procurement Guidelines  (2004, 2002) and the Australian Competitive Neutrality 
Guidelines for Managers (2004) described in Chapter Two. Hence they form part of the 
broader arena of public sector reform and DEWR’s (2004f: 1) declaration  that its 
tendering process abides by the Commonwealth Competitive Neutrality Policy. DEWR   145 
observes that with non-government organisations increasingly expected to deliver public 
services, it has an obligation to: 
Ensure that contracts are developed and managed wisely to achieve maximum 
benefit from government expenditure. Effective contracting can improve a 
department’s accountability in a particular activity by clarifying responsibilities, 
and specifying and monitoring performance standards and processes (2004f: 1) 
 
The manner in which the organisational requirements are set out in the relevant 
documents indicates the bureaucratic assumption that processes can be fully articulated 
before a client has had an opportunity to interact with the staff member, illustrating 
Pollitt’s (1993: 14) observation that managerialism is predicated on the assumption that 
‘anything  can, and should, be managed’. This contrasts, at least in part, with the 
traditional welfare insistence that in the first instance, a client’s subjective experiences, 
needs and realities must form part of the considerations influencing the process and goals 
of support (Payne 1997; O’Connor, et al. 2003; Pincus and Minahan 1973). Underlying 
this point, Pusey (2003: xiv) argues that under economic rationalism, subjective needs are 
not given attention, since it only attends to needs that fit an external objective criteria. In 
the words of King this perspective: 
is in line with the ‘time and motion’ spirit of Taylorism – a concentration on the 
immediate, concrete, controllable things which go on within one’s organisation 
and an avoidance of entanglement with wider value questions of the fairness, 
equity or social usefulness of the product. It is also consonant with the neo-liberal 
scepticism concerning concepts of justice or any collective values (King cited in 
Pollitt 1993: 60). 
 
Crucially, these new codification practices facilitate what John Harris (2003: 4) describes 
as a ‘pre-emption’ of professionalism. This is pursued through enhancing financial 
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and outcomes rather than process and values. These moves trigger new professional 
expectations amongst staff working in human services devoted to the development of a 
business orientation and skills in the art of gate-keeping and resource rationing. John 
Harris quotes one social worker in Britain, ‘well, if you want to become a counsellor, 
don’t come into social service. If you want to be an assessor and purchaser of services 
and a care manager, which is more managerial, monitoring, reviewing type of role then 
those are the type of skills that are going to be needed…so in a way you are becoming a 
different kind of an animal’ (Harris 2003: 5). As important, decisions reached are 
required to remain attentive to financial imperatives, with; frontline staff uploading 
prescribed statistical information on computerised systems, thus integrating measurement 
targets into everyday tasks in order to meet funder’s requirements. John Harris argues 
that these sorts of practices undermine professional ‘discretion, subjecting social 
workers’ to standardised recording and information processing procedures, enhancing 
managerial control through on-line recording, and ‘bypassing the need for retrospective 
accounts in parochial-professional supervision sessions’ (John Harris 2003: 6). As Hill 
observes this type of strategy, ‘seems to preserve the autonomy of those “hands-on” 
managers at the top whilst ensuring the efficiency of response by lower-level workers to 
their demands” (Hill 2005:269). 
 
In drawing attention to the use of computer-based information to regulate conduct since 
the Second World War, Bogard (1996: 2) talks of the ‘computerisation-surveillance-
bureaucracy nexus’ (Bogard 1996: 2). While he believes it is now common knowledge 
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particular attention to its use as ‘a means of ordering and systematising’ (Bogard 1996: 
16). He adds that in the pursuit of ‘efficiency, integration, coordination [and] planning’ 
through the use of such technologies, Western societies consolidate their instrumental-
rational features (Bogard 1996: 17, 187), a point also noted in Threagold (1990). 
 
Technologies and Practices of Efficiency 
 
The accent on efficiency is such a central feature of the Job Network’s Competitive 
Tendering and Contracting regime that it demands special attention. I discuss it here with 
reference to two of the key technologies of Job Network Programs. First, the assessment 
tool known as the Job Seekers Classification Instrument –  JSCI; second outcome 
measurement technologies. 
 
Classification Practices 
 
In 1998, DEWRSB introduced the Job Seekers Classification Instrument (JSCI) as a 
‘streaming tool between Job Network services and funding level for intensive support’ 
(DEWR 2007: 1). Its main function was to classify clients in order to determine a 
particular funding level (DEWRSB u.d: 1). Since Centrelink carries out the client 
classification functions prior to allocating job seekers to Job Networks, the JSCI ensures 
that a classification determination is made beforehand about the cost, level and kind of 
service an individual should receive from a Job Network provider. Under the JSCI this 
classification involves a broad range of social and economic variables including age, 
educational attainment, vocational qualifications, duration of unemployment, recency of   148 
work experience, family status, geographical location, Aboriginality, transport, and 
access to a telephone (DEWRSB u.d. Job Seekers Classification Instrument 1998, Att. 
A). Under the JSCI, unemployed people are variously assigned to Job Matching, Job 
Search Training, and the Intensive Assistance programs. Once Centrelink has determined 
what level of support suits an individual job seeker, the contracted Job Network 
providing employment assistance is bound to work within its parameters. 
 
All the staff interviewed at Peel Training and Employment complained about the client 
classification system conducted through Centrelink. The following quote is indicative, 
illustrating the participant’s belief that the Centrelink staff are not adequately equipped to 
administer the JSCI: 
Person fills the JSCI, [but the] officer doesn’t have time to talk to person. The 
computer allocates at a certain level, which is not appropriate. My argument is 
government should be providing funding at initial referral point especially 
because our outcomes are based on commencement, and this person is being 
mucked around. (Senior Staff) 
 
More generally, staff queried the level of skills and training of Centrelink’s interviewing 
officers and thought they did not have the training to determine what level of proper 
support should be rendered to recipients of LMPs. At a basic level, it was pointed out by 
three staff that Centrelink fails to appreciate that job seekers with literacy problems 
should not simply be asked to fill out a form. As one staff elaborated, ‘Centrelink tends to 
base judgement on how a person answers a question – there’s no interpretation – that’s 
wrong.’ All staff identified key factors they felt Centrelink frequently overlooked, despite 
the JSCI claiming to be comprehensive if an assessment is fully carried out appropriately. 
These factors included medical history, mental health, homelessness, and previous 
experiences of abuse, with staff making comments such as:   149 
A client of mine, victim of domestic violence, Hep C, cancer – I saw this person, 
we didn’t get this info. In fact, he should have gone to Community Service 
Program or Commonwealth Rehab[ilitation] Program. I can only conclude that 
the person [at Centrelink] interviewing him either didn’t have skills or their tool 
[JSCI] was limited (Service Delivery Staff 2). 
             
People doing interviewing should be Level Three. Must have experience and 
skills. We pick those needs up so quickly – but for them [Centrelink] they slip 
through easily (Service Delivery Staff 1). 
 
In another instance I had a pregnant woman referred - not just one. Should these 
late pregnant women be referred to us? A parenting program would be a better 
option especially for our group because they often are lacking in parenting skills. 
(Service Delivery Staff 2). 
 
 
Under the JSCI, Centrelink staff need to undertake a ‘Secondary Classification Process’ 
for complex cases requiring a particular measure of ‘professional or specialist judgement’ 
because of personal factors (DEWRSB u.d: JSCI 1998: Att A, Pt 2). Here, staff are 
required to pay attention to ‘behavioural triggers’, ‘self disclosure’, ‘visa status  and 
country of origin’ (DEWRSB u.d: JSCI 1998: Att A, Pt 2). While such JSCI checklist 
pointers are useful in capturing the level of assistance needed for a job seeker, in practice 
appropriate classification outcomes are only possible if Centrelink staff are willing and 
able to draw out complex elements connected with the situation of a job seeker.  
Four of the staff interviewed felt that clients can easily miss out on being allocated 
adequate resources under the JSCI screening process, underscoring the point that the 
validity of the JSCI is limited if not underpinned by the requisite knowledge base. As 
noted earlier in the program description, clients classified assigned under Job Matching 
attract the least amount of funding for the Job Network, while clients under Intensive 
Assistance receive the highest funding, with the Job Search Training being somewhere in   150 
the middle. It is particularly in this context that criticisms such as these have force. Thus, 
one staff member commented that: 
Another client 40 years of age he answered all questions [in the JSCI form]. He’s 
going through a child abuse case accused of interfering with a child. [Of course 
the] JSCI assessment didn’t say are you attending court? When I asked him if he 
had barriers preventing him from getting a job, then he expressed to me about his 
case and harassment experienced every time he has to leave his house. So 
[Centrelink] interviewer could have said IA [Intensive Assistance] is not 
appropriate  –  rather go to CSP [Community Support Program] -  so they are 
stabilised there. And that’s how it should happen. (Service Delivery Staff 2) 
 
At the time of conducting this study, if a Job Network agency perceived a referral to be 
inappropriately classified, and asked Centrelink for another assessment, they had to pay 
Centrelink for the expense. One senior staff member made this comment on this practice: 
‘we still do it for clients [pay Centrelink $500], but it costs us money. We don’t like the 
alternative, which is ‘parking’ - that’s not something we’ll do here.’ Another senior staff 
member notes that since referrals are costly, a client is only referred back to Centrelink if 
the agency was convinced this would change future client intervention outcomes.  
 
Ethically and professionally, it can be argued that all clients should be made aware of the 
purpose of any process to which they are subject. In my interviews I found that with the 
exception of one participant, none of the job seekers knew that their initial Centrelink 
assessments had been used to determine the nature and levels of service, they were to 
receive later at the Job Network site. 
  
As Pollitt (1993: 57) notes that in the UK: ‘a buffer is created between those who set the 
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who suffer criticism because they are publicly, [seen] to be implementing the cuts.’ In a 
similar way, DEWR is distanced from those outwardly administering the new 
classification frameworks. Supporting this point, Harris (2003: 7) observes that while 
‘central governments dictate priorities at the local level; they are protected from criticism 
despite their role in micro-managing operational activities.’ 
 
Outcome Measurements 
 
This section explores the way in which Job Network performance indicators, driven by 
efficiency considerations, can be seen to favour employment outcomes while neglecting 
education and rehabilitation concerns. My discussion is based on the assumption that 
outcome measurements are part of those ‘activities of ruling’ developed to ‘shape’ and 
‘instrumentalise conduct’ (Miller and Rose 1990: 8).  
 
In 1999, DEWRSB introduced its means for measuring the performance of Job Network 
operations, with Flinders University and Adelaide Centre for Economic Studies providing 
expertise in the development of these methods. Under the new specifications Job 
Network providers delivering Job Matching are required to record rates of job placement 
as a proportion of the overall client numbers the agency had been asked to service. 
Particular attention is given to those with full time and periods of employment exceeding 
six months, special equity groups such as people with a disability, Indigenous people, and 
clients from Non-English Speaking Background (DEWRSB 2001a, b). In the case of the 
Job Search Training scheme, successful outcomes are linked to the attainment of job 
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‘reliance on the Government income support (DEWRSB 2001a, b). For the Intensive 
Assistance program, outcomes  are  assessed in relation to the proportion of clients 
achieving employment lasting at least 13 successive weeks and hence leading to a 
reduction in reliance on income support benefits. Like Job Search Training and Job 
Matching programs, obtaining employment for special target equity groups contributes to 
the Job Network’s performance rating (DEWRSB 2001a, b). 
 
Under the system existing at the time of the interviews, caseworkers exercised some 
limited level of discretion in the use of funds to meet client needs in relation to such 
things as training, union tickets required on construction sites, and the procurement of 
specific tools of trade and so forth. The staff interviewed in this study liked this aspect of 
the Job Network funding framework, feeling that it went some way towards recognising 
individual needs. Having noted the benefit of this arrangement, however, all those 
interviewed raised a range of concerns related to the way in which program performance 
was measured and with limited resources at their disposal. 
 
In the following interview extracts three staff engaged in direct client service delivery 
comment on the shortfall in the resources considered necessary to produce better 
employment prospects for their clients. The staff were interviewed together. 
The [limited] amount of money requires that we make a choice about what needs 
we will address (Service Delivery Staff 2). 
 
But on the question of whether the money is enough - no. We need more for 
personal development. It needs to be two-pronged, for example, licence and tools. 
We now have to make a choice between rehabilitation and those sorts of things. 
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purposes. Education does not count in terms of contractual outcomes (Service 
Delivery Staff 1). 
 
We have unmet needs – education is one. I resent making the choice. For example 
a fork-lift ticket – we can pay for that. An employer can say a person can get a job 
if they get a ticket (Service Delivery Staff 3). 
 
Our people are 2nd and 3rd generation unemployed, so personal development is 
very important. Conflict resolution is very important for them - lack of skills in 
this area is a barrier to maintaining a job, and anger management is important 
(Service Delivery Staff  2). 
 
All of these participants also expressed concerns about the lack of adequate 
acknowledgement of improvement in a client’s educational, mental health profile as an 
outcome, and of the work necessary to achieve this. These are highlighted in the extracts 
that follow. 
Education does not count as outcome though 40% of our work is about that. 
Welfare support referral and advocacy don’t count as outcome….One issue with 
long-term unemployed is those, whose parents are unemployed, it perpetuates 
culture of unemployment (Service Delivery Staff 2). 
 
Other work, which don’t count as valuable include referral to CSP [Community 
Support Program], to Peel Youth, mental health, completion of drug and alcohol 
dependency program, or transfer from that to methadone program should be 
rewarded (Service Delivery Staff 2). 
 
Anyone who comes in who doesn’t have a year 10 Schooling which is about 30% 
to get them back to education, we pay for their course at TAFE. If they are in a 
course for 12 months we get recognition. But if it is less than 12 we get nothing – 
even though those short six-month courses may be what they need to move ahead. 
If I get a long-term unemployed lady she goes to TAFE for Certificate III 
Community Services, I pay $ 600. This certificate goes for 17 weeks. So the lady 
gets a certificate after passing, but the department does not see that as of value. So 
that sort of an outcome does not add to our star rating (Service Delivery Staff 3). 
 
But the alternative is that you are about getting people crappy jobs rather than 
improving their potential job opportunities so they can get into better jobs. How 
can a crappy job be a better outcome? We don’t think our agency is better off by 
this system (Service Delivery Staff 3). 
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A recurring theme in the interviews thus concerned the failure of funding provisions to 
recognise genuine improvements when jobs were not obtained. These improvements 
included successful educational course placements lasting less than 12 months, referrals 
for rehabilitation, personal development programs, advocacy service, and general welfare 
support. Muetzelfeldt’s (1992: 196) point that ‘meta-planning’ involves an incentive 
structure to generate the desired conduct supports that the focus on immediate 
employment outcomes encourages distant actors, Peel Training and Employment staff in 
this instance, to channel their efforts in particular directions. While this was certainly true 
in broad terms, in this case study, these participants’ responses also illustrate that these 
‘meta-directives’ may not always be followed, with the staff member’s reference to 
‘crappy jobs’ also illustrating the extent to which they may be subject to resistance. 
 
The 2001 DEWR website notes that Peel Training and Employment, together with 
another Job Futures group in Albany, managed to place 2,402 unemployed people in jobs 
(DEWRSB 2001c). The site makes no mention, however, of what these agencies 
achieved in terms of educational and training placements, nor to any other rehabilitation 
outcomes not deemed commercially valuable. John Harris (2003: 7) notes this disregard 
commenting that while central authorities ‘are dictating priorities at the local level; the 
voices of professionals…[and] service users are minimised, even though the policing of 
practice is undertaken in the name of commitment to the latter.’ 
 
A number of policy analysts have joined with the staff interviewed here to draw attention 
to the inadequate level of resources available to Job Networks to assist clients to build up   155 
their skill levels. In its submission to the 2001 Productivity Commission Inquiry into the 
Job Network Model, the Australian Council of Social Services, and ACOSS commentes 
that: 
Official evaluations and independent studies indicate that only a minority of 
Intensive Assistance clients receive substantial training (apart from training in job 
search) and very few receive subsidised employment experience. Assistance is 
largely confined to counselling [in-house], coaching, job search training, and 
short vocational training courses (of a few weeks duration). This is contrary to the 
expectation of the government when a Job Network was introduced. The 
expectation at the time was that providers would invest in assistance to overcome 
employment barriers (ACOSS 2001: 6). 
Jobs Australia (2002) has strongly challenged the basis of the official performance 
calculations, arguing that they do not offer any insight into the quality of the attained 
employment outcomes. While official data supports that in 2001 over 40 per cent of 
Intensive Assistance clients were placed into jobs, no details are given of the proportion 
of those whose 13-week job placements were supported through government wage 
subsidies. Jobs Australia also point out that once clients have used up their support 
provisions they often re-register with Centrelink as new applicants in need of 
employment assistance (Jobs Australia 2002: 4). 
 
In this context, the precarious and short-term nature of the jobs in which Intensive 
Assistance clients may be placed also needs to be noted. Cranford, Vosko, and Zukewich 
(2003: 9) comment on the recent rise in insecure and low paid jobs with an ‘insufficient 
wage for workers to maintain themselves and their dependents’. This has particular 
implications for those with lower educational qualifications. Based on the results of a 
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per cent of the employed who did not finish high school during the period 1986 to 1988 
were in precarious employment situations (ACER 2001, cited in ABS 2003). 
 
Given these trends, and the limited focus and nature of the current funding framework, 
Jobs Australia (2002:4-5) has proposed that outcome measurements should include client 
gains in acquiring of ‘soft skills’, shifts in attitudes towards searching for a job, and client 
feedback about a particular Job Network. This organisation argued that these points were 
especially pertinent to the complex experiences of clients under the Intensive Assistance 
program. Similarly, ACOSS (2001) has suggested that Job Network providers should be 
adequately compensated not simply for efficient outcomes, but also for service carried 
out (ACOSS 2001: 4-5). 
 
Against this, DEWR has strongly defended its position, arguing that its outcome 
formulations were independently developed with the assistance of the Flinders University 
and the Adelaide Centre for Economic Studies, and later vetted by Access Economics. It 
maintains that the indicators represent ‘a sound, leading-edge approach to performance 
measurements’ (DEWRSB 2002: 4; 20004: 2a, d) and put the Government in a position 
to identify good performance and evaluate outcome comparisons across the industry 
(DEWR 2004a). The quest to make performance comparisons across a particular industry 
is echoed in publications such as the Commonwealth Procurement Guidelines (2002: 4; 
(2004: 9) and the Financial Management and Accountability Act (1997). In line with this, 
authorities argue that in order to derive ‘better value for money’, it is necessary to have ‘a 
competitive procurement process, and require a comparative analysis of all relevant costs   157 
and benefits of each compliant proposal throughout the whole procurement cycle (whole-
of-life-costing)’ (DFA 2004a: 9).  
 
In 2000, DEWRSB made the decision to use the star rating mechanism as the primary 
tool guiding tendering and business allocations (Commonwealth of Australia, 2000a: 2). 
In 2004 DEWR reasserted this position, declaring that ‘the Star Ratings are a key 
criterion in assessing the potential re-allocation of business between providers’ and that 
‘DEWR will examine the potential for maximising performance by increasing the 
business levels for Job Network members with high Star Ratings’ (DEWR 2004c). The 
Government made it very clear that under the new Employment Services Contract 2003-
200 ‘those with ratings of three and a half stars or higher were normally offered what 
DEWR calls an ‘Invitation to Treat', allowing them to continue at their pre-existing 
business levels’ (DEWR 2004c: 5 Job Network Member Ratings). Here, the notion 
‘Invitation to Treat’ implies a kind of a preferred-service provider status – meaning that 
achievement of a higher Star Rating helps guarantee business allocation in the following 
three yearly contracting period. 
 
Rose’s (1996: 55) argument about the importance of “audit” mechanisms in achieving 
government objectives in neo-liberal regimes is instructive here. As he emphasises, the 
audit ‘travels well across space and time, is capable of being propagated in a multitude of 
locales, channelling and organising activities and linking centres of calculation to sites of 
implementation according to new vectors’ (Rose 1996: 55). Bogard’s (1996: 20) 
suggestion that computerisation has added another layer of regulation to make claims   158 
based on simulation is also relevant here. Since the data used in constructing the Star-
Rating model captures efficiency achievements defined by DEWR to the exclusion of 
what actually happens in practice to improve outcomes, this calculation is in fact an 
exercise in simulation – a mimicking of reality. 
 
The subordination of professional rationalities to efficiency objectives outlined in this 
section is broadly reflected in the academic literature. For example, Muetzelfeldt (1992)  
points out that with that the practices associated with neo-liberal governance dislodged 
the earlier welfare discourses, and alongside them ‘the associated policy practices of 
managing a mixed economy and the welfare state, which had resulted from previous 
historic compromises between labour and capital’ (1992: 190). And Rose (1996) remarks 
that under advanced liberalism, welfare professionals are no longer left to maintain 
‘established enclosures’, but, the very notion of professionalism becomes regulated by 
accounting and financial management regimes (Rose 1996: 54). Pollitt (1993: 11) 
comments that: 
There has been no mention, for example, of social needs, professional standards, 
deprivation, community or equity. They have not entered the ‘story so far’ 
precisely because, historically, they played little or no part in the development of 
managerialist ideologies. Thus the transfer during the last decade or two, of 
managerialism from private sector corporations to welfare-state services 
represents the injection of an ‘ideological foreign body’ into a sector previously 
characterized by quite different traditions of thought. 
 
He also suggests that: 
The Whitehall vocabulary of the 1980s soon incorporated the virtuous three E’s: 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the civil service…. In practice, however, 
the focus seems to have been far more on economy and efficiency than on 
effectiveness…..This is significant because the three E’s do not always march 
together (Pollitt 1993: 59).   159 
 
Cultivating employable minds 
 
In this section I explore how mutual obligation promotes a particular self-knowledge and 
self-discipline, what Dean (1995: 559) calls ‘self-formation’. My main argument here 
will be that there is no single subject position located - rather a bundle of a contradictory 
and inconsistent nature. 
 
Only one participant expressed outright objection to the major aspects of the current 
system. All the other six interviewed clients said they favoured engagement in the 
activities and programs offered by the agency. They also indicated their support for the 
general principles surrounding mutual obligation. In the following extracts four 
participants identify what they consider to be beneficial when participating in Job 
Network activities. Their comments indicate a range of ways in which job seekers can 
experience genuine focus by participating in the programs on offer: 
I have learnt about paying attention to resume, manners appropriate for work 
environment, and people skills. All of that will help me to perfect my job seeking 
skills and contact with employer. Apart from this training [that is Job Search 
Training] I receive support through my case manager. I see her for any problem – 
attitude, resume, relationship with the boss [in reference to employer or 
supervisor]. It is very good support (Client 1). 
 
At present I’m doing a basic course on JST [Job Search Training]. I never used a 
computer before. I can use it now and do my resume. Here things are more 
professional. They’ve done assessment, drawing up contract and I come and 
see…my case manager every fortnight. She organised an appointment for me to 
see a counsellor. This agency treats you like a whole person. Case management is 
very good and very empowering. She also organised a referral for physio – she 
should be rewarded. There are more things offered here, before I was with agency 
Mission Australia for about eight months. I never used to receive correspondence 
from them. I also felt very belittled there (Client 3).   160 
 
Job Search Training is excellent because it is a good way of upgrading on modern 
way of applying jobs. There is so much to learn now - I realise even where you 
put the address on the application has changed (Client 4). 
 
Me and my case manager worked out on the contract. I was involved [in 
developing an activity agreement]. My obligation is that I bring in a copy of 
Wednesday and Saturday newspapers - bring in and discuss. My Case Manager 
also finds other opportunities I overlook. She assists me and has helped a lot. 
Centrelink sent me to do JST, as part of my obligation I attend this course (Client 
3). 
 
The in-house Job Search Training (JST) course is one key form through which such skills 
are learnt. As mentioned in the methodology, I undertook two full days observing a Job 
Search Training course, which was running for three weeks. About 17 program 
participants were in attendance, of whom five participated in my study interviews. The 
training sought to equip participants with specific job search skills and promote an 
appreciation of the culture and world of work. To this end, participants role-played a 
range of ways of job searching such as telephone inquiries, addressing job selection 
criteria, competing on the job market, attending interviews, and developing and 
maintaining motivation. They also explored the kind of language, culture, dress code and 
negotiation skills suited to the world. 
 
During these training sessions, participants talked about their perceptions of the benefits 
of this program. Three participants spoke in very glowing terms of the skills of the person 
facilitating the course. As an observer, I reached the same conclusion about the quality of 
the program and the capacity of the presenter. 
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The following interview responses, which were voiced in relation to a question about 
participants’ attitude to mutual obligation, also indicate broad support to the aims of this 
program: 
I think mutual obligation is good because people just live off the dole…it means 
that I’m attentive, not rude, and give back input. Everyone is in a different boat. 
Some people don’t have the experience. I have experience in building trade, 
customer liaison – it all helps. Conditions are there to be abided, so if you don’t 
meet them, why are you here? Because we are here to make ourselves appreciated 
by employers.  
 
Activity agreements are brilliant. I’ve achieved a lot of information, which would 
not be accessible otherwise. I realised there is so much to learn. I was not aware 
of so many changes - it is good that this service is available. And I don’t think 
they should wait until people are unemployed to get this knowledge. Everyone 
should know about it. (Client 4) 
 
It is a good idea [mutual obligation] because that is the way it should be. For 
example, when I did the course before, many people turned up. You can’t 
generalise, but it must have an effect. See, I didn’t even have a resume, I didn’t 
know how to address a selection criteria, I’ve been in the workforce for a long 
time, I didn’t know what process people go through to get a job these days. 
(Client 6) 
 
In these, we hear participants taking the view ‘everyone should know about  it [Job 
Network supports]’, and recognising that learning to prepare resumes and address job 
selection criteria are sensible strategies for future employment. They also internalise 
expectations about appropriate behaviour (not being rude) and ‘being there  to make 
ourselves appreciated by employers’. As well as indicating appreciation, such responses 
can be read as showing how the unemployed are involved in a process where their minds 
are being ‘subjected to public inspection’ (Luther, et al 1988: 125-6). Hutton further 
states that through involvement in these kinds of activities, individuals are caught up in 
normalising processes through which government objectives are taken up and used to 
regulate self-conduct (Hutton 1988: 125-6).   162 
 
Although most of the participants supported mutual obligation in these respects, that their 
position was more complex is supported by their responses to other interview questions. 
When asked specifically to comment on their experiences of mutual obligation, a more 
qualified response was offered depending on individual circumstance and experience. 
Thus, one participant who earlier had indicated full support for the existing mutual 
obligation requirements was understandably displeased that Centrelink breached her for 
unintentional inaccurate reporting of her income earnings: 
I’ve just been told I’ve been breached. I was putting in my net earnings not my 
gross. I’ve not been breached for an activity here [not at Peel Training and 
Employment, but at Centrelink], it is more the earnings. They’ve got new forms, 
every fortnight you say how many hours you have done. It is very demeaning…It 
doesn’t do much for your self-esteem. They don’t trust you. I understand they 
have got to breach people but the system is not personalised, everyone is put in 
the same box. They are not addressing you at Centrelink they are addressing the 
number (Client 3). 
 
Another participant,  broadly appreciative of Peel Training and Employment held 
reservations about some of the courses he encountered in New South Wales. In his view, 
obligation only makes sense where it is accompanied by delivery of quality training. He 
also felt that middle-aged job seekers lacked access to certain training programs.  
 
I worked in a cattle station in Cooma. I did a course in farm skills. I did this 
ridiculous course. Some, not all courses are good. The trainer was teaching us 
fencing I knew more than he did. Welding course was good, but there are only a 
few of those...I did Job Search Training before in New South Wales [NSW]… 
Young people have more programs, apprenticeship schemes and that sort of thing. 
Employers prefer young people, because they don’t want to pay too much if they 
employ us. There is not much here in Mandurah (Client 7). 
 
At the same time this participant made some clear distinction between himself and those 
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Breaching? That’s fair enough. I’ve been in Centrelink and saw lots of young 
people. I have heard people say my young one has thrown my diary in the bin. 
One guy had only one job listed in his diary….The problem with unemployment 
is that most people are abusing the system, well some. So we all suffer, I think we 
should have a two-way system, one for the honest people. They should be treated 
decently. Take my case, I have worked in cattle stations, washing dishes in 
restaurants, prawn trawler, mining stations, worked in wool sheds pressing bales, 
done mechanical jobs in cattle stations, there are many scumbags who abuse the 
system. Politicians should differentiate so we are not all lumped together. If they 
can wield out the no hopers it should be good for everyone. I don’t want to work 
for the dole. They treat you the same way like the scumbags. 
 
 
Management Perspectives 
 
As implied throughout this chapter, the governance of the unemployed ‘is undertaken by 
a complex linking of agencies within and without the boundaries of the state’ (Dean 
1995: 571) with ‘job-readiness’ governed by actors beyond government institutions. 
Some insights into how this process operates were provided in the interviews with the 
three case managers coordinating the Intensive Assistance client support plans and two 
case workers providing client supports under the Job Search Training. The following 
conversation on the case managers’ experiences in the enforcement of mutual obligation 
regime offer staff perspectives about breaching: 
I don’t have a problem with breaching because it’s in his [in reference to a client 
previously mentioned by a staff member] best interest, and it is based on what 
they agree they’re gonna do (Service Delivery Staff 1). 
 
I think they breach themselves. My client has a drug dependency problem. Last 
week he refused to speak to me on the phone. Said he is working 20 hour a week, 
and not declaring to Centrelink. He has hung up on me, and not turning up for an 
interview (Service Delivery Staff 2) 
 
I believe the problem is that he has sold off tools of trade [tailor] that have been 
purchased for him, he is on parole. He hocked the tools before so we paid to get   164 
them back. But there is a difference between being sure yourself of the problem – 
we are not doctors (Service Delivery Staff 3). 
 
In the interviews with the Job Search Training workers, government initiatives were also 
supported broadly, and a reasonably authoritarian stance towards clients taken: 
 
We treat them well as before but we have to be tougher and focussed. If clients 
don’t turn up then it is a problem. An example of a worst scenario, recently four 
young people decided they’ll play up – disrupting training sessions, which made 
difficult to control. They were warned. All warnings failed, so Centrelink was 
notified but one apologised and was keen to start again, and this was okay…. 
Certainly there are benefits because now we are more focussed – so it is definitely 
better for the client (Service Delivery Staff 4). 
 
I think clients should do something like update their own skills. They may be 
timid or petrified – so it is good people can do something, but they don’t have to 
simply move from one training to another, as before (Service Delivery Staff 5). 
 
Here, we find that breaching is seen as a system exercised in the ‘client[s] best interest’, 
as something that is ‘better for the clients’ and able to ‘normalise’ the conduct of those 
who fail to help themselves. Dean (1995: 577) also offers some glimpses into how the 
‘technical and calculative aspects’ of government programs are translated into pastoral 
practices whereby clients are encouraged to take an active part in their own self 
regulation – this behavioural emphasis on assisting clients becomes less ‘timid’ or less 
‘disruptive’, suggests a narrowing of responses compared to the broad social and 
economic forms of welfarism. 
 
Walters (1996: 209) is deeply uneasy about a regime that ‘coerces’ people to take up 
insecure jobs. For him, these practices: ‘do more than obscure the “real” extent of 
unemployment. Rather they transform the very nature of the real.’ 
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In this situation, those involved in service delivery find their options and actions 
circumscribed by the procedural and contractual requirements binding them. Thus, for 
example, the case manager opposed to mutual obligation stated that her drive to support 
some clients attain long term outcomes was constrained by the requirement to ‘turn 
around a client with a big problem in one year’. And even those staff who clearly 
endorsed mutual obligation thought that the lack of sensitivity in the breaching process 
undermined the client-worker relationship. One case manager, for example, commented 
that ‘when breaching is recommended it impacts badly [on the working relationship], 
especially if Centrelink tells them I’m responsible [for reporting a possible breach of 
participation agreement]. Reinforcing this point, a senior staff said:  
For case managers it can be daunting in terms of how clients respond - abuse - are 
they gonna bring a gun? So I discuss with my staff that you do everything you can 
before breaching…but you do your own equation – if a client is going to bring a 
gun, should you be sending a client for referral like anger management? (Senior 
staff). 
 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The Competitive Contracting and Tendering technology used in regulating the conduct of 
Peel Employment and Training as a provider of employment assistance programs has 
provided the main focus of my discussion for this chapter. Most specifically, I have 
explored and described various ways in which employment assistance practices are 
ordered and promoted. The thesis has drawn attention to the ways in which in the first 
instance, under these contracting terms, a Job Network provider and its individual clients 
become drawn in particular contractual understandings of the ‘dos’ and ‘don’ts’ expected 
of each client. These understandings are spelled out notions of client responsibility and   166 
these understandings bind the Job Network provider through their particular funding 
contract with DEWR with a view that they will aim to deliver services within the 
parameters of responsibility spelled out by the government. Similarly, a recipient of Job 
Network assistance is expected to follow the terms of service delivery, otherwise they run 
the danger of being breached by Centrelink. In discursively spelling out notions of 
responsibility in this way, the case study has demonstrated the way in which non-
government providers can be encouraged into ways of understanding and treating clients 
in ways that closely resemble government intentions. 
 
This chapter has also highlighted the way in which, through the use of Competitive 
Tendering and Contracting strategy, it has become possible for DEWR, as a government 
authority, to spell out very detailed service specifications expected of a Job Network 
provider in meeting their contractual obligations. In this connection, the chapter has 
identified a growing use of codification practices shaping and reshaping the manner in 
which staff operate and treat clients. Crucially, the chapter has further revealed the 
regulation of practice made possible through the contractual arrangements that set very 
specific terms for performance measurements expected of a Job Network provider and 
the related compliance achievements. 
 
The chapter has drawn attention to the shortcomings of pursuing value for money, 
arguing that this appears to be taken too far, creating gaps in inadequate resources 
allocated to capacity-building and rehabilitation endeavours. In addition, the work argues   167 
that amidst these gaps, we also see an intensification of patterns of self-regulation 
intended to reinforce a self-gaze conducive to promotion of job-ready mentalities. 
   168 
Chapter Five 
Contracting Family Support Services 
 
Introduction 
 
This case study explores the regulation of homelessness through accommodation 
assistance provided at Swan Emergency Accommodation (SEA) under the Supported 
Accommodation Assistance Program (SAAP) – a nationwide program jointly funded by 
the federal and state and territory governments and administered under the latter 
jurisdictions. The chapter problematises the governing of homelessness -  how it is 
constituted and made knowable through particular authorities and knowledge systems. 
The research reveals that the management of homelessness is informed by a mix of 
governing rationalities indicating some kind of hybridisation of welfare rationalities and 
managerialists forms under the Preferred Service Provider service delivery arrangements. 
This case study also describes some notable contradictions in these co-existing 
rationalities of rule in so far as these knowledge systems inform the regulation of 
homelessness. 
 
Swan Emergency Accommodation is located in the Midland area in Western Australia. 
The service was opened in 1980 under its previous name, The Junction, signifying a 
physical location where the Great Eastern Highway and Great Northern Highways meet. 
Midland is the first large regional urban centre reached by interstate and country 
travellers who are coming to Perth by road (Swan Emergency Accommodation, u.d: 5).   169 
During the first two years of its operations, the service was totally reliant on the 
community and voluntary resources. In 1982 it was able to access some government 
funds. In 2001, a period during which the data for this case study was collected, this 
community-based agency was receiving about one million dollars annually of 
government funding through the Preferred Service Provider service procurement system 
administered by the State’s Department of Community Development. 
 
Swan Emergency Accommodation provides a range of programs from four different sites 
in the Midland area. These include a family centre known as Transea, catering for 
families with children. Transea Family Centre consists of four cluster-style dwelling 
units, providing accommodation to four separate families at a time. Young people are 
supported through another youth-specific facility known as Snow Bennet Youth Shelter 
which, like the above mentioned programs, offers a maximum of 13 weeks 
accommodation for up to 10 young people at a time. In addition, Swan Emergency 
Accommodation sponsors Karnany Aboriginal Service, a program coordinated with the 
involvement of the local Aboriginal community. Karnany seeks to provide culturally-
appropriate supports and advocacy. Swan Emergency Accommodation also maintains a 
limited number of supported houses in the community designed to offer additional 
transition support through a medium-term period, thus enabling easier entry into the 
mainstream housing options. Where relevant, clients can also access a drug education 
program run from the main administration premises (Swan Emergency Accommodation, 
u.d.: 5; Swan Emergency Accommodation, Transea Family Centre, u.d.). 
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Data Collection 
 
A total of eleven participants were interviewed at Swan Emergency Accommodation. 
eight of these were members of staff and management. They comprised a Management 
Committee Chairperson, an Executive Officer, the agency’s Program Manager and six 
workers involved in undertaking direct client work. Of these client workers, three were 
Family Resource Workers based at Transea Family Centre, one was a Youth Worker 
based at the agency’s Snow Bennett Youth Shelter, and another Coordinated at Karnany 
Aboriginal Service. Interviewees also included three homeless residents residing at Swan 
Emergency Accommodation; one was a lone father with his two school-age children and 
two were youths, a female and one male. The researcher was also invited to sit through 
one of the agency daily ‘hand-over’ meetings, where a summary of client-related matters 
was presented as the morning shift handed over operational activities to the evening shift. 
 
In order to situate the context of Swan operations, a broad description on the management 
of homelessness in Australia is useful. 
 
Managing Homelessness in Australia 
 
In 1945 Australia established a significant form of housing assistance under the 
Commonwealth-State Housing Agreement (CSHA) and through rent subsidies for 
individuals and families renting private accommodation. These housing agreements are 
subject to periodic negotiations, starting with the first Agreement in late 1945, followed 
by other Agreements in 1956, 1973, 1978, 1984 and 1989. By 1980, the rent subsidy   171 
(Rental Assistance) disbursed through the national income support system (social 
security) comprised almost half of government outlays targeting housing assistance 
(Parliament of Australia 1996: 2). Thus, in 2002-2003 the federal government spent a 
total of $1.847 billion on Rent Assistance alone (Commonwealth of Australia 2002:12). 
According to National Shelter and ACOSS (2003: 5), Rent Assistance is received by 
about one million people in Australia. As of June 2003, on average, the Rent Assistance 
recipients received $75 per fortnight and were paying an average rent of $264 per 
fortnight (ABS 2003: 2). 
 
Under Schedule 1 of the preamble to the Amendment of the Housing Assistance Act 1989, 
the Parliament of Australia affirmed its intentions to ‘protect the rights of all its citizens, 
including people who have inadequate housing, by recognising international standards for 
the protection of universal human rights and fundamental freedoms’ (Parliament of 
Australia 1996: 2). Significantly, this emphasises the importance of Australian citizens’ 
right to affordable housing, as formally recognised through a number of mechanisms, 
such as outlined by the Parliament of Australia (1996: 2): 
a)  the ratification of the International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights and on Civil and political Rights; and 
b)  the ratification of the Conventions on the elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women 
and on the Rights of the Child; and 
c)  the acceptance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of the 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women; and 
d)  the enactment of legislation such as the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission Act 1986. 
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In 1999, the government reiterated the ‘caring’ aspect of Australian society, pointing out 
that the country ‘has a long history of implementing a range of social policy reforms 
designed to assist those in most need…includ[ing] responding to the consequences of 
economic and social events that may adversely affect families and individuals’ (DFCS 
1999: 1). It went on to situate the coordinated governmental responses to issues of 
homelessness in this context. 
 
The Government directs funding to a number of specific areas such as elderly residential 
care, certain Indigenous housing programs, and those programs designed to facilitate 
greater independent living for people using Home and Community Care services 
(HACC), the housing support facilitated through the Commonwealth–State Disability 
Agreement,  and the Supported Accommodation Assistance Programs (Parliament of 
Australia 1996: 2). It is worth noting that the ‘Australian Government’s main 
programmatic response to addressing and alleviating homelessness is the Supported 
Accommodation Assistance Program (SAAP IV)’ (Commonwealth of Australia 2004a: 
5). 
 
Broadly speaking, seen from the perspective of governmentality, such housing provisions 
have been facilitated through: 
the rise of a new formula for the exercise of rule which one can call “social”. The 
authority of expertise became inextricably linked to the formal political apparatus 
of rule, as rulers are urged to accept the obligation to tame and govern the 
undesirable consequences of industrial life, wage labour and urban existence in 
the name of society: social solidarity, social security, social peace and social 
prosperity (Rose 1996: 39-40).   173 
 
Before exploring specifically the current delivery and organisation of crisis 
accommodation support services at Swan, is necessary to describe broadly the evolution 
of the Supported Accommodation Assistance Program. 
 
Shifting emphasis: SAAP 1 to SAAP IV 
 
Swan Emergency Accommodation is known as a SAAP agency, a provider in a 
nationwide network of almost 1,200 Supported Accommodation Assistance Program 
(SAAP) agencies. SAAP was first introduced in 1985 under the SAAP Act 1985. The 
activities of the SAAP were by no means new, but entailed a nationwide reconstitution of 
a range of NGO crisis accommodation support services with different historical 
beginnings and varied sources of government funding (Commonwealth of Australia, 
2002: 19; DCS u.d.: 2) 
 
By 1985 these nationwide crisis accommodation services had ‘developed in an ad hoc 
manner and varied greatly in quality, scope and approach…[and] they were characterised 
by inadequate funding, poor planning and coordination, restrictive program guidelines 
and very complex administrative arrangements’ (Lindsay 1993, cited in Commonwealth 
of Australia, 2002: 19). The birth of SAAP 1 in 1985 involved a new coordinated and 
centralised strategy bringing together federal and state government funded services under 
common political objectives (Commonwealth of Australia, 2005a: 2-4); Commonwealth 
of Australia, 2002: 19). 
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Miller and Rose’s (1990) point about governmentality being typified by centralised 
planning and ongoing policy appraisals is relevant in exploring the shifting rationalities 
which have characterised SAAP programs. It is in this way that SAAP I went through a 
major evaluation in 1987. Concerns were expressed that SAAP 1 needed to move beyond 
mere preoccupation with residential needs, focussed at enabling client access to ‘hostels, 
refuges and shelter accommodation’, to a new framework aimed at ‘assist[ing] clients to 
return to the community’ and avoid fostering dependency on SAAP services 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2005.: 2). In turn, the SAAP II enshrined in the SAAP Act 
1989  was  revamped to drive a major objective aimed at enabling a ‘transition from 
homelessness to independent living’ (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002:19). In 
facilitating this, emphasis was put on pursuing ‘individually tailored responses’, 
supported by efforts to closely align SAAP operations and access to capital funds under 
the Crisis Accommodation Program (CAP), enabling SAAP services to procure building 
funds. 
 
The optimistic justifications for ongoing appraisals to improve outcomes are evident in 
the 1994 modifications culminating in SAAP III. During this phase, SAAP was revamped 
‘to provide transitional supported accommodation and related support services to help 
people who are homeless or at the imminent risk of homelessness to achieve the 
maximum possible degree of self-reliance and independence’ and ‘re-establish a capacity 
to live independently of SAAP’ (Commonwealth of Australia 2005c.: 3). This key 
objective underpinning the SAAP Act 1994  was further embedded in the SAAP IV 
Memorandum of Understanding and Bilateral Agreements between the Commonwealth   175 
of Australia, states and territories. Through this Agreement, SAAPs are required to 
produce the following outcomes: 
•  Reduction in homelessness; 
•  Crisis responses and solutions that respond effectively to changing patterns of 
need; and 
•  Increased partnerships with other service systems to meet the needs of the 
homeless clients or those at imminent risk of homelessness 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2002: 1). 
It is through these requirements that the intellectual technologies of ‘A National Case 
Management Strategy’ were also reinforced (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002: 24) as 
essential in guiding SAAP operations. 
 
In 1999 under SAAP IV, the strategy for the management of homelessness included an 
emphasis on enabling flexible service delivery models to promote responsiveness to 
client needs; foster integration and collaboration between SAAP and other service 
systems; focus on individuals with high support needs; enhance data collection practices; 
increase performance, knowledge and skills and work towards a centralised performance-
based reporting regime, linked through the Productivity Commission (Commonwealth of 
Australia 2001). 
 
The alignment of SAAP with the broad public sector shifts was noted in the National 
Evaluation of the Supported Assistance Program (SAAP III) (DFCS 1999: 7), indicating 
that the evolution of SAAP had ‘responded to the requirements of broader government 
objectives for how services are conceived, defined, funded, delivered, monitored and 
evaluated. Many of these requirements have flowed from reforms initiated by the Council 
of Australian Government (COAG) during the early to mid -1990s’ (DFCS 1999: 7). For   176 
SAAP, the shifts included the introduction of the National Consumer Outcomes approved 
by COAG, a change that required an increased demonstration of individual consumer 
outcomes. Under this notion of consumer outcomes, authorities argue that this change is 
necessary in order to foster transparency and accountable practice, ‘facilitating 
comparisons between programs with similar objectives across and between jurisdictions, 
clarifying program objectives, and delineating the roles of the  various levels of 
government and of service providers’ (DFCS 1999: 8). Connected to this is the Family 
Services Framework, also endorsed by COAG. Under this framework, SAAP services are 
required to maintain an outcome focus instead of an output-based approach; the program 
is required to be based on clearly articulated performance and assessment measurements 
and client access to early intervention supports; and SAAP services are to be procured on 
contractual arrangements and not ‘funding agreements’. The degree to which these shifts 
are being taken, however, has tended to vary (DFCS 1999: 10). 
 
The National Evaluation of the Supported Accommodation Assistance Program (SAAP 
111) also points out that under National Competition Policy and following the release of 
the  Industry Commission’s Inquiry into Charitable Organisations in Australia (1993), 
state and territory and the Commonwealth governments have been moving at varied pace 
to reshape the way social programs are funded. In this quest, governments have 
introduced tighter service specifications, promoted use of quantitative and qualitative 
data to guide service planning and resource allocation, and consolidated reporting and 
data collection requirements. The report goes on to observe that ‘these are “hot issues for 
SAAP”. Purchaser-provider and competitive tendering models have engendered   177 
considerable angst, disquiet and (at times) outright hostility among many stakeholders. It 
is complex, difficult and not easily resolved’ (DFCS 1999: 226). 
 
This report draws attention, however, to the proposals of the House of Representatives 
Standing Committee Report (1998) which recommends that ‘no further steps should be 
taken towards implementing/pursuing competitive tendering of welfare services until a 
well-informed framework detailing a continuum of contestability has been developed’ 
(DFCS 1999: 226). The report proposed that in determining whether a service should be 
treated as a contestable market, one which could be potentially subjected to competition, 
‘but one which does not necessarily need to be opened up for competition’ (DFCS 1999: 
226). It is important to take into account the need to preserve existing regulation where 
this has been enacted to protect public interest  considerations. It also noted that 
contestable frameworks should be confined to areas where the support needs of service 
users are not complex. In addition, it recommended that these practices are best suited to 
those areas where customers command a strong purchasing power and where service 
providers have the ability to meet tender specifications. According to the National 
Evaluation of the Supported Accommodation Assistance Program (SAAP 111), ‘if this 
criteria is assessed across SAAP service sector, the capacity of service providers across 
the board to meet tender specifications is unknown’ (DFCS 1999: 226). 
 
The National Strategic Plan SAAP IV 2000 – 2005 Accountability Framework partly 
underpins the operations of Swan Emergency Accommodation. During the data 
collection phase (2001), this was the framework in operation. It was premised on a mix of   178 
measures under the criteria of quality, client outcomes, access, relevance, efficiency and 
service system development (DFCS 2000: 1). While some of these indicators are more 
specific, others are fairly broad. Thus, the efficiency criteria required demonstration of 
cost used in supporting each client per completed ‘support period’, program cost for each 
day of support, and cost incurred for supporting each client (DFCS 2000: 1). Under the 
category of ‘client  outcomes’, both the SAAP agencies and authorities administering 
SAAP (that is State and Territory governments) were required to maintain records 
involving the ratio of clients returning to seek SAAP services within six months of a 
previous ‘support period’ and the ratio of SAAP residents who manage to secure 
independent accommodation before exiting SAAP. There is also a requirement to ensure 
services are appropriate. Under the criteria of appropriateness, data must be kept on the 
ratio of ‘support periods’, (duration) where program outcomes had been met, the 
proportion of clients who chose to enter into agreed case plans, and the proportion of 
clients who lived in independent accommodation before using SAAP services. 
 
Furthermore, the framework requires the  maintenance of figures on the numbers of 
Indigenous and Culturally and Linguistically Diverse Background (CALD) people using 
SAAP services, evidence of ‘service system development’ and evidence of 
‘implementation of quality measures’ (DFCS 2000: 1). 
 
While commercial-in-confidence constrained  Swan Emergency Accommodation from 
providing contract details, they did provide a documentation that indicated the type of 
data collected in respect to the youth program. Under this youth program, outcomes   179 
during this period were calculated by taking into account the number of beds available; 
average bed capacity; their usage; the  number of young people accommodated; the 
number of young people under guardianship of the Department of Community 
Development; the number of clients who report satisfaction with the service; and the 
number of young people who leave to join family, extended family, supported 
accommodation or alternative forms of accommodation. The outcome criteria included a 
requirement for Swan Emergency Accommodation to stipulate reasons for terminating a 
client from their premises. 
 
Authorities by which SAAP Practices are Made Known 
 
It is possible to identify the authority by which ends and means are made by paying 
attention to regular and systematic authoritative statements (Kendall and Wickham 1999: 
42). This point is also reinforced in some governmentality inspired research (for instance, 
see Herbert-Cheshire 2001; Higgins 2000). Clarifying the nature of such authorities in the 
context of political rationalities, Harris draws attention to the work of Miller and Rose 
(1992), characterising this understanding of governmental rationality as: 
the “changing discursive fields” in which the exercise of political power is 
justified….are ways of thinking about the dimension and practices of government: 
How government should operate; the ideals and principles to which it should be 
directed; the relationship between authorities and their subjects (Rose and Miller 
1992: 178 – 179 cited in Harris 1999). 
 
The chapter has already described a range of SAAP shifts since the program was 
constituted. This section specifically and briefly locates the authorities through which 
SAAP is understood, shaped and re-shaped in the context of managerial and National   180 
Competition Policy reforms. The identified policy statements below set parameters 
within which the means and ends of SAAP operations come to be understood: 
  Agenda for Reform: Report of the Independent Commission to Review Public 
Sector Finances (McCarrey 1993a): Sought to shift government agencies from 
‘sheltered’ operations to a position more regulated by market forces. Hence, 
state government entities are called upon to introduce competition, and use 
commercialisation and corporatisation methods in order to remain 
accountable.  The report advocates contracting practices in order to pursue 
efficiency gains. 
  Production of 2000 –  2001 Annual National Performance Report detailing 
SAAP’s policy and operational progress across all States, Territories and the 
Commonwealth (Commonwealth  of Australia 2002), followed by similar 
Annual performance reports (Commonwealth of Australia 2003b; 2004a). 
  Proposal for greater use of rental subsidy (that is Rental Assistance) for 
homeless people and a simultaneous call for a reduction in the public housing 
stock maintained by the former Homeswest authority (see McCarrey Report 
1993b). 
  In 1995 COAG adopted three key intergovernmental agreements: Conduct 
Code Agreement, Competition Principle Agreement, and an Agreement to 
Implement National Competition Policy and Related Reforms. The 
Competition Policy Reform Act (Cth) 1996 is enacted, giving legislative and 
legal basis to the NCP (Queensland Government Treasury u.d:   181 
http://www.treasury.qld.gov.au/ncp/ncp2.htm; ACT Government 2001: 
http://www.competition.act.gov.au/comp/chp1.html). 
  The 1995 COAG National Competition Policy Agreements extend the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 to the public sector; through the Competition Principle 
Agreement, the notion of Competition Neutrality is pursued by ‘removing 
market distortions resulting from public ownership, removing anti-competitive 
legislation and restraining monopolistic and exclusive activity’(ACT 
Government 2001: http://www.competition.act.gov.au/comp/chp1.html); the 
Agreements also provided for a review of legislation nationwide, thus, 
ensuring the elevation of the notion of competition (Queensland Government 
Treasury u.d: http://www.treasury.qld.gov.au/ncp/ncp2.htm ACT Government 
2001:  http://www.competition.act.gov.au/comp/chp1.html). 
  The Department of Community Development develops a Preferred Service 
Provider procurement strategy for services delivered by non-government 
organisations (DFCS 1999a: Foreword). 
  Supported Accommodation Assistance Act 1994: SAAP is revamped to 
‘provide transitional supported accommodation and related support services’ 
in pursuit of a ‘maximum possible degree of self-reliance and independence’ 
for homeless people in need of assistance (SAAP Act 1994: Sect 5). 
  National Consumer Outcomes: Embedded under SAAP III, this framework 
promotes a performance system designed to facilitate ‘comparisons between 
programs with similar objectives across and between jurisdictions’. The 
framework is also endorsed under the COAG arrangements (DFCS 1999: 8).   182 
  National Strategic Plan SAAP IV 2000 – 2005, the Commonwealth, States 
and Territories commit to an Accountability Framework entailing the 
development and implementation of outcome based performance 
measurements (Commonwealth of Australia 2005). 
  SAAP 2000 –  2005 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU): The 
Memorandum brings together the Commonwealth of Australia, States and 
Territories as signatories operating under a common broad SAAP framework 
driven by client-focussed service delivery, a need to increase performance, 
knowledge and skills, a concern to maintain a strong and coherent national 
approach, and a promotion of flexible service delivery and performance 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2005e; 2002; 2003b). 
  Through the National Strategic Plan SAAP IV 2000-2005  –  the 
Commonwealth, States and Territories jointly committed to an accountability 
framework entailing the development and implementation of outcome based 
performance measurements (Commonwealth of Australia 2005c). 
  SAAP IV focuses on data collection and performance reporting procedures 
linking with new economic and accounting authorities such as the 
Productivity Commission (Commonwealth of Australia 2001). 
  National Competition Policy is formally noted within SAAP programmatic 
texts as an important vehicle through which SAAP programs become subject 
to ‘competitive tendering for service delivery’ (DFCS 1999b: 10). 
 
It is through a range of these authorities that the SAAPs have evolved against the 
backdrop of public sector managerialist shifts throughout the 1990s and beyond.   183 
 
Reforming the Homeless 
 
Complex Profile 
 
Interviews with all staff and management study participants indicated that homeless 
people using Swan Crisis Accommodation are largely drawn well beyond the Swan 
region. They come from all over Western Australia, including country and remote areas. 
A senior staff member also noted that the family centre, Transea, had a 75 per cent 
Aboriginal occupancy, while the youth shelter comprised only five per cent Aboriginal 
occupancy. 
 
All interviewed staff cited the complexity of the lives of homeless people attending Swan 
Emergency Accommodation to be crucial in establishing the context within which the 
agency’s operations can be explored. They identified an enmeshment of situations 
ranging from financial, alcohol and drug abuse, history of tenancy liability and history of 
physical and sexual abuse as common factors experienced by clients attending the 
service. Staff expressed these complex issues in a variety of ways: 
They have experienced a period of homelessness and there are not many options 
for these groups…Previous histories of physical and sexual abuse in the family – 
DV [domestic violence] families get stressed, and this presents a lot amongst our 
clients, so we have to have knowledge to address this (Senior Staff 07). 
 
We usually get the large families. The clients we get through here are large 
housing commission arrears - have fallen through with Homeswest - domestic 
violence - so really they’re the ones that really need supported accommodation. 
But because we are short term it is no longer enough to work through issues….So 
you don’t always know whether you’ve worked with the issues… a lot of issues - 
we deal with legal issues a lot. We don’t have the necessary professional person   184 
to work with them. At one time and another we see all these things that affect 
people (Service Delivery Staff 03). 
 
Some of them present with violent behaviour, aggressive behaviour towards each 
other or anyone else – alcohol and drugs – under influence with all sorts of things 
(Service Delivery Staff 01). 
 
In mapping out the nature of this complexity, for the purpose of this thesis it becomes 
almost unproductive to separate one issue from another as these matters are closely 
intertwined. The staff views illuminate further on this entanglement: 
 
With Aborigines they also don’t have the same opportunities in the private rental 
market (Service Delivery Staff 03). 
 
Often people don’t realise they have a problem and they wonder why things are 
not working out they just go out and spend $50 on lollies. It’s like talking to a six 
year old again - they are weak - they’re very, very weak….Parents prioritise their 
own needs before their children. Drug and alcohol is taking a lot of money, so 
they move to the next house and create problems…The older ones the brain is 
already fried from drugs (Service Delivery Staff 03). 
 
A single father interviewed at Transea Family Centre shared a story regarding his 
complex circumstances, indicating that in his situation his homelessness is bound up with 
a range of other difficult factors: 
I’ve had these children for four years on my own, without a break. So what I have 
got to be is have it together. My daughters used to be wards of the state. I had 10 
years of jail – so I hope this is a stepping-stone. Homeswest say we gonna stick 
you in a shitty street. So I basically jail my children – there is a drug dealer on this 
corner, and that, and that. My kids want to play in the drug dealer’s backyard. 
Here, I’ve got my own identity and there is someone to talk to 24 hours if I feel 
I’m gonna fall off the rails [drug related issues]….I have $ 1000 with Homewest 
because my heater blew up, my water bill used to be $90. There are so many 
people you are dealing with at Homeswest, I got fobbed off – just because I’ve 
been a drug dealer and I’ve been to jail (A single father). 
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For some staff, the complex nature of such situations facing clients begs the question 
about the role of the agency itself. A response of a senior staff captures the richness of 
this complexity: 
Before this position [a senior position], I was on the committee for a few years, 
now I have had a snapshot of what the target group looks like. The target group 
has changed mainly due to impact of drugs. Now we get one to two who are not 
using [drugs], while before we would get one or two users. Then, diminishing 
number of beds in psychiatric care is a problem we find - more people with drug 
and psychiatric problems coming into our care. If we get one person who is 
demonstrating psychiatric behaviour we are fine - but we get two to three, it is 
very hard for us then to manage and achieve our case management objectives 
unless we are reduced to being a bed and breakfast service. We have two at the 
moment, in fact we had three, but one went to court and didn’t come back I think 
because he got locked up. So we also get a drug court ringing up with people who 
get bail. If a young person doesn’t have a home we get a call to accommodate - 
and we do from time to time. But we’ve got to be careful we don’t become a bail 
hostel. One young person was on bail for prostitution and then we were asked 
whether they are meeting their bail conditions! So that can be tricky. Is it our role 
to police these young people? So getting the right balance is tricky and just 
maintaining a balance in the household is tricky. So when we had three 
psychiatric cases we had to close down one or two other beds because workers’ 
attention and time is required by those difficult cases. You don’t get funded more 
staff in those instances (Senior Staff 07). 
 
The complexity of client issues expressed by Swan Emergency Accommodation staff is 
reflected in the government data. A 1999 report commissioned by the Department of 
Family and Community Services, titled  Appropriate Responses for Homeless People 
Whose Needs Require a High Level and Complexity of Service Provision, provides 
useful insights on the perceived nature of  this group. Couched through professional 
psychosocial logics, the report identifies that SAAP service users have always included 
clients with ‘a range of high and or complex needs compounding or contributing to 
homelessness’ (Ecumenical Housing & Thompson Goodall Associates 1999: iv). 
Notably, since the late 1980s, SAAP program providers report ‘an increasing incidence of   186 
clients with “high need”’ (Ecumenical Housing Inc & Thompson Goodall Associates 
1999: iv). The document broadly classifies SAAP support services under the following 
typology of need: 
Category 1 - Intensive needs, which may compromise functioning and ability to 
meet basic needs which often manifest in difficult behaviours, and are more likely 
to be ongoing; [and] 
 
Category 2 - Intensive needs, which may compromise functioning but not the 
ability to meet basic needs, and are likely to be time limited; 
 
Category 3 - Non-intensive needs, which are unlikely to compromise functioning, 
and will be time-limited. 
 
Authors of this report suggest that a more insightful classification is required in order to 
effectively capture the complexity of clients’ situations. Such a classification would need 
to capture the following features and patterns of service use: 
•  Complexity and multiplicity of client needs tends to be associated with 
repeated occasions of presentation for accommodation request. 
•  High-level complexity of need is also associated with non-intensive supports. 
•  That the data collected by non-professional workers at staff sites 
underestimates the intensity of need due to lack of capacity to carry out 
diagnostic assessments. 
•  That SAAP service users also face ‘isolation and marginalisation from 
community services’ (Ecumenical Housing Inc & Thompson Goodall 
Associates 1999: vii). 
 
Staff at Swan Emergency had also identified Aboriginal people as comprising about 75 
per cent of their service users. Government sources also cite Indigenous people as being 
‘at particular risk of homelessness and of needing SAAP services’ (DFCS 2001: 2). The 
federal department locates this problem in the domain of other disadvantages associated 
with ‘health, employment, housing, education, cultural and historical factors’ (DFCS 
2001: 2), hence, predisposing this group to potential risk of homelessness. It maintains   187 
that for Aboriginal people the question of homelessness is multi-faceted, traversing the 
‘spiritual’ dimension, ‘overcrowding’, ‘relocation and transient homelessness’, ‘unsafe 
home: escaping violence, abuse or neglect’, ‘and lack of access to stable shelter’(DFCS 
2001: 3). 
 
Official sources also points to over-representation of Indigenous people as users of SAAP 
supports (DFCS 2001; Commonwealth of Australia 2004b; AIHW 2003; 2005). 
Although in 2001 they only represented an average of two percent of the national 
population, they comprised 14 per cent of SAAP recipients. During 1998 to 2000, 
Indigenous people comprised 13 per cent of the total SAAP service users. In Western 
Australia between 1999 and 2000, a total of 8,140 people used SAAP services; of these, 
2, 475 were from the Indigenous population. This represents 30.4 per cent of overall 
SAAP service users, indicating that Aboriginal people in Western Australia were 10.7 
times more likely to access these support services compared to the general state 
population. The West Australian figure is the highest rate of representation in the country 
(DFCS 1999b: 5). The estimated 75 per cent Aboriginal client population at Swan 
Emergency Accommodation is far above the state and national averages. In addition, 
Indigenous people exhibit a high pattern of repetitive crisis accommodation use (support 
periods) of SAAP services compared to the rest of the population (ABS 2003: 4). 
 
Moreover, the study notes that prior to receiving SAAP services, Aboriginal clients are 
less likely to be in private rental housing compared to the rest of the population. Instead, 
the group is comparatively over-represented  in public and community housing. In   188 
addition, Aboriginal SAAP users are less likely to have been purchasing or living in their 
own homes compared to the general population. The following illustrative official data is 
adapted from a Department of Family and Community Services (DFCS 2001: 11) 
  
Type of housing immediately before support –  Indigenous and non-indigenous 
support periods by location, 1999-2000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Type of housing     Urban centres   Rural centres    Remote centres    
before support     
_________________________%_________________%______________%_________ 
                    Ind.    Non-Ind.   Ind.   Non-Ind.         Ind.   Non-Ind.      Ind.   Non-Ind.  
 
Public or commu- 
nity housing    13.3  6.0  20.5  8.2  39.9   8.4  22.5  6.6 
 
Renting in    
private market    9.8  15.0  14.0  23.0  3.4  15.9  9.5  17.0 
 
Purchasing/living 
In own home    0.6  3.6  0.9  5.9  0.9  4.1  0.8  4.1 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
(DFCS 2001: 11) 
 
 
Disciplinary Practices 
 
Having outlined the SAAP and the complexity of the clients circumstances, attention can 
now be given to the disciplinary practices involving Swan Emergency Accommodation 
service operations. Operational case management tools and interview responses reveal a 
range of psychosocial techniques engaged in cultivating desirable conduct among service 
users under the Preferred Service Provider arrangements. Unlike the Labour Market 
Program case study in Chapter Four, the techniques used in the delivery of Supported 
Accommodation Assistance Program, while exhibiting managerial tendencies, also show 
a certain level of reliance on professional and welfare approaches. 
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In marked difference from the client assessment strategies of the job Network case study, 
all participant interviews and agency assessment forms show that Swan Emergency 
Accommodation’s initial assessments are undertaken on-site and in-depth by the agency 
staff. Workers obtain information using detailed, open-ended forms to establish 
individuals’ current circumstances. This involves collecting relevant social demographic 
information; profiling a client’s potential threat from domestic violence; and ascertaining 
their current social and economic circumstances, referral sources, place of 
accommodation prior to seeking crisis assistance, including a brief history; and medical 
and psychiatric status. Other key details relate to employment participation, income 
source, special needs and the children’s status, including their identifying information 
details, schooling arrangements and medical history (Swan Emergency Accommodation, 
Individual Profile and Transea Family Centre booklet u.d. a, c). 
 
This kind of assessment practice follows on from modern welfare traditions, whereby, 
firstly, it is essential to collect detailed information as part of the process in making sense 
of a client’s psychosocial circumstances. Client work, therefore, becomes informed by 
such psychosocial assessment techniques. Although these techniques are by no means 
homogenous, they have been influenced by welfare delivery traditions (see O’Connor, 
Wilson and Setterlund 2003; Howe 1987; Compton and Galaway 1994; Payne 1997). 
Rose (1996: 39) characterises this practice as ‘social’ in character, enabling ‘persons and 
activities…to be governed through society’ (Rose 1996: 40). In this way, the power of 
psychosocial knowledge produces its own constructed ‘domains of objects and rituals of 
truth’ (Foucault, 1977: 194 cited in Porter 1998: 211). Putting this in a context:   190 
Of course, individual speakers who want to be taken seriously must talk about the 
sort of objects collectively agreed upon by the scientific community of which they 
are members, but what determines the shared canons of seriousness are not the 
real or primary relations nor the reflective secondary ones, but by way secondary 
and primary relations are organised by discursive practice (Foucault 1977: 194 
cited in Porter 1998: 211). 
 
In keeping with SAAP III requirements (DFCS 1999a: 4), Swan Emergency 
Accommodation uses a case management framework requiring staff to provide their 
homeless clients with the opportunity to set up strategies and action plans aimed at 
addressing and reviewing client goals and outcomes. This case management model 
enshrined in the Commonwealth/State and Territories Agreement under SAAP III (DFCS 
1999a: 4), thus finds expression in the agency’s contractual service specifications. Here, 
the model is also identified as ‘case plans’ (Swan Emergency Accommodation, Service 
Specifications u.d.)  
 
All interviewed staff spoke about their work in terms of assisting clients in normalising 
relationships with their significant others and of enhancing parenting skills as part of the 
effective management of a stable household. Specifically, most interviewed staff referred 
to the agency’s case plan documentations [case management tools] which, they indicated 
sum up the essence of their day-to-day operations. 
 
These case plans are informed by a detailed open-ended Goal Setting tool conducted with 
individual clients. This tool guides the workers and their clients to identify working goals 
under the following specific themes: relationship with self, relationship with significant 
others, accommodation, housing-related debt and non-housing related debt (Swan   191 
Emergency Accommodation, Goal Setting  u.d.). Techniques used in examining one’s 
relationship with the self include exploration of confidence and self-esteem issues, and, 
where relevant, experiences of anger. Techniques used in assisting self-investigation on 
relationships with significant others delve into residents’ feelings and perceptions 
regarding their current relationships with partners and children, their approaches to 
parenting and their relationship with their family of origin. 
 
The Goal Setting tool also prescribes that the residents be encouraged to think about the 
type of accommodation suited to their family needs and assisted to cultivate desirable 
tenancy attitudes. Therefore, we find Goal Setting texts (tools) drawing attention to the 
examination of housing affordability, securing tenancy references and exploring debt 
status through examining rental arrears, water and power accounts, damage to property 
debts and other liabilities (Swan Emergency Accommodation, Goal Setting. u.d). 
 
The behavioural techniques on offer also enable residents to build resource awareness, 
for example, where to find budget furniture and various household items. Staff and their 
clients use the Goal-Setting tool, delving into detailed accounts of what level of debt a 
client has accumulated, their financial status with utilities providers, Telstra, Western 
Power and Alinta, including identifying specific plans that can be put in place to address 
existing debt with these agencies. The checklist also enables workers and their clients to 
look at an individual client’s tenancy history, including their relationship with the 
Ministry of Housing (Homeswest) – accumulated debt, whether bankruptcy has resulted 
from tenancy liabilities with Homeswest, then history of receipt of Bond Assistance and   192 
subsequent repayments. A debt repayment plan can then be proposed. Other types of debt 
are also investigated such as hire purchase and car repairs. In addition, any existing legal 
issues are also examined. 
 
Other efforts to reform the homeless at Swan detailed in the case management framework 
entail the use of ‘direct debit’ method to pay Swan’s rental, electricity and power costs 
(Transea Family Centre u.d: 3). In this way, since clients are required to pay for the use 
of crisis accommodation facilities, this practice affords opportunity to inculcate 
responsible tenancy behaviour. In this connection, the direct debit method is also 
progressively encouraged in addressing outstanding external debt issues. Thus, attending 
to the Ministry of Housing,  telephone or electricity arrears, can also be seen as an 
exercise in the cultivation of obeying minds, amenable to paying rents and achieving 
reintegration and normalisation in society. 
 
It is also in this connection that all staff mentioned broadly their professional roles in 
enabling enhancement of ‘life skills’, ‘counselling’, ‘parenting skills’, ‘budgeting skills’, 
and promoting clients’ preparedness for the ‘rental market’. In the process of inculcating 
house management disciplines, most staff mentioned that accommodation units are 
inspected accordingly. As one service delivery staff noted: ‘we assist clients with life 
skills, you know, hygiene standards, so that they are acceptable for when they are ready 
to rent’. Towards this end, families also receive a client manual setting out rules and 
conditions of residency at Transea Family Centre. Among other things, these rules 
stipulate that drugs and alcohol are not permitted in the centre and residents found under   193 
the influence of such substances will have their residency terminated. The rules also ban 
smoking and violent behaviour within Swan Emergency Accommodation premises. With 
these efforts in mind, most of the interviewed staff members noted that through their case 
management roles, the majority of their clients are successfully relocated into some kind 
of accommodation during the 13-weeks  of Supported Accommodation Assistance 
Program. The quest to build client skills and produce desired results can be understood in 
the words of Porter (1998: 213) who states, ‘what it means is that knowledge is never 
simply used for the sake of understanding the world. Rather, it is always used and 
constructed with a purpose in mind. That purpose may either be to control nature or to 
influence behaviour of others.’ Thus, it is also worth noting that through the roles and 
techniques invested at Swan Emergency Accommodation of practice, expert knowledge 
is implicated in ‘align[ing] the self-governing capacities of subjects with the objectives of 
political authorities by means of persuasion, education and seduction rather than 
coercion’ (Rose, 1996, p.50). It is by this means that we come to see the promotion of 
self-knowledge as promoted through various authorities by which crisis accommodation 
assistance has been conceived. 
 
Tenancy rules at Swan Emergency illuminate on the self-policing involving service users. 
Two interviewed youths spoke of their appreciation in regards to learning household 
routines, receiving care and adhering to at least basic crisis accommodation tenancy rules 
as necessary in consideration of the benefits of securing and maintaining a secure service. 
They used expressions such as the value of getting ‘good food’, ‘a caring service’, ‘a roof 
over my head’, and importantly, the young male client emphasised: ‘the support the   194 
workers give you is important. We don’t get a feeling from them that “we are just here to 
do a job” they really care about our wellbeing’. Here, the clients are internalising self-
knowledge about what  a well-functioning household ought to offer –  a knowledge 
implicated in decisions they continuously make about housing options, including the 
option of family re-unification for youths who run away from home. These two youths, 
while appreciative of Swan’s supports, seemed to the researcher far from being docile 
bodies. On one hand, they indicated awareness of house rules, which they are expected to 
observe, such as not returning to the premises under the influence, undertaking allocated 
house chores, and facing breaching consequences if implicated in substance abuse, 
violence, and offence, and so forth. On the other, they had clearly done their homework 
and both of them related that the agency provides one of the best support services in 
Perth. The young male seemed to have a very good knowledge of various SAAP 
‘shelters’ around the metropolitan area - what they offer and those, that he intends ‘never’ 
to use due to their limited care. In this sense, it seemed this participant was exercising 
choice within the parameters of what is on offer and in the context of the value he placed 
on the perceived quality of Swan Emergency Accommodation supports. 
 
It can also be argued that the homeless people’s desire to partake of the mainstream 
private rental market or the  public housing can be understood as a self-regulation, 
facilitating greater conformity to dominant tenancy attributes in Australian society. Thus, 
in discussing the use of such techniques in regulating the conduct of a service user, first, 
it should be appreciated that: 
discourse is not simply that which manifests [or hides] desire – it is also the object 
of desire; and since as constantly history teaches us, it is not simply that which   195 
translates social struggles or systems of domination, but it is the thing for which 
there is struggle, discourse is the power to be seized (Foucault 1984: 110).  
 
While the three interviewed clients spoke glowingly of the agency support, staff delved 
deeper into the workings of the current SAAP practices, identifying a number of other 
factors they considered a barrier in achieving maximum client outcomes under the current 
SAAP framework. Without exception, staff felt that in some cases the 13 weeks set to 
address the crisis of homelessness is limiting for some clients. They thought that the 
cultivation of independent living goals amongst their clients was hampered by the lack of 
adequate medium-term supported accommodation. 
 
The following responses typified this concern: 
…it is just that the ones we can’t place, it is very difficult to place them in 13 
weeks. They need more than just crisis accommodation. What we really need is 
an extension of something like medium supported housing [six months stay in a 
community-based supported accommodation] - you know what I mean. There’s 
certainly a need for a lot more crisis accommodation (Service Delivery Staff 01). 
 
 
We need more independent supported accommodation, but there are waitlists up 
to six months to get into independent supported accommodation (Service Delivery 
Staff 02). 
 
13 – weeks stay is a constrain – 13 weeks is just the tip of the iceberg, we’re just 
getting to know the person and its time for them to leave. But there’s a provision 
in our contract for us to accommodate one extended stay person, in this case after 
13 weeks, we can allow them an additional 13 weeks. We also have youth houses 
now, so some young people can be moved to supported accommodation if there is 
a vacancy. But the point is we have to juggle and see if people are appropriate for 
the vacancy, if they can stay together – they can have a falling out. And despite 
this availability, it is just not enough to meet the needs of a lot of other clients 
who could benefit from medium supported accommodation (Service Delivery 
Staff 02).  
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Some staff went on to make a range of remarks, indicating that even medium-term 
supported accommodation may not be adequate to cater for all clients’ needs. One staff 
put it in these terms: 
For some people it’ll be beneficial to have time extended. The biggest stumbling 
block is with medium-term accommodation they are allowed to stay there for a 
maximum of nine months. But there again before accommodation ends they get 
upset and children agitated. So it’s not enough (Service Delivery Staff 05). 
 
This point can also be seen in the context of earlier concerns expressed in relation to the 
diminution of the Ministry of Housing’s welfare function. 
 
Six respondents expressed additional concerns that the agency had limited resources to 
support residents who are making a transition through medium-term accommodation. 
They felt that a successful transition into independent accommodation is more effective 
when it is adequately supported with resources. These quotes put their views into context: 
 
There’s no time to see and cover all clients after they leave the service. Vicky, the 
Program Manager she does continue to see some, but her time is limited. 
Outreach is neglected – outreach is an area of need too. So when a client leaves 
our service there is no time to cover. Y (coded) is also a counsellor, she can see 
some ex-residents, but can’t see them all - no time (Service Delivery Staff 02). 
 
We mostly do individual advocacy – we take people to appeals interviews and 
advocate on their behalf, address debt and homelessness. Here [in the Indigenous 
program], we need more support to get all of this in place. It’s only two of us. 
There are two workers - a receptionist and myself. For me to be able to do these 
things we need another worker here (Service Delivery Staff 03). 
 
I am a bit uneasy about moving people from crisis to medium accommodation and 
how you move that to long-term, outreach will be important. You need outreach 
resources…but we are trying to build a relationship with another agency to see if 
they can provide outreach (Management Committee Member 08). 
 
Two of the frontline staff who noted the connection between barriers to outcomes and 
limited transitional medium-term accommodation, also, noted their inability to compel   197 
people into participating in the case plans. This meant that some clients were individually 
responsible for remaining stuck in situations of perpetual shift. 
 
Well, as I see it, [constraints] this is more due to people’s willingness to 
participate. Really, the only constraint is what they put on themselves, I’ve not 
come across anything [in terms of barriers barriers] – for me the opportunity is 
there. Clients are the only ones who prevent themselves from grabbing those 
opportunities, they are there…We see, quite honestly, now a lot of problems 
we’re seeing behind that are drug and alcohol related, right. We offer them 
services to get help in those areas – a lot of them are not willing to go down that 
track - You know what I mean. They are not willing at this point in time - it’s 
what I’m saying. Sometimes you just get frustrated you know people have got 
potential but they won’t – you know what I mean? As I said, but they wont take 
that extra step. It is challenging, it is disappointing, it’s - you’ve your successes, 
and you know it’s a real cross section of people we’re dealing with (Service 
Delivery Staff 01). 
 
 
Another staff member also felt that lack of compulsion was bound to affect desired 
outcomes. In fact this response suggests that in this context the treatment of clients under 
the current system is ‘less coercive’. 
 
Before we had one house and they had one bedroom each and we could direct 
them and mums were asked to stay with children and we would run a session for 
them. Here [the current independent unit dwellings] they can leave them. It is 
difficult to compel now because programs are not compulsory. So autonomy – 
there is more of it for them [client autonomy] because we more or less have to run 
it the government way… Before, via supported action planning we could say you 
must attend and we will give them a warning. Now [service funding] 
specifications say if they want accommodation only, then that’s all you give. We 
try when they come we say you will attend SAAP meetings but if they don’t we 
can’t enforce (Service Delivery Staff 05). 
 
Yet again, the same staff member seemed to accept the shift in the current notions of 
client choice and seemed to find a way of working around this change. Rather than 
reinforcing unproductive compulsion, this staff member still saw informal interactions   198 
with clients as valuable, regardless of the absence of contracted case plans or working 
agreements: 
People are not compelled to participate because that way [if compelled] they 
won’t get anything out of it. But it’s amazing that even if they are coming to the 
office to discuss things, they see us as being in charge there in the office. And you 
can get the same person in the courtyard or in their unit; they seem to be more 
relaxed like ‘this is my turf’. There they don’t feel as threatened. It’s amazing, 
you sit with them over a cup of coffee in the house, and it’s amazing how they 
open up…. ‘I’m in my home, I’m in control’ (Service Delivery Staff 05). 
 
The notions of choice regulating the relationship between individual clients and their 
SAAP agency signifies a social democratic discursive framework privileging a particular 
way of respecting felt needs. This is evidenced by the right embedded into service 
operational rules, stipulating, for example, that while all clients are expected to 
participate in this Case Management Service involving ‘Support Action Plans’ (Transea 
Family Centre 2002: 2), the ‘residents have the right to refuse a service and refusal 
should not prejudice their future access to services’ (Transea Family Centre 2002: 7). 
 
Notwithstanding this social democratic notion of choice about whether or not to enter 
into case management arrangements, these practices can still be seen as disciplining 
mechanisms used in reforming excluded groups through the normativity of the social 
body, thus, making populations into ‘subject of needs, attitudes and relationships, a 
subject who was to be embraced within, and governed through, a nexus of collective 
solidarities and dependencies’ (Rose 1996: 40). 
 
At least four long-serving interviewed staff drew further attention to the role of the 
Ministry of Housing; the following senior staff response best illustrates this opinion:   199 
Then, [prior to reforming the Homeswest] on exiting crisis accommodation, they 
[clients] went into Homeswest housing because it was plenty so they’ll be housed. 
This has gotten difficult - minimum waiting list is five years - about two year 
waitlist before, so we now don’t have a third level [long-term], therefore 
accommodation is no longer there…If it is mum and dad with kids, yes, they can 
get into private accommodation. But if it’s an Aboriginal family with five kids, 
the reality is different. So they can go to relatives, which can lead to another 
family becoming homeless (Senior Staff 07). 
 
Most of the staff dealing with families strongly felt Homeswest should offer their clients 
some supports aimed at sustaining good tenancy mentalities to minimise the risk of 
eviction. 
It’s just not enough [crisis accommodation and long-term housing options] - 
we’re just the tip of the iceberg – we’re not meeting the demand. Yeah, this is my 
personal opinion, like they’ve been evicted from Homeswest accommodation for 
rental arrears or whatever - they come to us, and we negotiate with Homeswest to 
start addressing their debt to get them back into Homeswest, there’s a hole there! 
If we can negotiate on their behalf for the client to repay their debt and allow 
them to get back in, I feel there needs to be somebody there, to work with them to 
address the debt, rather than dislocate the whole family! You know what I mean, 
and I think that’s creating a lot of anti-social behaviour, because kids are being 
uprooted away from school, their friends, the whole network, to me it should be 
addressed at Homeswest level. I just don’t understand – because I mean a lot of 
our clients are only going to be housed with Homeswest - they are big families 
with four, six kids on social security, really you don’t have much chance of 
getting private rental, you know. I feel there is still a need for somebody in the 
public housing section that should be able to work with them [Homeswest 
residents at risk of losing their home] to address debt. It bothers my mind that 
Homeswest allows a person to get to eight, ten - thousand dollar debt! …that’s 
what blows me away! (Service Delivery Staff 01) 
 
Here we are conscious of our responsibility – they pay me here – clients pay their 
rent. I just don’t understand. Some of that could be damage to a house –  I 
understand that, but at the end of the day if it is damage - throwing someone out, 
they still have to fix that house, so even if they could work with them at that level 
to prevent them from being evicted. So I feel there is a need to work with them at 
that level to avoid eviction. Have family workers within their structure to address 
this. As we say, with some of them here, if they learn nothing else, they learn to 
pay a rent. And it’s only because of our presence – so something like that in 
Homeswest will help (Service Delivery Staff 01). 
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Fopp (2002: 52) also expresses concern over a lack of adequate long-term housing 
provisions for these groups. He argues that in putting emphasis on medium-term 
accommodation, ‘SAAP has potential to increase the gaze, the surveillance, thereby 
enhancing the potential for power or technologies of domination, which can be exerted 
over clients. He observes that as far back as 1993, housing evaluation studies were 
showing that crisis accommodation agencies were finding it difficult to support their 
client’s secure accessible and affordable accommodation. Fopp (2002: 55-56) then goes 
on to argue that the change to SAAP II, with its emphasis on transitional options (for 
example, medium-term housing), signalled that the problem of homelessness had gone 
beyond being simply of a crisis nature. In his view, this shift in approach signalled the 
end of a commitment to provide long-term affordable housing for those in need, to one 
that prized linkages between crisis and other community resource agencies. Fopp (2002) 
further cautions that such SAAP’s emphasis on notions of community support and the 
pursuit of medium-term housing options runs the danger of fostering surveillance upon 
members of the homeless population who are simply in need of long-term housing. In his 
view, the main hindrance to attaining optimal outcomes for homeless people has more to 
do with diminishing access to affordable and appropriate public housing due to the 
proliferation of free market policies. 
 
Contradictory Rationalities 
 
The nationwide policy shift favouring the use of the Rental Assistance strategy has been 
challenged for failing to deliver affordable housing for at least a third of the one million 
Australians who are under this system. In the first instance, 35 per cent of people   201 
receiving Rental Assistance ‘exceed the government’s own measure of housing 
affordability by spending more than 30% of their incomes on rent’ (National Shelter and 
ACOSS 2003: 4). Moreover, another 9 per cent of Rental Assistance recipients spend 50 
per cent of their earnings on rent alone. It is important to recognise that between 1993/94 
and 2003/2004, the federal expenditure on Rental Assistance rose by 7 per cent, 
representing a $1.92 billion increase in real terms. During the same period, however, the 
overall federal and state government expenditure under the Commonwealth-State 
Housing Agreement (CSHA) had gone down by 54 per cent to 1.28 billion (National 
Shelter and ACOSS 2003: 5). The decline in such funding earmarked for public housing 
is worth bearing in mind in making sense of ongoing challenges in relation to the 
management of homelessness in Australia. Those challenges remain evident in a range of 
other literature (AIHW 2005; Commonwealth of Australia 2004a, b). 
 
Drawing from the experiences of staff at Swan Emergency Accommodation outlined 
earlier, there are some homeless people who are less likely to enter the private rental 
market even following SAAP intervention. As noted in the National Evaluation of the 
Supported Accommodation Assistance Program (SAAP III): 
A situation of concern to the national Evaluation Team is the inappropriate 
housing (crisis through to long-term) made available to Indigenous people who 
are homeless. Due to the lack of facilities capable of housing large families, there 
were consistent reports of overcrowding. The Western Australian Evaluation 
Report (Cameron Associates, 1998) highlighted one example of a 23-member 
family living in a single family unit. The Report shows that such overcrowding 
can exacerbate the situation of the marginally housed by, for example triggering 
violence. This is often the experience of young people who are marginally housed 
and can lead to the loss of accommodation. Although an extreme case, this 
example is indicative of the outcomes of inflexibility and lack of affordable and 
appropriate housing (DFCS 1999a: 98). 
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The National Shelter and ACOSS (2003) report on housing affordability discussed above 
also adds weight in partly problematising the effectiveness of the Rental Assistance 
mechanism. Here, the public choice and neo-classical economics assumption of there 
being a supposedly universal rational individual whose housing market preferences can 
be simply dictated through Rental Assistance methods (the quasi-market signal) to 
redirect homeless people into private rental does not fully hold. As implied in the client 
profile sketch earlier, the housing needs of some of the homeless people are complex and 
not easily mathematically disentangled from other psychosocial struggles by simply 
encouraging reliance on rental vouchers. 
 
Instead, an exploration of the National Competition Policy practices as implemented by 
SAAP in Western Australia is more meaningful through considerations of the public 
housing calculations that followed the McCarrey Report (1993b). The competitive 
practices influencing the provision of SAAP services (under the Preferred Service 
Provider model) are only one part of the exercise of rule. In this case, a concurrent and 
relevant key area of reform is one that required the then Homeswest to strategically de-
emphasize its ‘welfare function’ (McCarrey 1993b). As discussed in Chapter Two, the 
logic advanced for this shift was the need to use public finances more effectively and 
efficiently according to neo-liberal governance. This can be seen through everyday client 
experiences at Swan Emergency Accommodation who struggle to secure long term 
accommodation. 
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A more neo-liberal shift in the state’s housing provisions is demonstrated by the housing 
shortage connected with the Ministry of Housing’s  limited housing stock and the 
commercialisation principles leading to evictions. 
 
Other Views on Contractual and Service Specification 
 
There is a common view among all interviewed staff that the Preferred Service Provider 
model has added more administrative requirements, producing more paperwork in the 
form of six-monthly reports. Senior staff communicated that they also submit quarterly 
financial reports to the Department for Community Development, (DCD). In addition, 
since the inception of the Preferred Service Provider practices, DCD, acting in its 
capacity as a funding authority, convenes regular review meetings following a 
submission of every bi-annual report. These periodic meetings involve regional 
department funding officials and Swan Emergency Accommodation’s executive staff. 
SAAP services, however, are not subject to the spot checks that characterise the working 
arrangements between Job Network agencies and DEWR, their funding provider. 
 
Interestingly, the three interviewed management and executive staff were very positive 
that under the Preferred Service Provider arrangements the department had become more 
pro-active and supportive of Swan Emergency Accommodation. They praised the 
departmental funding officers for being more accessible, maintaining and facilitating 
open communication, clarification and feedback on service performance. Thus, senior 
staff felt the Department of Community Development is more helpful under the current 
model compared to the previous system.   204 
 
Unlike the Job Network senior and frontline staff who were very clear about the shifts 
involving the contracting process, Swan Emergency Accommodation frontline staff 
stated that they were not as clear about how this process worked. For example, none of 
the casework staff expressed any awareness that the Western Australian Council of Social 
Services (WACOSS) was involved in facilitating industry-specific consultations in 
assisting both the government and the community sector in working through service 
(tender) specifications – a crucial process in influencing the design of service frameworks 
at a state level. At the same time, some of these frontline staff expressed concerns over a 
perceived government monopoly in determining program service specifications. They felt 
that the new system reduced their access to operational resources. For example, one 
worker noted that: 
It would be good to have some family days, but how you organise them differs 
and varies – and depends on the family we have got at the time – if they get along 
together. If we had a bus, cooking classes and cooking days – so we block these 
thoughts [due to perceived inflexibility in the funding system]….Parenting classes 
will be good, you ask if I’ve spoken to the Community Development Officer at 
DCD, we’re not sure they can offer that though – they inform us of programs at 
neighbourhood centres. Perhaps if they surveyed us beforehand especially 
because our clients are not highly motivated [hence, they cannot be simply slotted 
to an existing program without taking their needs into account] (Service Delivery 
Staff 06). 
 
Another staff member stated that ‘in many ways, the agency has operated in good ways, 
and now the government tells us what to do and how to do’. In addition, an example was 
shared by a separate staff member who explained how she had to go to a police station to 
identify a former client of Swan Emergency Accommodation: ‘sometimes it is very hard   205 
to account for what you are doing in the program – this is someone who doesn’t live here 
anymore!’ 
 
When discussing the processes involving the development of service specification, 
frontline staff stated that aside from the regular program-related reports they were not 
aware that any room existed for them to influence service specifications under the 
Preferred Service Provider system. Rather, some workers saw contracting specifications 
as a mere rationing resource tool. This is exemplified in the following responses: 
I would like to run a cooking class, parenting, I don’t know…We are not privy to 
any of that info about budget, we’re just told money is tight. So this affects how 
we deliver services. Residents need pots and pans. Residents have storerooms; we 
should ensure all units have everything they need. Towels, sheets should be in 
storage area. But it is now being used to store maintenance shed. It would run 
better if every unit had its own storage shed. So I put it down to lack of money 
(Service Delivery Staff 05). 
 
But we’re always under-funded, we run well, provide outcomes, but our creativity 
is stifled because of lack of money. But we can’t always put this in the progress 
report, so that can create disillusion (Senior Staff 07). 
 
This practice shift may be described as a ‘change by limitation’ (Foucault, 1991b: 56) 
since these agency staff already value services that are included in the contractual 
specifications, but feel constrained by increased lack of flexibility, which they attribute to 
ongoing rationing. In this way, the competitive discourses are ‘reproducing unequal 
power relations’ (Porter 1998, p.216). 
 
In addition, drawing on the point made by a Family Resource Worker that they exclude 
certain information from periodic program reports, analytically, such practice facilitates 
‘self denial’ by not capturing some of the staff’s own evaluations (Porter 1998: 216) –   206 
evaluations that could generate other intervention ideas. Through such self-denial or 
censorship, as Porter (1998) points out, it becomes possible to limit what comes to be 
regarded as true practice knowledge. In practice this means certain views about service 
delivery held by frontline workers can not be guaranteed necessarily to reach relevant 
senior staff within DCD, and may also not be captured fully through the industry tender 
specification input consultation coordinated by WACOSS.  
 
Another worker felt that since the establishment of the Preferred Service Provider model, 
her planning and decision-making capacity was being impacted upon because she could 
no longer work out the financial status of the programs with which she had a significant 
involvement at Karnany Aboriginal Centre: 
It limits me because they get a bookkeeper to come in, he comes in three days per 
week from Swan - so I need a copy of the budget so I know what I’m working 
with. We talk about these issues with the Acting Executive Officer - I feel we’re 
addressing issues - If I know what’s going on, it takes away all these nigglies that 
you don’t want (Service Delivery Staff 03). 
 
While senior management at Swan Emergency Accommodation had acknowledged the 
positive aspects of the Preferred Service Provider framework, they noted that the 
demands of the current model may prove problematic for some of the smaller non-
government providers. They pointed out that while their agency service benefits from the 
professional expertise of their senior workers, there are other small agencies in the Swan 
region who may struggle to meet additional administrative demands such as bi-annual 
reports. In this context, one participant concluded that in her view ‘we [NGOs] need 
change in the way community organisations are run’, a view that found resonance with 
another senior staff member’s perception that the ongoing government demand for   207 
accountability under the Preferred Service Provider system has implications in terms of 
structure:  
new model requires new structure – I see that we’ll have different structures. We 
need [the composition of the management committee] someone with background 
in accounting as well as service delivery….but there is fear of liability of being 
accountable for someone else’s actions –  so not everyone is prepared to be 
involved, not many people see it as a viable option (Management Committee 
Member 08). 
 
Accompanying this disquiet was the expression of uncertainty about a potential takeover 
by other community organisations. A senior member in the Management Committee at 
Swan Emergency Accommodation said he felt very strongly about communicating these 
concerns to the researcher, indicating that in his view, this issue should be given urgent 
attention since contracting practices bring to the fore issues of conflict of interest 
amongst members of voluntary management committees -  a point he felt has been 
overlooked in the conceptualisation of the contracting system. He pointed out that most 
of these voluntary management personnel are individuals already connected with other 
parts of the welfare sector in the Swan region. Thus, under the premise of contestable 
markets, such volunteers could potentially use knowledge concerning strengths and 
weaknesses of an agency they are managing on voluntary basis to promote competitive 
tendering interests in favour of organisations that employ them. The following quote puts 
these concerns in a perspective: 
Too many of our NGOs are easy to take over. Agency X [agency name coded] has 
grown incredible power, $ 2 to 2.5 million in - they brought under their umbrella 
all these small organisations. They have wanted to absorb a few groups. Often the 
same groups are on the management committees [of other local organisations] 
because of interplay with councillors and juggling of budget and some wanting to 
abrogate responsibilities [local government]. Swan Accommodation some time 
ago avoided a coup. We had new members who stack the meeting so they can 
take over part of Swan Accommodation. We have come so close to being taken   208 
over, and the motives for the takeover were very poor. It may not matter to FaCS 
[now the Department of Community Development] that there could be a takeover 
- but it does matter. Someone wanted to takeover Karnany [the Aboriginal Family 
Centre affiliated with Swan Emergency] – power – not concerned with services, 
but just wanted to takeover! [Management Committee Member 08]. 
 
 
De-emphasising Collective Systemic Activities 
Interviews with all Swan Emergency Accommodation staff indicated a marked departure 
from practices of collective systemic advocacy as an important mechanism in fostering 
responsive human service delivery. While thus far it has been argued that the application 
of the case management model and the Preferred Service Provider systems exhibit a 
strong sense of hybridisation, the focus on the client-centred practice tips the balance 
away from systemic advocacy, lobbying and networking. To appreciate this change fully, 
it is necessary to look at where the bulk of the accommodation worker’s time is going 
and, importantly, what activities are seen by staff to be falling by the wayside. Staff noted 
with concern the shift taking them away from collective systemic inputs as part of the 
normal service practice. Using their words: 
I don’t get out due to time limitations, it’s very hard sometimes to get out and 
meet other people like Centrelink and JPET [Job Placement, Employment and 
Training Programme], Swan Youth Service, etc. It is important sometimes to meet 
people you often talk to on the phone. Networking is valuable, but fitting in is 
difficult. Ministry of Justice - we work a lot with them, since a lot of our clients 
are referred from that department we work a lot more with them. (Service 
Delivery Staff 02) 
 
Sometimes it doesn’t allow me to do everything I want to do. The service we are 
in, accommodation, we can’t just go off, like other services. We look at 
[individual] advocacy, mediation, etc. Before was the same [in terms of limited 
funding], but because now flexibility is gone, it is more evident for us in the 
constraints presented by the new system (Service Delivery Staff 06) 
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The Indigenous Program Coordinator also stated that she was too preoccupied with 
individual client-centred operations, leaving her with limited time to attend collective 
efforts, which she said were confined to one particular interagency network: 
 
In terms of working with other agencies, I don’t think I’ve done anything much to 
sensitise others [external agencies] about their criteria. But we have opportunity 
for interagency cooperation through the Midland Aboriginal Advisory Group – 
[comprising of] workers in departments, Aboriginal workers from government 
departments, MOJ [Ministry of Justice], Police Citizens, Yerrigan, the 
employment service centre, the police, and community leaders, etc. What we hope 
to achieve is address issues when they come up and who’s best positioned to 
address those issues and allocate which agencies are to follow up and resolve, and 
tell everyone what’s happening. They’ve these sorts of groups in the country. So 
that group allows things to come to the fore. We meet monthly (Service Delivery 
Staff 03) 
 
Furthermore, a senior staff member noted that there are more possibilities for pursuing 
collective strategies. She felt, however, this role was limited due to heavy demands 
connected with individual casework operations: 
 
In fact, we may have more bargaining power than other agencies, we can’t strike, 
but we can raise [issues] with ministers, Michael [Executive Officer] and I used to 
ring ministers. Now operational activities take too much of our time. Lack of 
involvement in lobbying is now endemic. We have lobbied, and networking is 
valued, but we are stretched with our operational matters. It costs your time to 
lobby, network, unless funding is threatened….They closed AMES [Aboriginal 
Medical Service], Derbal Yerrigan in Midland, I wrote to the Minister to express 
concern. Of course I prioritise, if it is major, I will [lobby]. I don’t go to most 
community meetings this is partly because I don’t work full time. And we can’t 
afford additional staff but it is simply that there is less money to go around 
(Senior Staff 07) 
 
 
The complaints about lack of flexibility indicated here stand in sharp contrast to the key 
SAAP objective aimed at promoting flexible service delivery as enshrined under the 
Commonwealth/State and Territories SAAP 2000 –  2005 Memorandum of 
Understanding (Commonwealth of Australia 2005b). In addition, the quest for a client-  210 
centred approach reinforced through SAAP’s shifting objectives, while enabling certain 
operational possibilities, do limit the range of operations. 
 
The privileging of individual client interventions marginalises systemic advocacy, 
lobbying and networking. Yet, official SAAP sources emphasise that other community 
resources such as the Job Placement, Employment and Training Programme (JPET) are 
essential in providing ‘a holistic approach to assist young people…to overcome problems 
preventing them from maintaining stable accommodation and entering into full-time 
education, training or employment’ (Commonwealth of Australia 2004a: 10; 
Commonwealth of Australia 2003b:  6-16). This departure from collective strategies 
‘changes by implication’ and ‘limitation’ (Foucault 1991b: 56). In this new position, the 
authorities’ favouring of the commercial value of the client-centred operations displaces 
the boundaries of practice. Swan Emergency Accommodation as a provider assumes a 
reformed ‘position and role’ as a ‘speaking subject in the discourse’ (1991b: 56), within 
the Preferred Service Provider framework. This is not to say individual solutions are not 
important, rather, the decoupling of individual advocacy from systemic strategies shifts 
the boundaries of operations and the sense that is made of the notion of homelessness. 
Yet, as noted in the National Evaluation of the Supported Accommodation Assistance 
Program (SAAP 111), the support needs of SAAP service users are high and offer very 
minimal choice between services (DFCS 1999a: 226). Drawing attention to the caution 
raised by the House of Representatives Standing Committee Report (1998) here, it may 
be still necessary to  take account of service users’ level of need in determining the 
appropriateness of SAAP services to contestable market arrangements (Commonwealth   211 
of Australia 1999b). It can be argued that the requirement for systemic advocacy will be 
higher with this group given its demonstrable high support needs. Under such conditions, 
specifications may need to be approached with an even greater caution (much as it seems 
SAAP authorities have not gone along to embrace the fully-blown competitive tendering 
versions). 
 
The decline in systemic advocacy at points of delivery is not the preserve of the Preferred 
Service Provider arrangements. This seems to be a growing feature in some human 
service areas where there is an emphasis on being client-centred and where competitive 
practices have been introduced. For instance, the funding criteria for Australia’s migrant 
settlement services under the Integrated Humanitarian Settlement Scheme  (DIMIA 
2000/2003) marked a strong departure from previous funding arrangements directed at a 
variety of policy advocacy programs, in preference to more individual client-centred 
approaches. Emphasising a similar point, Mendes (2003b) discusses a parallel shift which 
sees a significant decline in the spread of government-sourced advocacy funding across a 
range of peak umbrella bodies around the country, justified through the methodological 
individualist assumptions of neo-classical economics, which reduces collective advocacy 
to a function of self-interest. 
 
It would be misleading, however, to assume that given these constraints, no creative 
community linkage is occurring. For example, the coordinator of the Karnany Aboriginal 
Centre reported that: ‘we got funding for young people to learn new skills – sports. So 
we’re finding lots of alternatives, shifting people away from drug use. The Shire has   212 
given us two big jobs [through a tender bid]. We also put in a submission to lotteries for a 
bus’. Thus, in this context, innovative projects are also evident despite the shifts that have 
taken place in relation to boundaries of practice. 
 
Official SAAP texts put great emphasis on SAAP’s role in facilitating effective 
community service linkages as a critical element in attaining client outcomes. 
Partnerships, effective linkages, collaboration and service integration are highlighted 
under SAAP IV and enshrined in the Commonwealth/State and Territories Memorandum 
of Understanding (DFCS 2005b: 4; Commonwealth of Australia 2002: 6; Ecumenical 
Housing and Thompson Goodall Associates 1999). Elaborating on this point, a 
government-commissioned report on homelessness prepared by the Ecumenical Housing 
and Thompson Goodall Associates (1999) highlights the necessity of these linkages as 
essential in: 
•  Raising the profile of homelessness in the community, particularly where 
people are excluded from services; 
•  Developing collaborative relationships with specialist and generalist 
services locally; 
•  Participating in local regional planning for coordinated services; 
•  Participating in training and education of mainstream services to increase 
the responsiveness and appropriateness of service to homeless people. 
    (1999, p. ix-x) 
 
Despite the emphasis given to such a strategy, however, the workers experiences at this 
particular site of practice are largely paradoxical and contradictory to this claim. 
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Neglecting Professional Development 
 
Most of the interviewed staff expressed concern over what they described as a growing 
neglect of ongoing professional development needs for staff under the Preferred Service 
Provider system. A senior staff member confirmed that the Department of Community 
Development’s training wing, Community Skills Training Centre, no longer provides 
training for SAAP workers on an ongoing basis. The exception is applied to new SAAP 
staff. As a result, Swan Emergency Accommodation is no longer in a position to ‘claim 
back money for our workers attending upgrade of skills, but they [DCD] only now target 
new workers.’ This senior staff revealed that she was already planning to write to DCD 
asking the department to rethink its decision. 
 
Another management staff explained that this shift is disempowering of Swan Emergency 
Accommodation staff, a point echoed by a Family Resource Worker asserting that ‘we 
must update skills, before we used to do CSTC [Community Skills training Centre 
training courses], now they’ve stopped that…but now it’s just like, “well there is just no 
money for that”.’ In this sense, the shift in the ‘nature of directing principle’ (Foucault 
1991b: 56) inscribed in managerialism elevates instrumental  rationality, while 
simultaneously disregarding the relevance of ongoing professional development 
practices. As Pollitt (1993: 60) observes, managerialism tends to be accompanied by 
moves away from development of human resources in preference for greater emphasis on 
resource control. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
The chapter has explored the governance of homelessness as understood under the 
Supported Accommodation Assistance Program at Swan Emergency Accommodation. In 
this context, I have explored how housing needs are made knowable through a mix of 
existing authorities, noting the continuing presence of traditional welfarist rationalities, 
mediated increasingly through managerialist forms. In looking at the everyday 
procedures and frameworks guiding the regulation of the homeless population at Swan 
Emergency Accommodation, the discussion has also made visible the diverse relations of 
power that inhabit the ‘social body’ (Foucault 1980c: 96). The focus on client 
intervention techniques, while certainly engaged in normalising client conduct and 
making it more amenable to particular household management forms, also reveals 
practices divergent from those observed in the previous Job Network case study. In the 
case of SAAP, the case plans remain ‘voluntary’, differing markedly from the more 
competitive practices instituted in the delivery of Labour Market Programs. In this 
context, despite the limits imposed through the managerial shifts involving SAAP II, III 
and IV, the parameters set for client and staff autonomy, while constrained, are far less 
subjected to the advanced liberal ‘calculative regime’ (Rose, 1996: 54). Put simply, at an 
operational level, it can be argued that a range of psychosocial rationalities co-exist with 
the rationing managerial and competitive practices. As Cheek and Rudge (cited in Porter 
1998: 213-4) observe, ‘at any one particular point in time, various discursive frameworks 
will co-exist. Some will complement each other, others oppose each other, some will be 
dominant, others submerged within that dominance.’   215 
 
At the centre of this discussion is also the concern over diminishing long-term housing 
options for homeless people, a phenomenon accompanied by an equally increased 
complexity in the situations of homeless people in need of accommodation assistance, 
pre-occupying this SAAP agency with greater client-centred operations. Under these 
conditions, we simultaneously see the demise of collective advocacy strategies, squeezed 
out due to lack of resources. 
 
Under these conditions, the growing managerialist features are evident in the further 
development of performance measurements noted in the report titled Supported 
Accommodation Assistance Program (SAAP), Annual National Performance Report 
2002 – 03 (Commonwealth of Australia 2004a ). In this context, continuing data 
development trends are worth our ongoing attention since they play part in discursively 
defining SAAP’s field of operation. 
 
Given the non-government sector’s broad reliance on the use of voluntary management 
committee personnel, a question has also emerged about the conflict of interest associated 
with the notion of contestable markets (that is, allowing for potential contenders to take 
over program operations previously undertaken by another provider if they prove 
themselves more competitive). 
 
A final theme emerging in this chapter is also the marginal positioning of Indigenous 
people embedded in the regulation of homelessness relating to shifts that have   216 
significantly reduced the extent of available public housing stock in keeping with the 
pursuit of greater public sector efficiencies that occurred throughout the 1990s. The 
techniques of rental assistance intended to encourage families to access private rental 
housing appear oblivious to the subject positioning of this disadvantaged group. 
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Chapter Six 
 
Reflections 
 
This study set out to look at the influence of Australia’s National Competition Policy in 
reshaping human services. In this final chapter I draw out key research findings and 
reflect on the influence of National Competition Policy reform in shaping human 
services. I also offer some insights into the policy and research implications of my 
findings. I conclude with some reflections on the methodology. 
 
I have drawn heavily from governmentality theory in the exploration of my research 
question. The thesis has also broadly situated the welfare rationalities within a social 
democratic tradition, in this case drawing on the work of Pusey. Locating these welfare 
rationalities in this tradition was important as it is the so-called social democratic context 
that NCP has increasingly dismantled. 
 
Findings 
 
Governmentality techniques and the project of National Competition Policy 
In my introduction, I stated that in order to shed some light upon the impact of 
competition policy in re-shaping human services, it was first necessary to describe the 
broad formulation of the policy.  To this end I described the influence of neo-classical 
economics, public choice theory and a managerialist body of knowledge.  Connected to   218 
this, the thesis followed the trail of policy techniques used in assembling the National 
Competition Policy reform, such as Competitive Tendering and Contracting and 
Competitive Neutrality as variously engaged in facilitating new governance of the 
economy of human services.  As part of this analysis, it became clear that the 
justifications used to put together this reform are reliant on a variety of discursive 
formations, characteristic of the neo-liberal era. These insights are useful in showing how 
particular NCP methods and frameworks circulate in the public sector, and, in turn, 
influence activities of non-government organisations. The significance of this point ought 
not be underestimated, especially as human services are not commonly understood to be 
priority target areas under NCP. 
 
Specifying, ranking and organising human service practice 
In teasing out the workings of Competitive Tendering and Competitive Neutrality, my 
research has demonstrated that they have managed to alter approaches in the style and 
form of service delivery by prescriptively and contractually detailing specific accounts of 
what services should be delivered and how they should be delivered. I have suggested 
that through these frameworks, programs can increasingly regulate human service 
operations through notions of ‘value for money’. In this way, more and more of human 
service programs are defined and clarified in greater detail by central authorities in a bid 
to govern the economy of human services. 
 
Part of the genius of Competitive Tendering and Contracting arrangements lies in their 
ability to order practice in ways they consider superior. In this respect this thesis has   219 
drawn attention to NCP’s promotion of one reading of what constitutes notions of client 
responsibility in the course of working and interacting with Job Network clients. The 
significance of reworking this cannot be underestimated. It suggests new directions in the 
way relationships involving unemployed people, society and the state are being 
constructed. In this respect, I have also demonstrated how a discursive closure has been 
rendered possible through the circulation of official definitions that impose specific 
meanings about how a responsible job seeker is meant to behave in relation to their 
employment assistance agency (Job Network), and in relation to their continued 
preparedness to maintain a perpetually job-ready status.  
 
The thesis illustrates the way in which official policy can influence and regulate a Job 
Network provider so that they come to align their practice with governing objectives. 
This has implications not just for the Job Network programs covered in this study, but 
also for programs designed for people with disabilities and single parents. 
 
Given its capacity to detail prescriptive specifications relating to the practices expected 
from a non-government provider, the Competitive Tendering and Contracting system as 
used by DEWR and monitored by Centrelink, should not be simply as a tendering 
method. Instead, it is a strategy used to consolidate government objectives, in the process 
ensuring non-government providers keep pace with the broader governing aims. In this 
way, these strategies can be further described as part of what Gordon (1991: 2) calls a 
way of looking at ‘who can govern; what governing is; what or who is governed’. 
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I would like to conclude this discussion by drawing some attention to the work of Le 
Grand (2007; 1984). Most particularly, I recap this analysis in connection with the point 
Gordon  (1991: 2) makes,  as used in the discussion above,  regarding the need for 
understanding these strategies as ways of looking at ‘what governing is; and what is 
governed.’ Le Grand (cited in Means 1994: 64) reminds  us that these quasi-market 
arrangements are readily distinguishable from other private markets in that the choice for 
purchasing a service is not commonly extended to the consumer. Even where clients use 
vouchers, the existing arrangements only allow them access to a pre-determined or 
specified service. Moreover, actors involved in service provision are  themselves 
regulated in the context of the terms of their delegated power. For Le Grand, the success 
and failure of these quasi-market arrangements need to be assessed in the way in which 
they manage to promote notions of efficiency, equity and choice. These assertions have 
relevance to  the contested nature of what comes  be regarded as the domain of 
governance;  and  who is subject to it;  and under what terms. Yet, given  Le Grand’s 
argument that these matters are not simply about efficiency, but also equity and choice; 
then it can be possible to subject understandings of contestable to further scrutiny. In his 
more recent work, he suggests that quasi-markets can promote innovative practice (Le 
Grand 2007: 212) However, it should be noted that his formulation of quasi-markets is 
consciously articulated as separate from managerial models that are preoccupied with 
performance calculations (see Le Grand 2007). 
 
In drawing attention to Le Grand’s (2007) position, it should be remembered that his 
view of economic regulation of social problems retains some flavour of his earlier work   221 
emphasising efficient outcomes, consumer choice and promotion of equity (see Le Grand 
1984). Under this interpretation, it can be seen that the contestation around the 
calculations of choice can contribute in thinking about how services can be organised in 
the future. 
 
Regulation through intensified codification strategies 
My thesis also involves identification and discussion of the codification techniques used 
in ordering and systematising day to day client support processes and service operations. 
Again, I maintain here that through these practices, it becomes possible to reshape 
activities of non-government parties (contracted providers) into alignment with the 
governing objectives of the day. More specifically, the codifications manage to organise 
and rank practice knowledge in ways aligned with managerialism. In this way the 
principles of National Competition Policy (Hilmer 1993; DFA 2002a, b, 2004a; NCC 
2002a) are translated into specific codified operational frameworks and thus have effect 
at a local level. Consequently Quality Assurance practices such as those at Peel Training 
and Employment embody more in the way of managerialist governing assumptions in 
relation to the unemployed than one might initially expect. 
 
Writers such as Harris (2003) and Pollitt (1993) have long commented on the managerial 
use of strategies reminiscent of Taylorism discussed in Chapter Three, in containing and 
pre-empting the scope of professional practice. My thesis takes this analysis a step further 
by revealing step-by-step how the codification inventions are put into operation in the 
regulation of everyday human service delivery processes and practices. My arguments   222 
also suggest that there is a need to pay attention to a growing trend involving 
instantaneous transfer of information from sites of practice to funding headquarters such 
as DEWR in Canberra, promoting a centralised compliance regime by virtue of these 
highly ordered and systematised processes. My thesis cautions that the kind of 
regimented practice that may result may hinder responsive professional practice as 
people’s unique individual circumstances may get overlooked. 
 
Regulating through performance measurement 
The new measurement techniques associated with National Competition Policy stand out 
as one of the very significant means whereby the interaction between Job Network 
providers and the unemployed people is regulated. While the role of outcome 
measurement in shaping human service practice is not new, the intensified use of this 
strategy in achieving the goals of NCP is evident especially in relation to services funded 
under the framework of Competitive Tendering and Contracting. 
 
In this regard, this study highlights the current emphasis on job placement outcomes, with 
the associated aim of reducing reliance on income support benefits. In particular those 
measures may have deleterious long-term impacts on those groups that exit the schooling 
system prematurely, since they are more likely to be in need of opportunities requiring 
step-by-step skills development. The need and benefits for such skill development is 
evident in the ACER (ABS 2003) study noted in Chapter Five. Clearly, post-secondary 
qualifications do make a difference in the longer term, a point reinforced in a recent 
OECD (2006) study where it has observed that:   223 
On average across OECD countries, only 56% of adults without proper upper 
secondary qualification are in employment. Of those who are, 26% earn one-half 
or less than one-half of the national median earnings. While many countries have 
seen steeply rising benefits from university education, including some of those 
where university education has expanded most, people who have not completed 
upper secondary school, and particularly women, continue to face serious labour-
market penalties (OECD 2006: 1). 
 
In Australia, ACOSS (2001) and the Jobs Network (2002) suggest, that to be effective, 
Australian Labour Market Programs need to incorporate developmental, education and 
skills training underpinnings. The authors argue that these components need to be 
incorporated in the Job Network payment structure overseen by DEWR to ensure these 
providers can adequately provide referral and emotional support service in the course of 
its day-to-day interaction with clients. As noted in Chapter Five, the current SAAP 
performance measurements, in contrast to the Job Network system, include the 
‘occasions of support’ for each client. In reporting these figures, central authorities now 
maintain data on the extent of repeated use of crisis accommodation provisions for each 
client. This information should be helpful in indicating some of the long-term trends and 
constraints in achieving long-term housing solutions. 
 
Another significant practice promoted by National Competition Policy is the 
development of centralised performance information systems enabling authorities to 
evaluate and make cost comparisons across human service industries (for example, see 
Hilmer 1993; McCarrey 1993a, b; DFA 2002c; 2004a FMA 1997; DFCS 1999). In this 
thesis I noted that both the Competitive Tendering and Contracting and the Preferred 
Service Provider systems are underpinned by a comparative performance approach aimed 
at promoting ‘value for money’. These comparative strategies make it possible to reward   224 
higher performing providers with automatic contract extensions without necessarily being 
subject to the rigour of a competitive tender system.  In using Competitive Tendering and 
Contracting strategy, it thus becomes possible to shape and foster particular service 
priorities and provider behaviour. I stress that the consequences are worrying since 
difference between a higher and a lower performer may result from fostering job 
placement outcomes at the expense of capacity building. In addition, my research points 
to the fragility of arrangements that draws in Job Network providers who remain 
ambivalent about the credibility of what counts as good performance.  
 
Regulating behaviours and beyond 
Following on from work done by a range of governmentalist writers and contributors (for 
example, Dean 1999; Miller and Rose 1990; Harris 1999; Walters 1996), the thesis draws 
attention to the regulatory practices engaged in normalising the conduct of homeless 
people. It describes in some detail a case management approach targeting homeless 
people with a view to promoting acceptable household management behaviours, 
normalised tenancy and family-relationship attributes. These regulatory practices are not 
neo-liberal in character and do not necessarily stand in tension with traditional 
professional practices. Nonetheless, the impact of the accounting reforms that reshaped 
the then Homeswest housing authority following recommendations of the McCarrey 
Report (1993b) produced reforms that seem not only managerialist, but also decisively 
neo-liberal in character. In promoting Rental Assistance (vouchers) methods as a less 
expensive and more targeted alternative to the expansion of public rental stock, these 
strategies overlooked the position of certain disadvantaged groups, including Aboriginal   225 
people.  In other words, mechanisms such as Competitive Neutrality promoted under the 
National Competition Policy and in turn underpinning the previous housing reforms, 
contrary to their claim to universality have unequal effects at the population level in 
relation to people’s social, material and cultural circumstances. 
 
As well as the significant over-representation of Aboriginal people indicated in the SAAP 
figures, there are other vulnerable groups. As reflected in the national data profile, the 
clientele using crisis accommodation services include people experiencing substance 
abuse, psychiatric conditions, and some people caught up in the justice system. This 
suggests a need for contractual service delivery arrangements that are more sensitive to 
human complexity. In raising this, I am keen to draw attention to the view taken by the 
Productivity Commission Inquiry Report (2005), which seems to clear the way for the 
possible extension of competitive practices in other areas of human services. Here, Le 
Grand’s views on the regulation of social problems can be of use as he treats efficiency, 
choice as specific objectives upon which the role of the market must be judged upon. A 
less critical acceptance of the proposal of the Productivity Commission Inquiry Report 
stands the chance of reinforcing application of methodological individualism to complex 
social and economic issues. 
 
Finally, the mechanisms of Competitive Tendering and Contracting prescribe and /or 
encourage particular forms of behaviour among their subject populations, in this case the 
unemployed and the homeless. In particular, the promotion of mutual obligation, as Dean 
(1995: 566) points out, can be described as ‘ways of problematising and disclosing what   226 
it is to be a human being’. Following from the new Welfare to Work Employment 
reforms that came into effect in July 2006, a range of people with disabilities and single 
parents are now subject to various forms of mutual obligation requirements. Insights from 
this thesis suggest that they too will become subject to the significant yet distant 
influence of NCP. 
 
Treating human services as contestable markets 
 
I now turn to the question of conceptualising human services as contestable markets, an 
assumption that underpins the NCP logic leading to the use of contracting and tendering 
practices. I will discuss this point in relation to significant gaps evident in the Preferred 
Service Provider contractual arrangements covered in this thesis. In this study, it has been 
suggested that the policies and practices aiming to turn human services into competing 
rival markets, have shifted operations away from collective activities such as advocacy, 
lobbying and networking in preference for client-centred activities. These losses are 
worth of close attention, as they stand in tension not only with the desires of some of the 
service providers, but also with other official government strategies. So while SAAP’s 
official documents highlight the importance of collaboration, partnerships, service 
integration, and the promotion of effective linkages in addressing issues of homelessness, 
many of the staff in this study felt deprived of the opportunity to pursue these roles. This 
suggests that the compartmentalisation of roles attendant on the Preferred Service 
Provider model may be leaving limited opportunities on the ground to undertake broader 
and collaborative work. If the performance indicators to which SAAP is subject do not 
recognise these broader inputs around service and program development more generally,   227 
then it is likely that the individual-centred operations will maintain a stronger hold at the 
expense of other possible operations. 
 
The neglect of professional development under the Preferred Service Provider 
arrangements is also a point of concern. The rationing of access to the previously readily 
available training support programs through the state’s Community Skills Training 
Centre, seems at odds with the goals of SAAP IV (Commonwealth of Australia 2002: 
41),  where  official emphasis is given to the need to foster improved knowledge 
acquisition among SAAP providers. It is also questionable whether community providers 
command enough power at the bargaining table to cost fully their contractual obligations, 
so that they incorporate the continued operations of their non-case management 
responsibilities (that is networking, lobbying and building partnerships). The Government 
of Western Australia formalised an agreement with peak bodies in the state community 
services sector under the Funding and Purchasing Community Service: A Policy 
Statement on a Fresh Approach to Funding Relationships With Not-For-Profit Sector 
(Government of Western Australia and State Supply Commission 2002). These 
arrangements, which promise to deliver responsible contractual practices, are worth 
future attention to see the extent to which they engage and respond to the experiences of 
everyday practice. Under this policy it is clearly affirmed that ‘Public authorities have a 
role in developing the capacity of the not-for-profit sector to meet needs in the 
community’ (Government of Western Australia and State Supply Commission 2002: 17). 
This point is reiterated in the Government’s Industry Plan for the Non-Government 
Human Services Sector, which identifies capacity-building strategies as necessary in the   228 
pursuit of good governance, accountability over finance and human resources, leadership 
and policy development; and service delivery (Government of Western Australia 2004: 
20). More broadly, however, improvements of this nature will involve the federal 
government. If notions of collaboration and service linkages are to be given enhanced 
expression on the ground, then the cooperation of various tiers of authority to rework the 
existing incentive structure will be needed. 
 
Finally, I argue that any application of the notion of contestable markets to the human 
services needs to pay attention to the potential conflict of interest involving management 
committee members who may hold multiple loyalties with a range of other local 
organisations that under the promotion of competition, may stand to gain through another 
organisation’s loss (including those whose management they assist on a voluntary basis). 
In this context, these quasi-marketised arrangements may promote self-interest in ways 
that the architects of contestable markets may not have intended.  Broadly speaking, these 
concerns may have relevance across a range of human service industries reliant on 
volunteer management committees to manage their services. 
 
I note in previous chapters the extension of Competitive Tendering and Contracting 
practices to other federally-funded programs such as the Integrated Humanitarian 
Settlement Services, the Commonwealth Rehabilitation Services, and the management of 
detention centres holding asylum seekers around the country. In Western Australia, there 
are also other moderated versions of competitive practices and service agreements 
currently deemed in keeping with the competition arrangements (Auditor General 2000;   229 
Government of Western Australia 2004a: 20; Government of Western Australia 2004b; 
State Supply Commission 2002). It is worth noting that a recent Productivity 
Commission Inquiry, the Independent Review of Job Network, Inquiry Report 
(Productivity Commission 2002), was required to make reference to a possible extension 
of the fully blown Competitive Tendering and Contracting methods to other areas of 
human and community service. More specifically, it considered ‘payment based 
outcomes; [and] competition that rewards good performers with more business’ 
(Productivity Commission 2002: sect. 15.1), adding that the competitive Tendering and 
Contracting system can be considered for application to other human service areas. 
Significantly, a recent review of NCP reforms (Productivity Commission Inquiry Report 
2005: 85) supports the extension of competition techniques to a broader range of human 
services, it maintains that the NCP reform is an economic necessity, but does 
acknowledge that the reform should seek to offer support to people who are unlikely to 
fare well under it. This is a clear reminder of the tight parameters within which general 
community welfare under NCP’s neo-classical economic underpinnings is interpreted and 
regulated. Under such ongoing policy appraisals, it is important that the issues associated 
with notions of contestability in relation to human services are further explored and 
debated in order to better inform future policy considerations. 
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Reflections on the re-making of professionalism, including the role of technology 
 
In Chapter Four the thesis discussed professional concerns that become apparent as the 
new managerial forms consolidate particular ways of ordering operational processes and 
procedures. Key to these reflections are broader implications on the containment of 
discretionary privileges once exercised by professionals, and the shifting and contested 
expectations of what it means to be a professional, within these managerialised 
arrangements. These  arrangements include  the role of new  technologies,  professional 
practice, and the need to understand these changes within the broader concerns of social 
relations. 
 
The constraints on professional autonomy strongly experienced by staff at Peel Training 
and Employment, and to some extent the limitations felt by staff at Swan Emergency 
Accommodation reverberate in other areas of human service practice (see Jones 2003; 
Duff and Larsen 2003; Lonne, McDonald and Cox 2003). According to Clarke (1998), 
one of the most significant points about the new managerialism is its ability to facilitate 
greater level of compliance, while at the same time leaving practitioners rather cynical 
about the role of these new managerial innovations. Clarke concludes that what makes 
managerialism  successful in reshaping practices is its success in pre-empting practitioner 
judgements, leaving staff to conclude that ‘there is no alternative’ (1998: 178) outside of 
these dominant arrangements. In the process, concerns with mediating the political, social 
and economic conflicts embedded in the capitalist systems are redefined into concerns   231 
with techniques accounting for ‘performance’ and ‘quality’, as if these questions can be 
completely abstracted away from politics.  
 
The impact of the new technologies as seen in the LMPs Case Study thus need to be 
understood beyond their role in classifying and ordering human service operations, and as 
part of radical change of professional practice. Similar to the findings of this thesis, a 
study by Brown (2003) highlights that often the design and installation of computerised 
client systems are developed and installed without input or deliberations with 
professional staff working in these human services. In this study, Brown (2003: 3) found 
that 110 supervisors (who were attending her university class in management of human 
services) overwhelmingly had not been consulted on changes relating to use of new client 
data  base systems. Yet, these changes  directly impacted on practitioner decisions  by 
prescribing which practice needed to be recorded or excluded. As she puts it, ‘how could 
they do something they saw as professionally relevant if there was no box in which to 
record it? How could they avoid a task that was computer generated if they thought it was 
not appropriate at the time?’ (Brown  2003: 3). Loader (1998)  concludes the  new 
technologies are not as benign acquisitions, but often purposefully put into use with a 
view of regulating social relations of welfare practice. In his view, they constitute 
competing power struggles with major ramifications about inclusive and exclusive 
practices, in the process, ‘reinforc[ing] existing patterns of inequality: or to define the 
terms of engagement’. This leads Loader to caution that the Post-Fordist arguments can 
be problematic due to their  lack of  concern with the disquiet  indicated by welfare 
professionals in relevant areas. Later on I reflect on the Schumpeterian welfare thought   232 
where there is some indication that some writers that are starting to engage with some 
notions of social relations. 
 
If the issues concerning the re-configuration of professionalism are becoming clear, there 
is still no common position about how to respond to the issues involved such as the 
managerial attacks on notions of autonomous professional practice. Ife’s (cited in Jones 
2003) response to the challenge of de-professionalisation, whereby he takes the position 
that any engagement with the dominant managerial discourses can only further serve to 
undermine social work values. Ife suggests that social work interests are best served by 
renewed commitment to notions of community work. It still remains unclear whether 
welfare practitioners driven by a community work ethos can shelter themselves from the 
market practices that have come to redefine service provision beyond the public sector. 
Neither is it clear whether a community work ethos can be understood as a homogenous 
position. Hugman (cited in Jones 2003: 2) takes the view that traditional understandings 
of professional practice are no longer tenable and suggests that practitioners think more 
along the lines of responsiveness and openness in service delivery. In this context, 
Hugman (2005) proposes that rather than consider professional value positions as ‘rules 
of conduct’, we would do well to treat them as frameworks for thinking our way through 
the issues on any given matter. It is in this way that we come to see the moral and 
ambiguous nature of current professional practice. For Jones (2003: 3), the autonomous 
claims of professional practice are now of less relevance considering the shifts that have 
place, leading him to conclude that professionalism should be seen in the context of 
constant re-consideration of positioning within the emerging complex dynamics of power   233 
relations. On the other hand, Duff and Larsen (2003: 7) note that the future of these 
arrangements may partly rely on their impact on service delivery and the context in which 
they are experienced by practitioners and their clients. 
 
I believe that the subject of de-professionalisation could benefit from further research. 
That may include some of the issues pointed to in this thesis, but also to the need to look 
more broadly at other contemporary themes that are indicating major shifts and 
challenges in relation to who is a professional, their role within the context of a welfare 
state, and the mediation and regulatory roles played by people working in human 
services. 
  
Reflections on the Schumpeterian thoughts and notions of workfare 
 
The thesis previously noted that in the context of  Schumpeterian understandings, 
economic change is always seen to be influenced by innovations in the methods of 
production; and that these innovations occur in areas beyond the pure economic sphere, 
while paradoxically becoming the catalyst for ongoing economic change. Understood in 
this context, innovation entails distinct shifts in the methods of production – the sorts of 
shifts involved in reforming Australia’s employment assistance programs. This implies 
the deployment of  key strategies such as the use of Competitive Tendering and 
Contracting in determining which agencies should be involved in providing Job Network 
programs. The notion can also be applied to a range of managerialist operational practices 
such as the consolidation of online information system capable of instantaneous data   234 
transfer, practices of outcome measurements and so forth. Seen in this narrow sense, the 
LMPs  shift can be understood as part of a neo-  Schumpeterian Competition State, 
although how far the Schumpeterian thesis fits Australian developments is debatable. 
More specifically, it is problematic because the shifts involving Job Network and mutual 
obligation practices are  heavily dependent on the  application of methodological 
individualism in regulating the conduct of provider organisations and their unemployed 
clients. I call it neo-Schumpeterian in the sense that Schumpeter himself was completely 
opposed to the application of individualist calculations (as discussed in Chapter Two) in 
the non-economic sphere, while still reinforcing that it was the non-economic sphere 
which served as the  engine of economic development. Hence  his opposition to the 
individualist calculations of neo-classical economics in relation to notions competition in 
understanding and fostering economic change. This may be a useful context to bear in 
mind when reflecting on the workfare practices. 
 
It is also clear that notions of a workfare state although bearing certain common 
elements, they still cannot be generalised (see Torfing 1999; Lodemel and Stafford 2002; 
Grover and Stewart 1999). Studies across a number of welfare states indicate that the UK 
and US programs are fairly neo-liberal in character, while Denmark’s workfare 
innovations have consciously been disarticulated from a neo-liberal tone. And clearly, 
where a neo-liberal  approach is evident (Grover and Stewart 1999; Torfing 1999), 
programs tend to exhibit application of innovations that seem more influenced by 
methodological individualism. In turn, we see what Torfing (1999) calls defensive neo-  235 
liberal workfare strategies used to drive down wages and introduce more flexibility, and 
reduction in social security benefits. 
 
In this context, I would  like  to emphasise a couple of key points emerging  from 
reflections on European-based workfare programs. The study by Lodemel and Stafford 
(2002) is relevant here, as it covers a number of European countries and also draws on 
the US experience. The study was also undertaken in conjunction with six institutions and 
centres of research across Europe. Lodemel and Stafford highlight the need to enhance 
the quality of workfare program measures offering more ‘individually tailored options 
with a strong evidence of human resource development’ (2002: 4). They also suggest the 
need to set up particular rights-based systems alongside current notions of obligations. 
Such rights, they believe, would need to incorporate outcomes that go beyond paid job 
placement. These include individual gains in social participation, psychological 
wellbeing, and reduced levels of dependency on drug and alcohol use. This argument 
resonates with the views of Australian LMPs providers and analysts discussed in this 
thesis. What is interesting about the European experience is that the Lodemel and 
Stafford (2002: 14) study indicates that in France the structuring of workfare programs 
targeting unemployed people with high support needs seems to be producing specific 
programs involving solid levels of training by private employers, which yielded some of 
the best results for people with lower level education. 
 
The French experience has relevance to the recent policy shift in Australia involving a 
stronger regulatory regime for sole parents and people with disabilities, including those   236 
with mental illness. Given the difficulties some of these groups face when it comes to 
labour market entry (as illustrated in the sorts of profiles indicated in my SAAP case 
study) the call for entrenching notions of rights alongside obligations can further  be 
understood in the context of such vulnerability (although not exclusively). As summed up 
in this quote: 
[Workfare programs] expanded to include wider target populations in all six 
countries [Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, France and Norway], 
compulsory programs are increasingly used to target recipients who have greater 
and greater barriers to work. In this situation, regular work may be a distant 
prospect or even an impossible aim for many recipients. It is therefore necessary 
to secure the right to activation also for these groups (as seen in Denmark) and 
tailor programmes to further the social integration of excluded people (Lodemel 
and Stafford 2002: 15). 
 
 
Reflections on thesis 
 
The governmentality approach has proved a rich source of analysis illuminating a range 
of methods and techniques that are reworking approaches to human service delivery. 
Specifically, it has thrown a focus on the discourses governing the management of 
unemployment and homelessness. The approach has also been useful in offering pointers 
to the sorts of self-governing possibilities and relations to particular human service 
organisations fostered through the techniques of NCP. In considering areas for future 
research in this area it remains important to conduct ongoing studies into the nature of 
social relations connected with the governance of the unemployed and homeless people. 
The findings of this research offer some useful pointers emanating from everyday client 
experiences and organisational operations and processes for further study. In the 
meantime, the study, in probing how the NCP jigsaw puzzle has been put together - how   237 
various notions have been produced and fostered, and through which particular 
techniques - suggests the unstable nature of these arrangements and the basis upon which 
they are being justified. In this way they are indeed, contestable and changeable. Perhaps, 
then, it is fitting to end this work with a statement from Rose (1998) to precisely this 
effect: 
The virtue of Foucault’s work to me is its capacity to enable one to see that things 
could be different – that things were once different and that things can be different 
again – and that our ways of understanding and making truth about the world 
shape what is possible to do in the world…. 
The kinds of battles that that can be fought, it seems to me, are battles in 
truth. That is to say, in any situation, wherever there is a set of relations of power 
which depend upon arguments making a claim to truth, then a fight can be 
mounted, different forms of truth can be justified, different forms of truth can 
seek to find their authority (Rose 1998). 
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INVITATION LETTER 
 
Pendo Mwaiteleke 
C/O School of Social Work and Social 
Policy 
Curtin University of Technology 
Kent Street 
BENTLEY 
Ph: 08-9266 7681 (w) 9478 3570 (H) 
 
e-mail: 
mwaitelp@spectrum.curtin.edu.au 
08 March 2001 
 
Celia Will 
Manager 
Peel Training Employment 
Mandurah 
 
 
Dear Celia, 
 
I am a Lecturer in the School of Social Work and Social Policy at Curtin University I am 
currently undertaking research, exploring the impact of National Competition Policy (e.g. 
competitive tendering and out-sourcing) on delivery of government-funded labour market 
programs and family support services. The study is part of my Ph D program being 
undertaken at Murdoch University. 
 
I am interested in getting your service (employment program) to participate in my study 
specifically as a provider of Flex 1, 2 and 3 Programs. The study will focus on three 
major questions: 
-  How does the competitive tendering model affect treatment of clients? 
-  Who gets what service? 
-  Under what terms are services being accessed and delivered? 
 
The study will take a form of two case studies for which your agency will be one of them. 
The second case study is being drawn from a list of state-funded family support 
providers. The methods involved in this research will include interviews and focus 
groups. I am interested in having the opportunity to speak to your clients, and staff 
involved in direct client support, managerial staff and the management committee. 
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It is my hope that this project will contribute in promoting understanding of how program 
structuring under competitive tendering models is influencing the treatment of clients at 
the point of service delivery. It will also increase understanding of what kind of recipients 
benefit from the new program and service delivery arrangements. Thirdly, it will 
highlight ways in which organizations are responding to these new models of service 
delivery. 
 
All possible steps will be taken in the course of study to protect issues of privacy and 
confidentiality. In addition, your agency will have opportunity to comment on the draft 
report before it is publicly released. 
 
Thanking you in anticipation. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
Signed 
Pendo Mwaiteleke  
(BSW, Post-Grad Welfare Diploma, MA (Public Policy) 
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INVITATION LETTER 
 
Pendo Mwaiteleke 
C/O School of Social Work and Social 
Policy 
Curtin University of Technology 
Kent Street 
BENTLEY 
Ph: 08-9266 7681 (w) 9478 3570 (H) 
 
e-mail: 
mwaitelp@spectrum.curtin.edu.au 
 
Mr Michael Mills-Borley 
Swan Accommodation Services 
53 Northern Highway 
MIDLAND 
 
 
Dear Michael, 
 
As I briefly explained over the phone, I am a Lecturer in the School of Social Work and 
Social Policy at Curtin University I am currently undertaking research, exploring the 
impact of National Competition Policy (eg. competitive tendering and out-sourcing) on 
delivery of government-funded labour market programs and family support services. The 
study is part of my Ph D program being undertaken at Murdoch University. 
 
I understand that your agency receives funding from the Department of Family and 
Children Services (State) to support families in crisis with accommodation services. I 
also gather that your service has been there for a while, and has been a beneficiary of 
government funding under the old ‘grants’ funding model as well as the new Preferred 
Service Provider model. On basis of this criteria I would therefore like to formally extend 
an invitation for your agency to participate in my study. 
 
The study will focus on three major questions: 
-  How does the Preferred Service Provider model affect treatment of clients? 
-  Who gets what service? 
-  In what terms are services being accessed and delivered? 
 
The study will take a form of two case studies for which your agency will be one of them. 
The second case study is being drawn from a list of federally-funded Jobnetwork 
providers. The methods involved in this research will include interviews and focus   241 
groups. I am interested in having the opportunity to speak to your clients, and staff who 
are involved in direct client support, managerial staff and the management committee. 
 
It is my hope that this project will contribute in promoting understanding of how program 
structuring under competitive tendering models is influencing the treatment of clients at 
the point of service delivery. It will also increase understanding of what kind of recipients 
benefit from the new program and service delivery arrangements. Thirdly, it will 
highlight ways in which organizations are responding to these new models of service 
delivery. 
 
All possible steps will be taken in the course of study to protect issues of privacy and 
confidentiality. In addition, your agency will have opportunity to comment on the draft 
report before it is publicly released. 
 
Thanking you in anticipation. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
Pendo Mwaiteleke  
(BSW, Post-Grad Welfare Diploma, MA (Public Policy) 
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-  Appendix 3 - 
 
 
Pendo Mwaiteleke 
C/O School of Social Work and Social 
Policy 
Curtin University of Technology 
Kent Street 
BENTLEY 
Ph: 08-9266 7681 (w) 9478 3570 (H) 
 
E-mail: 
mwaitelp@spectrum.curtin.edu.au 
28 March 2001 
 
Celia Will 
Manager 
Peel Training Employment 
Mandurah 
 
 
Dear Celia, 
 
I would like to take this opportunity to thank you and your agency for accepting to 
participate in this study. As you advised, I will be speaking to your deputy, Mark Lawther 
to clarify how further arrangements might proceed. 
 
Upon your return, I will be requesting a brief written confirmation reiterating your 
agency’s acceptance in participating in this study. I will also be seeking clarification 
about access to any of the relevant internal agency client data, so that I am clear what 
rights I have in relation to using this information in my report. 
  
Thanks again for your cooperation, and I am looking forward to a continued productive 
working relationship.  
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
Signed 
Pendo Mwaiteleke  
(BSW, Post-Grad Welfare Diploma, MA (Public Policy) 
 
 
cc: Mark Lawther   243 
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Pendo Mwaiteleke 
C/O School of Social Work and Social 
Policy 
Curtin University of Technology 
Kent Street 
BENTLEY 
Ph: 08-9266 7681 (w) 9478 3570 (H) 
 
E-mail: 
mwaitelp@spectrum.curtin.edu.au 
29 October 2001 
 
Don Tuncliffe 
Swan Accommodation Services 
53 Northern Highway 
MIDLAND 
 
FAX:    9250 1513 
 
Dear Don, 
 
I am taking this opportunity to thank you and Swan Accommodation staff and the 
Management Committee Chair for the opportunity given for me to conduct my research 
work at your agency. I have started analyzing data and will be happy to share some of 
this information with your agency in the future, once my first draft report is completed. 
As indicated at the outset, we could organize a meeting in the future with a few 
representatives from your agency should you wish to provide any comment relating to a 
preliminary report.  
  
In the meantime, I will appreciate a brief letter from you reiterating your agency’s 
acceptance in participating in this study. It is simply the requirement of the University’s 
ethics policy that I keep a record of this documentation. In addition, if you have a new 
annual report or other statistical information I will appreciate looking at it. This is mainly 
general information on the statistical breakdown on types of clients you assist and the 
nature of services provided. 
 
  
I am looking forward to a continued working relationship.  
 
Thanking you in anticipation. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
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Pendo Mwaiteleke 
Lecturer, Curtin University  
(BSW, Post-Grad Welfare Diploma, MA (Public Policy)   247 
 
-  Appendix 7 – 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
SECTION A 
 
EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING FEDERALLY-FUNDED 
SERVICES (LABOUR MARKET PROGRAMS) 
 
i)  Direct staff providing employment and training support for ‘jobseekers’ 
(Jobnetwork service) 
ii)  Policy and management staff  (Jobnetwork) 
iii)  Clients – Employment & training (Labour market programs) 
  
 
Direct staff providing employment and training support for ‘jobseekers’ (Job 
Network service) 
 
Factors influencing tendering and contracting of services apart from the notion of 
competition 
 
Ways in which the current funding service criteria is accommodating client needs. 
 
Identifiable constraints of current model of service procurement in addressing perceived 
priority service gaps 
 
Treatment of clients under the new system 
 
Usefulness of JSCI tool in assessing client needs 
 
Formalised client activity agreements mandated by government funding contracts. 
 
Enforcement of mutual obligation. 
 
Incentives promised by the new system to focus encourage service providers broker ‘real 
jobs’.  
 
How competition amongst providers is encouraging improved results for your clients 
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Policy and management staff  (Job Network) 
 
For Profit Organisation/Not for Profit/ or Profit made to cross-subsidise other programs. 
 
Tendered program as a small single service/ or part of a large state/ nationwide network? 
 
Available documentation on aims and objectives of service. 
 
Funding structure relating to your program – Flex 1, 2 & 3. 
 
Description of program delivered in the context of the existing service contract? 
 
Target groups benefiting Flex 1, 2& 3. 
 
Designing eligibility criteria for Flex 1, 2& 3. 
 
Designing the assessment (JSCI) tool 
 
Organisational changes made to accommodate the current program framework 
 
Changes in client practice 
 
Opportunities and constraints under the new service framework 
 
Enforcement of mutual obligation. 
 
Program/ service cost structure 
 
Duration of current program contract funding. 
 
Policy advocacy relating to general clientele  
 
Opportunities in the sector to work with other service providers on issues of mutual 
interest 
 
How organisation adjusting to change 
 
 
Clients – Employment & training (Labour market programs) 
 
Age ……….Sex………. 
 
Unemployment duration………  
   249 
Support being receiving from this agency 
 
Category of service 
-  Flex 1 
-  Flex 2 
-  Flex 3 
 
Client obligations for continued receipt of income benefits. 
 
Client views on breaching system and mutual obligation. 
 
Range of choice regarding which Jobnetwork client may use. 
 
Activity agreement 
 
JSCI assessment 
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SECTION B   
 
A FAMILY SUPPORT SERVICE FUNDED BY THE STATE 
DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN SERVICES (FACS).  
 
i)  Management staff of Swan Accommodation Service 
ii)  Direct staff providing accommodation services at Swan Accommodation 
iii)  Clients 
 
Management staff of Swan Accommodation Service 
 
For Profit Organisation/Not for Profit/ or Profit made to cross-subsidise other programs. 
 
Programs funded by FaCS under PSP model 
 
Total funding currently received from FaCS   $………… 
 
Tendered program as a small single service/ or a large state/ nationwide network? 
 
Needs and characteristics of  target group. 
 
Current program funding. 
 
Target groups  
 
Designing program eligibility criteria 
 
Designing service delivery model 
 
Please, provide information on the tender criteria 
 
Organisational changes made to accommodate requirements of the new framework 
 
Changes in client practice in line with the new framework 
 
Identifiable opportunities and constraints with the new service framework 
 
Comment on the current program cost structure 
 
Agency policy advocacy function in the current context. 
 
Impact of contracting system on type of services offered.     251 
 
Program funded for………..years 
 
Direct staff providing accommodation services at Swan Accommodation 
 
Interview guide as per ‘Management staff of Swan Accommodation Service’ indicated above. 
 
Clients 
 
Occupation: 
 
Category of service received 
  -SEASAP 
  -Youth Shelter 
  -Family Shelter 
 
Support received from this agency 
 
Lengthy of time in receipt of Swan accommodation service 
 
Experience of using this service. 
 
How is the service currently meeting client needs 
 
Comments on responsiveness to client needs 
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-  Appendix 8 – 
Murdoch Letterhead 
 
CONSENT FORM  
 
Dear Participant, 
I am a PH D research student at Murdoch University and a lecturer at Curtin University. I 
am currently undertaking a research study exploring the impact of competitive tendering 
in providing government-funded services in employment and training programs (labour 
market programs) and family support services. 
 
The study looks at three major questions: 
-  How does the competitive tendering model affect treatment of clients? 
-  Who gets what service? 
-  Under what terms are services being accessed and delivered? 
 
Your contribution will involve participating in an interview, which will take a maximum 
of 1.5 hours. 
 
It is my hope that this project will contribute in promoting understanding of how the 
current policy changes are influencing the treatment of clients at the point of service 
delivery. It will also increase understanding of what kind of recipients benefit from the 
new program and service delivery arrangements. Thirdly, it will highlight ways in which 
organizations are responding to these new models of service delivery. 
 
All possible steps will be taken in the course of study to protect issues of privacy and 
confidentiality. 
 
My supervisor and I are happy to answer any questions you may have regarding this 
study.  Feel free to contact me on 08-9266 7681 or my supervisor A/Prof. Patricia Harris 
on 9360 6000. 
 
                             ******************* 
I………………………have read the information above. Any questions I have asked have been answered to 
my satisfaction. I agree to take part in this activity, however, I know that I may change my mind and stop at 
any time. 
 
I understand that all information provided is treated as confidential and will not be released by the 
investigator unless required to do so by law. 
 
I agree that research data gathered for this study may be published provided my name or other information 
that might identify me is not used. 
 
Signed……………………………………. 
Participant/Guardian/Authorised Agency Representative 
Date:……………………….   253 
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